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Abstract 
 
In this research I focus on courts in their roles as administrators and social policy 
actors. My research question is whether court administrative behavior alters policy 
outcomes. While Brown v. Board of Education researchers have typically explored the 
effectiveness of particular policy tools (e.g., busing, magnets, etc.), I focus here on the 
managerial and policy implications relative to how often and intensively courts use 
interventions.  In other words, I focus on judicial administrative behavior as a possible, if 
partial, systematic explanation for judicial impact.  
Using panel data of approximately 125 school districts, my linear findings suggest 
that court interventions do manifest an impact on policy. However, nonlinear models 
suggest that the effect of judicial behavior is bounded by degree; extreme degrees on the 
adjudicative/political powerbroker continuum (see Diver, 1979) may not correspond with 
positive policy impact.  The evidence from public school desegregation suggests that 
when one examines the question of degree, there are circumstances when judicial 
behavior closer by degrees to adjudication may be more effective than judicial behavior 
that is closer to political exchange.  
If, as many argue, the nation is as segregated now as a half-century ago, the 
implications of this study suggest that policy impact in this area of public governance 
may be related to the types of judicial behaviors used to govern desegregation policy.  If 
the nation decides once again to revisit the present incarnation of school segregation, 
should federal courts be the ones to pick up the oars as they did in such cases as Missouri 
v. Jenkins where the court played persistent administrative role for decades?  Or, should 
ix 
courts step back and steer, leaving particular desegregation policy choices to school 
administrators?  Before a governance arrangement can be supported that involves 
extensive court intervention, it should rest on empirical evidence of how courts have 
“rowed” in the past.  In testing a theory of impact based on the continuum between 
rowing and steering, I provide not only a study of interest for law and courts scholars, but 
broader lessons for governance that help move public administration beyond the largely 
dichotomous question of steering versus rowing. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
One type of book that practically no one likes to read is a book about the 
law.  Books about the law are notorious for being very difficult to read.  
This is one reason many lawyers make heaps of money.  The money is an 
incentive—the word “incentive” here means “an offered reward to 
persuade you to do something you don’t want to do” – to read long, dull, 
and difficult books.   
(Snicket & Helquist, 1999, p. 83-84). 
 
 
 
This dissertation is about law, policy, and management.  While certain parts of it 
may be “notoriously” analytical or technical, my incentive in writing this work is to 
further our understanding of the role that courts play in shaping policies that affect our 
lives.  Even as I presently write, the Supreme Court of the United States is hearing 
arguments in two elementary/secondary school cases –Seattle, WA and Louisville, KY—
concerning the role of race in public education.  Many have anticipated this day since 
2003 when the Court last dealt with this issue in the higher education Bollinger cases.  
Among other issues, these litigants are grappling with policies addressing evidence 
(Chemerinsky, 2002; Clotfelter, 2004; Frankenberg & Lee, 2002; Orfield & Bachmeier, 
1997; Orfield & Schley, 1994; Orfield & Yun, 1999) that schools are, at best, 
resegregating and, at worst, experiencing segregation levels rivaling those of 1950s—
despite some observations (Glaeser & Vigdor, 2001) that residential segregation actually 
declined over the last half-century. 
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In the Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306  (2003), public law school admissions 
case, the U.S. Supreme Court gave litigants hope that the issue of racial equality in 
education will once more be part of the national policy agenda. Some observers believe 
that the Grutter Court  “went beyond Brown in finding successful integration a necessity 
for the American economic system and even national security. Nothing so positive about 
the compelling necessity of interracial education had been said by the Supreme Court for 
three decades” (Orfield & Lee, 2004, p. 9 ).  Other scholars (Parker, 2002; Wicker, 1997) 
generally encourage this direction and have advocated the need to give courts more 
power and responsibility in realizing the Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 
U.S. 483  (1954) mandate that Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. (1960) declared to be the 
“joyous daybreak to end the long night of enforced segregation . . . transforming the 
fatigue of despair into the buoyancy of hope.” 
Even as litigants hold out hope that policy makers, especially courts, may 
someday fulfill the dream of Brown, others find equally compelling Gerald Rosenberg’s 
thesis in The Hollow Hope (1991) that the judiciary faces real constraints that prevent it 
from affecting social change, which they contend helps explain why Brown has gone five 
decades without true fulfillment. 
Centered on the theoretical and practical implications of this debate of judicial 
impact, my study addresses two intellectual audiences.  The first comprises those legal 
studies scholars and social scientists focused on understanding the potential of courts to 
impact public policy.  The second audience comprises social scientists concerned with 
public, administrative behaviors and actors.  To the first, I present a theoretically-driven, 
nation-wide, longitudinal study examining the impacts of a variety of court decisions on 
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policy outcomes.  For the second audience I empirically engage one of the important 
questions of New Public Management—whether good administrators steer or row—and 
present findings that a court’s managerial behavior does indeed matter to policy 
outcomes.  Both audiences considered together, I emphasize that litigants’ expectations 
of policy change as a product of judicial intervention should be carefully evaluated in the 
context of how courts “managed” desegregation in the decades following Brown.   
In sum, my research question is whether court administrative behavior alters 
policy outcomes over time. While Brown researchers have typically explored the 
effectiveness of particular policy tools (e.g., busing, magnets, etc.), I focus here on the 
managerial and policy implications relative to how interventions are used and the of role 
courts in using them.  My research question carries the potential to instruct a larger, 
unresolved debate surrounding the broader impact of courts on policy. 
Chapter 2 focuses on this larger debate, synthesizing the literature that serves as 
the foundation for my research.  Chapter 3 comprises a development of judicial impact 
theory, drawing, for example, on the scholarship of Montesquieu and Colin Diver (1979) 
to build empirical, hypotheses accounting for a spectrum of judicial administrative 
behaviors and policy impacts.  This spectrum accounts for courts that adjudicate and 
courts that reach beyond adjudicatory means as political powerbrokers. Chapter 4 details 
a secondary, longitudinal data that contain two variables of interest: judicial behavior and 
policy outcome.  The former, judicial behavior independent variable of interest is 
operationalized according to the frequency and intensity of court intervention over the 
course of observation (~1968-1986).  The latter, policy impact dependent variable is 
operationalized as measures of improvements in racial integration over time.  In addition 
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to data descriptions, Chapter 4 also describes the methods used to test the models 
analyzed in Chapter 5.  Chapter 5 reports the validity of  ‘judicial powerbroker’ 
hypotheses based on longitudinal models of judicial behavior relative to federal court 
involvement in desegregation pursuant to Brown. Based on the results reported in 
Chapter 5, Chapter 6 concludes with the policy and administrative implications of this 
work.  
While some note that “available research has not yet explained systematically 
why some Supreme Court rulings prevail over time, but others do not” (Marshall, 1989, 
p. 494), I focus on judicial administrative behavior as a possible, if partial, systematic 
explanation for judicial impact. If, as many argue, the nation is as segregated now as a 
half-century ago, I hypothesize that policy impact in this area of public governance may 
be related to the types of judicial behaviors used to govern desegregation policy.  If the 
nation decides once again to revisit the present incarnation of school segregation, should 
federal courts be the ones to pick up the oars as introduced in the Bollinger case?  Or, 
should courts step back and steer, leaving particular desegregation policy choices to 
school administrators?  Before a governance arrangement can be supported that involves 
extensive court intervention, it should rest on empirical evidence of how courts have 
“rowed” in the past.  In testing a theory of impact based on the continuum between 
rowing and steering, I introduce broader lessons for governance that help move public 
administration beyond the largely dichotomous question of steering versus rowing. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Debating the Impact of Courts 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe and contextualize the debate 
surrounding judicial impact on public policy.  In the first section I place the judicial 
impact debate within the broader context of policy studies.  My purpose in adding this 
context is to draw parallels between the approaches in the judicial impact research and 
the broader policy themes of incrementalism and rationalism.  In the second section, 
Boundaries of the Judicial Impact Debate, I explore the accomplishments and limitations 
of existing judicial impact research and argue that such research largely adheres to a 
dichotomy of either incremental or rationalistic approaches.  I conclude this chapter by 
introducing the need to theoretically and empirically bridge the dichotomy.   
Framing the Judicial Impact Debate 
 
One of the most fundamental debates in public policy, best articulated by Etzioni 
(1967, p. 385), is “to what extent social actors decide what their course will be, and to 
what extent they are compelled to follow a course set by forces beyond their control.”  In 
this dissertation I offer research focusing on an important set of social actors in this 
question:  federal courts.  My research raises questions about the role of courts in 
desegregation policy following Brown v. Board of Education (1954).  My research also 
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supplies implications for the field of public management by illuminating the 
‘administrative’ behavior and impact of the judiciary.   
The question is of great relevance as we consider the efficacy of courts in solving 
some of our most vexing social problems.  Komesar observes that when legislative, 
executive, and administrative decision making results in political malfunction,1 courts 
cannot act “without remaking the underlying societal decision.  Despite continuing claims 
by judges that they do not make legislative decisions or social policy, that is precisely 
what judicial review (no matter how it is defined) requires them to do.  As such, the 
judiciary’s ability to resolve the underlying societal decision becomes relevant” (1988, p. 
690).  
Judicial Impact and Policy Studies: Rational and Incremental Typologies 
 
In an effort to simplify navigation of the literature exploring the ‘ability’ of courts 
to resolve societal decisions, I begin in the tradition of many policy studies by identifying 
some typologies to help organize the chaos that so often characterizes decision-making in 
public policy.  Typologies, like models, “make it easier to remember the essence of 
complex intellectual arguments and offer the happy illusion that a matter has been settled 
by our betters” (Shafritz, Layne, & Borick, 2005, p. x).  Hogwood and Gunn (1984, p. 
43) observe that typologies are constructs “which nowhere exist in real life but which can 
help us to understand and explain real phenomena and to formulate or refine statements 
of what is desired.”   
                                                 
1 Which Komesar defines as “severe systemic under representation of a given interest” 
(1988, p. 690). 
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The use of typologies is particularly useful because the judicial impact literature 
represents an oft-shifting, historically-cyclical, and ever-heated debate surrounding the 
impact of courts on social policy.  Relying on a range of largely qualitative, rarely 
quantitative (Canon & Johnson, 1999, p. 180; Stephen L. Wasby, 1970),2 and 
comparative methods, researchers have nuanced and contrasted their arguments 
concerning the policy potency of the judiciary.3  The search for a theoretical and 
empirical understanding of the extent to which judges decide what the course of policy 
will be characterizes the efforts of these scholars.   
In addition to simplifying the judicial impact debate, applying policy typologies to 
the judicial impact research clarifies how the richness of the overarching policy control 
debate can be applied to the judicial impact question.  As a point of entry and 
organization, I reference a few typologies in this research synthesis that serve as 
foundation for a deeper understanding of judicial impact in policy decision making.   
The first typology champions rationalism as an approach to social control. 
Weber’s conception of bureaucracy as an organizational means of maximizing the 
rationality of authority and decision-making, and Simon’s description of a rational, if 
boundedly so, administrative man represent this tradition of policy decision-making.   
The second typology recommends incrementalism as an approach to social 
control.  Although Charles Lindblom shares Simon’s bounded rationality assumption, 
Lindblom’s (1959) classic “root” and “branch” approach yielded another tradition of 
                                                 
2   “much of what exists . . . is based on case studies of the effect of particular decisions in 
individual jurisdictions” (Stephen L. Wasby, 1970, p. 25-6). 
3 I am indebted to, and have drawn from, several insightful reviews (Canon & Johnson, 
1999; O'Leary, 1993a; Schultz, 1998b; Stephen L. Wasby, 1970) of particular aspects of 
this literature.  
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policy decision-making by contrasting an incremental, successive limited decision-
making (branch) with the orthodoxy of rational-comprehensive decision-making (root).  
Returning to the fundamental question posed at the beginning of this chapter, a key 
observation (Etzioni, 1967) from Lindblom’s work is that rational-comprehensive 
decision makers maintain a high degree of control within the policy environment.  
Incremental decision-models, on the other hand, ascribe much less control to decision 
makers.   
 Scholars succeeding Lindblom have used these contrasting typologies in myriad 
ways.  For public law scholars, Colin Diver sets synoptic and incremental decision-
making as the opposing boundaries of administrative law, which he defines as the “search 
for a theory of how public policy should be made” (1981, p. 393).  Diver elaborates that 
the space within the typologies’ boundaries is “the vast landscape we call 
policymaking—the reconciliation and elaboration of lofty values into operational 
guidelines for the daily conduct of society’s business” (1981, p. 393).  Returning to 
Hogwood and Gunn’s description of ideal typologies, the utility of the concepts of 
incrementalism and comprehensive rationality is not found in their actual existence, but 
in the idea that can serve as a point of entry or departure, a benchmark for deviations and 
comparisons.  Understanding the boundaries of the debate, or “ideal” types marking the 
spectrum’s ends, aids our comprehension of the views constituting the landscape between 
the poles.  The approach is not unprecedented (e.g., Rosenberg, 1991) as will be 
discussed later. 
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Defining Judicial Impact 
 
Before applying polar typologies to the judicial impact debate, I begin by briefly 
drawing attention to some of the meanings of “judicial impact.” A popular definition of 
judicial impact is Gerald Rosenberg’s where, in his focus on the Supreme Court, he 
describes judicial impact to be those reforms directly resulting in “policy change with 
nationwide impact” (Rosenberg, 1991, p. 4).  Wasby (1970)  is less exclusive in his 
definition and contemplates that judicial impact might also be indirect (see Figure 2.1).  
He ascribes judicial impact to include impact on lower courts, the public, and government 
officials.  
 
In drawing out implications of intervening judiciaries for public administration, 
authors like O’Leary and Koenig (1994) and Moe and Gilmour (1995) remind us that 
Figure 2.1 Understanding Direct and Indirect Impact of Courts 
adapted from Wasby (1970, p. 35) 
 
 
Public Officials & 
Administrators 
Lower Courts 
Supreme Court 
Public 
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judicial impact is not confined to the external relationships between courts and public 
decision makers.  O’Leary and Koenig (1994, p. 180) clarify  that law, including judge-
made law, is the “water in which public managers swim,” and that “public administration 
is produced within the law and at the same time is affected by the law.” 
A parallel argument illustrating the richness of the ‘judicial impact’ question can 
be found in the broader literature of organization studies.  In exploring the influence of 
law on organizations, Walter Powell poses the question “just how malleable is the law?” 
(1996, p. 960).  Relying on Scott’s (1995) categorization of institutions as normative, 
cognitive, and regulative, Powell concludes that  law’s influence and illumination of 
organizations potentially reaches far beyond the external, regulatory aspects.  Eschewing 
the ‘law and society’ view of ‘regulative’ law as ineffectual (e.g., Rosenberg’s Hollow 
Hope), Powell encourages organization scholars to consider, among other things, that 
“law is practiced in an organizational setting that shapes its conduct” and that “law serves 
as both a normative and a regulatory environment in which organizations operate” 
(Powell, 1996).   
 Facing the richness of the judicial impact literature, researchers have organized 
the impacts of the judiciary (direct and indirect) in a variety of ways.  For example, 
Canon and Johnson (1999, p. 193) parse the judicial impact question into (1) the contest 
of policy priorities between the Supreme Court and elected (especially Congress) 
branches; (2) the societal impact of courts, excepting the US Supreme Court, as policy 
makers, and (3) the role of courts in mobilizing public voice. 
This dissertation emphasizes a hybrid of the first two categories of Canon and 
Johnson’s conceptual framework.  I concern myself with the research question of whether 
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the judicial behavior of courts, federal district courts in particular, is associated with 
discernable social policy outcomes. 
Judicial Impact Typologies 
 
Returning to the typologies previously introduced, I argue that two powerful 
traditions provide useful boundaries.  One is a model of judicial impact where courts and 
judges have little impact on public policy.  In the broader tradition of incrementalism, 
judges under this typology have “much less command over the environment” (Etzioni, 
1967, p. 385).  This typology approximates the ‘law and society’ model that Powell refers 
to where law-on-the-books, including judge-made law, is ineffectual.   
The opposing typology models judicial impact where courts and judges 
significantly impact public policy.  Like the rationalistic approach, judges under this 
typology have a “high degree of control over the decision-making situation” (Etzioni, 
1967, p. 385).   
The incremental-rationalistic polar typologies have manifest themselves, if not 
explicitly, in much of the judicial impact literature.  For example, Rosenberg (1991) 
contrasts a dynamic court model with a constrained court model.  The dynamic court 
perspective contemplates the judiciary as “powerful, vigorous, and potent proponents of 
change” (1991, p. 2). The constrained court view, on the other hand envisions courts as 
“weak, ineffective, and powerless” (1991, p. 3) relative to social change.   
Prior to Rosenberg’s book, Horowitz (1977) also constructed, if implicitly, the 
policy control typologies as hinging upon the question of judicial capacity.  Discussed in 
greater detail below, Horowitz suggests that certain structural aspects of adjudication 
(e.g., the inability to ‘plan’ policy action as courts must rule on individualized 
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controversies brought by the litigants) leave courts devoid of the capacity necessary to 
control social policy.  Horowitz ascribes legislative and executive/administrative 
branches the more rationalistic elements of social control because of their capacity to 
plan, execute, and enforce their decisions. 
My reading of Barclay and Birkland (1998) suggests that the varying treatments 
of the concept of control under the rationalistic and incremental models are broadly 
reflected in the divergence of how public law and public policy scholars view courts as 
social policy actors.  Barclay and Birkland (1998: 231) describe public policy scholars as 
placing policy formulation and control beyond the traditional reach of courts.  Public law 
scholars, on the other hand, deem courts to be viable policy making institutions with 
control over creation, choice and implementation of policy alternatives (1998: 231).  
Ultimately, Barclay and Birkland prescribe an alignment between public law and public 
policy scholars.  They encourage public policy scholars to recast their apolitical 
conception of courts to reflect more of the empirical evidence of the judiciary’s political 
relevance.   
Clearly there are two aspects of Barclay and Birkland’s work: descriptive (what 
is/has been) and prescriptive (what ought to be).  Feeley (1989, p. 275) refers to this 
division as arguments of propriety—arguments founded in conceptions about how 
government powers and functions should be divided—and capacity.  While the line is not 
always clear between descriptive and prescriptive policy typologies (Hogwood & Gunn, 
1984), I am trying to focus as much as possible on descriptive models of judicial impact.  
Other studies have explained the historical, intellectual division of these streams (e.g., 
Friedman, 2005; Michelman, 1978) and have only recently proposed conceptual 
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frameworks to unite the two (Friedman, 2005).  For example, Friedman observes that the 
normative work of legal scholars should draw upon the richness of the positivist theory  
and approach, which “opens up a virtual playground for normative scholars in a field 
where at least some of the central debates have become stultified” (Friedman, 2005, p. 
337).  For this dissertation, my primary focus is not prescriptive models, or models that 
address the propriety of judicial intervention.  While the normative certainly influences 
the descriptive researcher, were that my focus I would confront a vast array of literature 
that focuses primarily on more normative theories of judicial review and activism, e.g., 
(Neely, 1981), rather than theoretical and empirical descriptions of judges’ 
historical/current impact on public policy.   
 I reiterate that review of the literature addressing the descriptive, judicial impact 
questions is couched between the two lenses discussed above: the rationalistic and 
incremental.  I do so to gather and encompass many of the typology approaches (e.g., 
constrained/dynamic court, court capacity v. lack of court capacity, public law v. public 
policy approach) within a broader framework, a family of theories about how much 
control particular actors have over their policy environments.  I see two benefits to this 
approach.  First, by grouping specific typologies into a rationalistic and incremental 
framework, I encourage a common language use that makes the judicial impact debate 
more accessible to other, related policy debates (e.g., impact of citizen groups on judicial 
intervention).  Second, generalizing the judicial impact debate in this way facilitates the 
importation of a rich tradition of relevant policy theories and models that nuance the 
rationalistic/incremental approach.  These include theories such as  punctuated 
equilibrium (Baumgartner & Jones, 1991, 1993), policy streams (Kingdon, 1984) and 
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garbage can models (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972), mixed-scanning approaches 
(Etzioni, 1967) and evolutionary change theory (John, 2003).  
Boundaries of the Judicial Impact Debate 
 
 Judicial impact studies have generally focused on individual cases.  They rarely 
systematically explore the particular effects of judicial activity on policy and 
administration over time within an agency or policy area.  This observation is supported 
by Wasby (1970), Taggart  (1989, p. 243), and O’Leary (1990).   
An empirical exception to this observation, O’Leary’s dissertation research (1990; 
1993a) includes a fine summary of many of these studies, and underscores the direct and 
indirect impacts of judicial influence.  Her review of the impact literature, as well as her 
own analysis of court influence on the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), confirm 
that a judge’s ability to change social policy falls along a continuum, both “multifaceted 
and complex” (O'Leary, 1993a, p. 170).  The continuum O’Leary observes can be framed 
between the rationalistic and incremental boundaries discussed above.  Where courts 
have less command over their policy environment (e.g., incremental), actions simply 
affirm the behavior of the EPA (O'Leary, 1993a, p. 170).  Court behavior at the 
rationalistic end of the continuum (i.e., more command over their policy environment) is 
responsible for “bringing about change in the agency’s policy and administration” 
(O'Leary, 1993a, p. 170).   
 I agree with O’Leary that judicial impact falls along a continuum.  However, I 
also observe that judicial impact studies can generally be bifurcated into those tending 
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towards a rationalistic description/view of court behavior, and those with an incremental 
description/view of court behavior.4  
 
Judicial Impact and Incrementalism  
 
Some researchers (e.g., Schultz, 1998a) have chosen the Federalist Papers as their 
point of entry into the incrementalist’s perspective of the judicial impact debate and as 
one of the older, if not best articulated, illustrations of the debate itself.  I begin with 
Montesquieu’s 1748 The Spirit of Laws, which, in expounding a theory of the separation 
of governing powers, explores implications of the judicial impact debate in history’s 
greatest societies.  Montesquieu’s insights were directly influential in the formation of the 
United States.  Referring to competition between legislative, executive and judicial 
powers, Hamilton’s 1788 writings draw upon Montesquieu’s observations that “of the 
three powers above mentioned, the judiciary is in some measure next to nothing”  
(Montesquieu, 1748: Book 11, Ch. 6; The Federalist Papers, No. 78).  Hamilton’s 
reasoning is relatively straightforward:   
The Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the 
community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes 
the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be 
regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the 
sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of 
the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be 
said to have neither force nor will, but merely judgment; and must 
ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy 
of its judgments (The Federalist Papers, No. 78). 
 
This view of the judiciary underscores the incrementalist’s pole in the debate: a judiciary 
whose relative social impact is constrained and innocuous.  Because policy control under 
                                                 
4 Using the terms in a slightly different sense, Feeley and Rubin (1998, p: 15-16) would 
add to classic analysis (i.e., rationalism) and incrementalism the mode of hermeneutics.  
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this approach is generally beyond the reach of the judiciary, the Hamiltonian view is 
more akin to an incremental, successive limited policy typology. 
 Scheingold’s (1974) articulation of the Hamiltonian view suggests that 
incremental-like limitations of court policy power are more a function of the judiciary’s 
temporal function.  Thus, even if a court successfully stipulates a right, political debate is 
likely to follow—drawing the policy influence away from the courts and to those political 
powers wielding purse and sword.  Whether intentional, Hannon’s review of 
Scheingold’s book emphasizes this language when he observes Scheingold’s inclination 
to view the right itself, even after articulated by a court, as “another political asset or 
weapon similar to money or status” (Hannon, 1975, p. 1070). 
 The most prolific contemporary advocate of a judiciary of limited policy 
influence is Gerald Rosenberg.  His 1991 book The Hollow Hope has become a focal 
point of the judicial impact debate.  As Rosenberg himself states, the book “hit a raw 
nerve” (1998, p. 253) by demonstrating the limitations of American courts to produce 
“significant social reform.”  For example, in commenting on the policy legacy of Roe v. 
Wade, Rosenberg observed that “Courts do not exist in a vacuum. Supreme Court 
decisions, even those finding constitutional rights, are not implemented automatically or 
in any straightforward or simple way.  They are merely one part of a broader political 
picture. In and of themselves, they accomplish little” (Rosenberg, 1995, pp. 192-93).   
Rosenberg’s conclusions are based on contrasting his own conception of the poles 
of the judicial impact debate.  Rosenberg’s dynamic court perspective contemplates the 
judiciary as “powerful, vigorous, and potent proponents of change” (1991, p. 2).  The 
Constrained court view frames courts as “weak, ineffective, and powerless” (1991, p. 3).  
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The latter model, which Rosenberg recommends as offering greater explanatory power, 
hypothesizes courts’ relatively weak impact can be accounted for by the following 
constraints (1991, pp. 13-21): (1) inherent nature of constitutional rights is that of 
limitation –courts are limited in giving voice to a broad range of social policies; (2) the 
judiciary’s dependence upon other branches; and (3) the paucity of judicial tools to effect 
policy development and implementation. 
In reconciling the Dynamic and Constrained views Rosenberg (1991, pp. 32-35) 
argues that while courts generally will not significantly impact policy because of the 
preceding constraints, they might happen upon windows of significant policy relevance if 
(1) other actors induce compliance through positive incentives or imposed costs, (2) 
market mechanisms provide sufficient apparatus for implementation of judicial decrees, 
or (3) those crucial to implementation are willing to act and are  induced to do so by the 
shield/cover/leverage of the judicial decree. 
Implicit in his “reconciliation” of both the constraints of the constrained court 
view and the conditions of the dynamic court is Rosenberg’s dissatisfaction with the 
dynamic court view and his assertion that a court’s social impact is entirely dependent 
upon exogenous factors, e.g., political and economic environment. In other words, 
Rosenberg argues that a court cannot, of itself, effect social change.  Even if all the 
conditions were to be met, a careful reading of Rosenberg suggests they would be 
satisfied not by the court, but by some other/non-judicial actor willing to 
induce/discourage compliance or by fortuitous market conditions.  Possibly on this 
premise, Rosenberg argues (1991, p. 30) that “while courts may be more effective in 
producing significant social reform than the constraints of the Constrained Court view 
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allow, the Dynamic Court view does not definitively demonstrate when, and under what 
conditions, court efficacy can be found.”  
Reflecting Hamilton’s view that the purse and sword of public policy are external 
to the judiciary, Rosenberg’s rationale is not entirely original.  In the decades preceding 
Rosenberg’s Hollow Hope many scholars perceived the difficulties courts faced in 
impacting social policy.   
With a general focus on both the “sword” and “purse” Robert Dahl (1957) 
empirically challenged the influence of the Supreme Court on separation-of-powers 
grounds.  Proposing a conception of a ruling-elite—comprising the popularly elected 
president and majority of Congress—Dahl challenged the traditional conception of the 
Court as a check on the popular branches of government.  For example, Dahl observed 
that even in the relatively few cases where the Court declared unconstitutional major 
policies of Congress (from 1790-1957), Congressional preference prevailed a majority of 
the time in subsequent iterations of the policy.  Dahl similarly argues that the ruling-elite 
conception of policy influence accounted for the general harmony that exists between the 
executive and judiciary.  Dahl (1957) concluded that courts are more often part of a 
majoritarian political leadership, a partner with rather than a check on the other branches.  
Dahl accorded courts some power in determining a policy’s reach and ultimate success, 
but that “by itself the Court is almost powerless to affect [the policy’s] course” (1957: 
293) 
With a general focus on the “sword”, Roscoe Pound’s 1917 enumeration of the 
Limits of Effective Legal Action noted that “laws will not enforce themselves. Human 
beings must execute them, and there must be some motive setting the individual in 
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motion to do this above and beyond the abstract content of the rule and its conformity to 
an ideal justice or an ideal of social interest” (p. 166).  Pound observed that during at 
least two stages of legal development, jurists generally ignored questions of legal 
enforcement thereby contributing to the present day divergence between “law in the 
books and the law in action” (p. 158).  Pound’s essay, a foundation for the legal realism 
movement, describes the enforcement gap’s role in accounting for the difference between 
law on the books and law in action. 
With a general focus on the “purse” in 1977 Donald Horowitz used four case 
studies to suggest that courts’ ability to effect social change is limited by their 
institutional composition and their capacity, or lack thereof, to marshal resources (e.g., 
resources for planning, information, and management and control) to address social 
problems.  He concludes that the judiciary’s unique process of focusing on individual 
litigation is what “unfits” (1977, p. 298) the judiciary for public policy work.  Horowitz’s 
reference to Benthem’s work is particularly enlightening on this note.  Benthem wrote 
that because a judge’s decree for society, which stems from a single case is but a “partial 
amendment [of the greater social problem, it] is bought at the expense of universal 
certainty; that partial good thus purchased is universal evil; and that amendment from the 
judgment seat is confusion” (cited in Horowitz, 1977, p. 2). 
While Horowitz’s analysis does not confirm total confusion, he does point out 
several factors (1977, pp. 256-74) that limit the thoughtful impact of judicial decisions on 
policy.  These are generally expressed as limitations of judicial capacity: 
• Restricted ability to assess policy costs, alternatives, and implementation 
environments. 
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• Confinement to redistribution of budgetary assets, as opposed to expansion of 
budgetary resources. Horowitz concludes after one case analysis that judicial 
impact’s “foremost obstacle . . . proved to be budgetary” (1977, p. 258). 
 
• “Limited capacity [of] the courts for sensing the relevance of social facts and for 
ascertaining them” (1977, p. 260), causing a severance of those facts that are 
contextually related and the merger of those facts that are contextually unrelated. 
 
• Neglect of those interests expressed less formally than those conversant in legal 
language and relationships. 
 
• Limited administrative capacities (e.g., manpower, patience for periodic 
monitoring of consequences, supervision of implementation, managerial aptitude). 
 
In keeping with the incrementalist perspective of a judiciary’s command of its 
policy environment, many have refined or amplified the implications of limited judicial 
capacity.  Stewart and Sunstein (1982) ultimately favor courts entertaining rights of 
action and initiation against administrative agencies but observe that “enthusiasm for 
judicial remedies must be tempered by an acknowledgement of the considerable 
limitations.  [C]ourts apprehend and implement only a few of the various possible 
conceptions of institutional purpose [of complex administrative schemes]” (1982, p. 
1319).  Whether courts actively choose or are externally influenced to reach beyond their 
traditional capacities in crafting remedies, they may initiate an order that compels 
administrative action to a degree that is impossible to enact due to paucity of 
administrative resources (Frug, 1978); “courts can do little to resolve such an impasse” 
(Stewart & Sunstein, 1982, p. 1283).  Because of these capacity limitations, Stewart and 
Sunstein recommend the Hamiltonian purse and sword argument: “Congress [purse] and 
the President [sword] should be  . . .encouraged to develop nonjudicial methods for 
controlling administrative authority” (1982:  p. 1319). 
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Empirical studies offer some support.  For example, Taggart (1989) studied the 
capacity of courts to influence the purse powers of legislatures.  He did this by analyzing 
the impact of courts on state expenditures for corrections.  Using a quasi-experimental, 
time-series design, Taggart modeled total and operating expenditures as a function of, 
among other things (e.g., measures of budgetary dynamics), court intervention.5  
Although some of Taggart’s modeling suggests that court intervention has statistically 
significant explanatory power, Taggart  ultimately concludes (1989, p. 267) that the 
collective influence of courts on state corrections budgets is “almost non-existent” and 
that the dynamics of state budgeting have far more explanatory power than judicial 
intervention. 
Moving beyond the capacity argument, Komesar (1988) recommends economic 
and institutional analyses to reveal when the benefits of judicial intervention are greater 
than the costs of political malfunction (see Chapter 2, fn 1).  Komesar is sensitive to the 
limitations of courts, but recommends analyzing, simultaneously, the capabilities of 
political decision makers as well.  With this calculus, Komesar comes up with a narrow 
list of circumstances where court capabilities, even if limited, can remedy severe political 
malfunction.  Ultimately, however, Komesar observes that no matter how aggressive a 
judiciary, they are physically constrained to reach and influence only a miniscule number 
of policy decisions.  “Moral evolution, discovery of national principals, and search for 
civic virtue---whatever those terms mean—are not dominated by the judiciary because 
they cannot be” (Komesar, 1988, p. 659). 
                                                 
5 Where court intervention was expressed as a binary, dummy variable.  
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More recent analyses ( Wise & Christensen, 2001, 2005) have paid particular 
attention to the capacities of administrative programs, and state and federal courts in 
determining the relative impact of the judiciary.  Because of the limitations of federal 
courts to manage public programs, Wise and Christensen suggest, among other things, 
that a careful and simultaneous assessment of the capacities of courts--state and federal--
and administrative programs precede federal courts intervening in public service 
provision.  Relevant questions include the following: 
First, can the [federal] court fulfill the informational requirements, both 
technical and political, that would enable it to effect a successful remedy? 
Second, will the court have sufficient time to frame and reformulate the 
remedy and conduct as it supervises the institutions involved? Third, are 
the communication tools available to the court effective? Fourth, are the 
powers available to the court sufficient to gain cooperation among the 
multiple actors? Fifth, is there an identifiable goal for the remedy and a 
foreseeable end to judicial supervision of the institution? ( Wise & 
Christensen, 2005, pp. 591-92) 
 
 
Negative answers to these questions implicate federal judicial abstention.  These 
doctrines constitute the authority granted by the US Supreme Court to lower federal 
courts to abstain from hearing certain cases.  At the heart of the judicial doctrine of 
abstention is the recognition that the federal judiciary, as Rosenberg and others point out, 
often lacks the capacity to improve the execution of public policy.   
 Underpinning the capacity questions raised by Wise and Christensen above, many 
scholars, building upon Pound and Horowitz’s traditions, provide insight into these 
judicial limitations.   
 One of the more intuitive limitations of an intervening judiciary’s ability to 
impact policy comprises courts operating beyond their traditional realm of action and 
authority.  This particular limitation forms the basis for theory building in chapter 3.  For 
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the present, Stephen Yeazell’s (1977, p. 259) memorable observation concerning judicial 
intervention in the delivery of public education illustrates this point: “once one 
comprehends that the court is displacing the [school] board . . . the occasionally circus-
like quality of the hearing becomes more explicable, if not more orderly. It doesn’t, as the 
judge has remarked upon occasion, look much like a court, and for good reason: it really 
isn’t one.”  William Fletcher’s (1982) analysis of institutional reform litigation confirms 
that intervening judges, most fluent in the tools of legal rules and precedent, frequently 
confront political and bureaucratic territory where legal rule and reasoning bears little 
influence. Lon Fuller (1978, p. 363) supplies some insight in identifying judicial 
adjudication (the contest of legal proofs and reasoned arguments) as but one form of 
problem resolution that stands in contrast to contract-based (negotiation) and election-
based (voting) social ordering.  Yeazell (1977) assesses that the complexity of reforming 
public institutions necessitates multiple actors and approaches (e.g., contract, election and 
adjudication) that, in addition to adjudicative mechanisms, require negotiation, political, 
technical, and scientific mechanisms, all competencies beyond a judge’s legitimate 
control.  These problems are referred to by Yeazell and Fuller as polycentric problems, “a 
complex problem with a number of problem ‘centers,’ each is related to the others, such 
that the solution to each depends on the solution to all the others” ( Wise & Christensen, 
2001, p. 115; Yeazell, 1977).   
Judges operating beyond their typical competencies often face practical 
limitations.  Yeazell outlines these limitations from a comparative perspective 
(comparing judges to political actors).  
First, courts are less able than the political branches to apprise themselves 
of the “legislative facts’ necessary to understand questions of public 
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policy.  Second, since courts normally enforce their judgments by 
compulsory process without a significant opportunity for reversal or 
modification by private parties affected by these judgments, they are less 
likely than other governmental decisionmakers to solve and re-solve a 
polycentric problem until an optimum solution is found.  Third, since 
institutional decrees necessarily entail a great deal of discretion in their 
formulation, and since discretionary behavior is largely beyond the power 
of an appellate body to control, the primary means of external control over 
trial court behavior is virtually useless.  Finally, and most important, 
courts have no institutional authority to assess normatively the ends of 
possible solutions to non-legal polycentric problems (1977, p: 641). 
 
With these limitations in mind, the authors reviewed here concede that “there are 
polycentric elements in almost all problems submitted to adjudication.” (Fuller, 1978, p. 
397).  However, they emphasize that the key to navigating the limitations of judicial 
influence on policy is discerning when the non-adjudicative “elements have become so 
significant and predominant that the proper limits of adjudication have been reached” 
(1978, p. 399).   
Peter Schuck (1983) articulates three ideologies that underpin the assessment of 
when courts might become involved in institutional reform.  These methods of 
intervention are pure rights vindication, where programmatic elements are downplayed in 
favor of courts vindicating individuals’ rights; judicial interpretivism, where judicial 
management of institutional remedies is allowed because courts are viewed as best suited 
to actualize legal rights and values even if not best suited to manage structural changes; 
and institutional competition, where non-judicial institutions play a critical role in 
working along side courts to actualize legal rights and values.  Affirming the polycentric 
arguments of Fuller and Yeazell, Schuck (1983, p. 178) ultimately rejects the former two 
propositions, noting that institutional competition alone facilitates assimilation of 
“conflicting goals, limited resources, political and ideological struggle, and human and 
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institutional imperfections . . . into social reality.”  In other words, Schuck’s 
recommendation of institutional competition seems to be founded in its sensitivity (in 
contrast to pure rights vindication and judicial interpretivism) to the balancing of 
adjudicative and non-adjudicative elements recommended by Fuller. 
Failure to be sensitive to this balance by exceeding the adjudicative role 
comprises the judiciary’s limited impact on policy and can follow three scenarios: 
First, the adjudicative solution may fail.  Unexpected repercussions make 
the decision unworkable; it is ignored, withdrawn, or modified, sometimes 
repeatedly.  Second, the purported arbiter ignores judicial proprieties – he 
“tries out” various solutions in posthearing conferences, consults parties 
not represented at the hearings, guesses at facts not proved and not 
properly matters for anything like judicial notices.  Third, instead of 
accommodating his procedures to the nature of the problem he confronts, 
he may reformulate the problem so as to make it amendable to solution 
through adjudicative procedures” (Fuller, 1978, p. 401).   
 
The scenarios raised by Fuller each implicate the perspective that courts are limited in 
their ability to effect sound policy.   
John Yoo (1996) offers insight into why an adjudicative solution to polycentric 
policy making might fail.  He observes while judicial organizations are experienced in 
assessing legal causation and establishing legal fact, courts are limited in adjudicating a 
solution that will reach non-adjudicative needs because polycentric problems require 
predictions about how judicial remedies will interact with non-legal dynamics (e.g., 
social, political, economic).  As highlighted in Fuller’s scenarios, courts that proceed in 
this pursuit run the risk of circumventing  the solutions that political/majoritarian actors 
and administrative organizations might bring to bear upon the problem (Mishkin, 1978; 
Yoo, 1996).  Paul Mishkin explains that an adjudicative remedy to polycentric problems  
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inevitably involves allocation of state resources.  To such decisions, the 
more abstract problems, possible countervailing considerations, and 
possible competing claims are all highly relevant.  There is nothing in the 
nature of litigation which necessarily brings these matters out, or indeed, 
which provides a good vehicle for their development even if tried (1978, 
p. 965).   
 
Returning to the rational-incremental ideal types, these authors all suggest that 
judges are consigned to an incremental role, the construction of social reality beyond the 
realm of the adjudicator’s influence.  Lee Epstein’s empirical work offers some 
affirmation of this conclusion.  For example, in their review of US Supreme Court 
constitutional civil rights decisions from 1953 to 1992, Epstein, Knight, and Martin 
(2004) found that justices’ decision making patterns reflect an awareness of their context 
of majoritarian/political preferences.  Lending support to Schuck’s institutional 
competition proposition, Epstein et al.’s (2004, p. 186)  analysis and conclusions illustrate 
an incremental perspective of judicial policy control, reinforcing that 
justices understand they will be unable to generate efficacious decisions---
decisions that other actors will respect and with which they will comply—
unless they are attentive to the preferences of those other actors and the 
institutions that structure the Court’s interactions with them.  [G]iven the 
institutional constraints imposed on the Court, justices cannot effectuate 
their own policy goals—whether they accord or collide with the ruling 
regime’s—without taking into account the goals and preferences of the 
other branches.  Justices find the best way to have a long-term effect on 
the nature and content of the law is to adapt their decisions to the 
preferences of these others.   
 
Neal Devins’s work also establishes this conclusion.  In analyzing the decisions of 
the Rehnquist Court from 1995 to 2003, Devins (2004, p. 199) concludes that “while the 
Court helps shape popular and elected government discourse, the Court must operate 
within parameters established by elected officials. For this very reason, decisions 
invalidating federal and state legislation are usually tied to signals sent to the Court by 
 Chapter 2 27 Christensen 
 
elected officials and the American people.”  Devins’s work reiterates that cognizant 
courts should understand their policy limitations and behave accordingly—with 
deference to other, political actors with influence over polycentric policy problems.  
In many respects, Devin’s work echoes Shep Melnick’s classic work two decades 
previous.  While Melnick (1983) allows that courts have deeply impacted program 
outcomes (e.g., diminished agency ability to implement and adapt their own directives), 
he emphasizes that such impact occurs within, and is dependent upon, a broader political 
context (e.g., with Congress’s blessing).   
 Even if one accepts Schuck’s institutional competition model for judicial 
intervention, a model more sensitive to the polycentric nature of problems, Colin Diver 
warns that judiciaries “competing” to the point of exceeding their adjudicative role run 
into another policy limitation.  Diver (1979) observes that some judges, wanting to be 
effective in reforming public institutions, behave beyond their adjudicative role (Fuller’s 
second scenario) and become broker/bargainers, competing for policy powers against 
other non-judicial actors.  Seeking political power to affect the institutional remedies to 
vindicate rights, judge-brokers are taken up in the political institutional remedies 
perspective at the expense of the adjudicative, legal rights perspective for which they 
were trained (Diver, 1979, p. 104).  So doing, Diver uncovers a paradox: judge-brokers 
lose legitimacy and, by implication, loss of influence of the policy problem that the court 
was trying to direct.  As the judicial-political bargaining relationship progresses and 
lengthens, which it often does in judicial power brokering situations (e.g.,  Wise & 
O'Leary, 2003), the judge loses legitimacy to participate in the policy solutions and can 
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draw “less and less on the reserve of authority that the revered position of neutral 
lawgiver confers” (Diver, 1979, p. 106). 
 In concluding this section I return to Rosenberg to highlight a specific application 
of the incremental view of court control over policy to Brown desegregation policy.  
Rosenberg primarily uses historical/qualitative analyses to emphasize that the ability of 
courts to effect social change is extremely limited. In commenting on Civil Rights policy, 
Rosenberg asserts that “in terms of judicial effects . . . Brown and its progeny stand for 
the proposition that courts are impotent to produce significant social reform” (1991, p. 
71) Specifically contemplating the legacy of Brown, Rosenberg emphasizes this point: 
“courts and their decisions are part of broader social currents.  On their own they can do 
little to alter those currents.  In Brown, the Supreme Court jumped in and was swept 
along with the rest of the country.  Brown was a small rivulet flowing into a sea of 
change” (interviewed in Ryan, 2004: 2).   
 Rosenberg and the incremental view of court control are not without detractors.  
What Rosenberg views as judicial ‘rivulets’ of influence, others view as torrents of 
judicial pressure with the ability to change policy outcomes.  
 
Judicial Impact and Rationalism 
 
 
 To contextualize how Rosenberg’s critics differ in their conclusions, it is 
important to articulate how they differ in their approaches. 
Canon and Johnson’s (1999) Judicial Policies: Implementation and Impact stands 
as one of the more widely read criticisms of Rosenberg.  Canon and Johnson bring to the 
forefront aspects of judicial behavior supporting a conception of the judiciary that 
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challenges incremental policy influence.  They recommend to their readers that the 
judiciary often behaves as a rational-comprehensive decision maker, maintaining a high 
degree of control within various policy areas.  One of the main ways they construct this 
argument (see chapters 2-4) is to broaden and articulate a scope of inquiry that includes at 
least four, potentially impacted populations: interpreting, implementing, consumer, and 
secondary.  Each of these actors, in turn, “may respond to a judicial policy” individually 
and collectively shaping the ultimate impact of the judge’s decision (Canon & Johnson, 
1999, p. 17-18).  Like Wasby (1970, see also Figure 2.1) before them, Canon and 
Johnson’s scope of inquiry is broader than Rosenberg’s, and implicates the indirect 
influence that a judiciary can have over policy.  Michael McCann, another one of 
Rosenberg’s critics, expounds on this point, emphasizing that Rosenberg’s conclusions 
about judicial influence are not surprisingly impotent and incremental because he 
excludes “a far broader set of complex legal manifestations and dynamics,” favoring a 
“top-down, linear judicial impact focus” (1996, p. 480). 
Another material criticism of Rosenberg’s approach is his exclusion of lower 
courts—an exclusion accounted by others, including Wasby (1970, see Figure 2.1), 
Canon and Johnson (1999), and McCann (1996).  These authors also criticize 
Rosenberg’s temporal framework.  Canon and Johnson’s inquiry includes analysis of 
immediate and later responses (e.g., 1999, p. 4-9), while McCann’s (1996, p. 480)  round 
chastisement of Rosenberg’s temporal approach includes geographic delimiters as well: 
“the expectation that courts must unilaterally generate in a short time behavioral changes 
across the nation that uniformly comply with specific legal mandates to qualify as 
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“significant” impacts connotes a standard so high as to assure its own negative 
conclusion.”   
Jonathan Casper’s work (1976) reminds us that the exchange between Rosenberg 
and his critics is neither new nor novel.  Using many of the same arguments, proponents 
of rationalistic judicial impact such as Jonathan Casper criticized the more incremental 
approaches of Robert Dahl’s work decades before Rosenberg’s work.  Casper argued that 
Dahl’s conception of judicial influence is overly limited and that “even in Dahl’s own 
terms, he does not take account of the Court’s influence on public policy” (1976, p. 63), 
but focuses on a dichotomous, policy winners/losers approach that subverts the broader 
scope of judicial influence.  Casper observes that in most cases, the Supreme Court does 
not immediately (i.e., within Dahl’s four year window) declare Congressional policies 
unconstitutional.  Thus, Casper argues that Dahl missed many instances (roughly 70 
percent) of the Court’s policy influence over Congress.  John Gates (1992) offers an 
alternative perspective of Dahl’s ruling-elite hypothesis that recasts courts as highly 
influential policy players.  Gates, in his study of judicial review of states’ policies, asserts 
that the Supreme Court plays an important catalyst role in re-aligning the ruling-elites.  
Chayes (1976) also illustrates an avenue contrary to the ruling-elite hypotheses by 
observing that the nature of judicial appointment actually insulates judges from certain 
political pressures of conformance, allowing them to more freely influence policy than 
Dahl would suggest.  In short, scholars like Chayes and Gates ascribe a much more active 
role to the Court than Dahl’s passive description of the Court taking its cues from the 
dominant political powers.   
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Canon and Johnson (1999, p. 198) likewise conclude that in policies contested 
between courts and “the purse,” courts wield significant influence ranging from a matter 
of years to a full generation before Congress asserts its iteration of policy direction.  In 
addition to reviewing literature on  the mixed, but undeniable, influence of lower courts 
(1999, p. 199-204), Judicial Policies ultimately concludes that Rosenberg’s hypotheses 
were misguided.  For example, although lacking the powers of the purse and sword, 
Canon and Johnson (1999: 216) argue that “the courts’ dependence on the other branches 
is only important when the other branches must help the court implement a reform . . . 
clearly this is not always the case.”  Indeed, Canon and Johnson (1999, p. 211-15) assert 
that the Supreme Court has initiated major policy movements in many areas over the last 
50 years including criminal justice, reapportionment, religious issues in public education, 
abortion, pornography, and freedom of  commercial speech (i.e., professional 
advertising).  
With general reference to the context of policy making, Kagan (2001) has argued 
the rise of adversarial legalism—that policy making is increasingly articulated on the 
adversarial stages of common law courts, giving the judiciary increasing power in 
defining policy.  Nathan Glazer’s essays (1975; 1978) during the 1970s spoke of a 
seemingly irreversible trend of an “imperial judiciary.”  While pleading for judges to 
withdraw from judicial activism, he observes the courts’ “far reaching decisions – [as] 
estimated by the impact on people and their everyday lives” (Glazer, 1975, p. 106).  
Indeed, Glazer notes (1975, p. 108) that even the check that is the legislature “no longer 
controls the purse, if the Court rules otherwise.”  In his 1978 article, Glazer doesn’t 
question the impact of the judiciary, but whether the impact is desirable (pg. 80).  His 
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rationale is based on the notion that judicial intervention actually impacts policy by 
reducing the capacity of administrators (pg. 80).  
Building on the notion of judicial impact via the capacity of administration, the 
literature of public administration has been particularly helpful in documenting the 
influence of courts on policy.  For example, Rosemary O’Leary’s Environmental Change 
(1993a) empirically documents that courts very often take first seat in policy control 
because of conflicting political and social contexts.  In her 1980s study of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), O’Leary found that the EPA was often more 
influenced by federal court decisions than by political directives.  O’Leary’s findings 
were based on an analysis of over 2,000 federal court decisions spanning 1970-1988.  She 
classified these cases across a matrix of influence: judicial decisions upholding EPA 
action to judicial decisions actively seeking to alter environmental policy. O’Leary linked 
each of these decisions to agency response and judicial follow-up.  While she noted a 
range of judicial behavior, from passive to aggressive, O’Leary discovered that from both 
the agency and individual civil servant level, compliance with court decisions had 
become priority (1990, p. 561-62).   
Spriggs (1996) tests hypotheses similar to O’Leary’s in a different empirical 
manner but against a broad array of federal agencies.  Using ordered probit regression, 
Spriggs tests a multivariate model of the impact of every Supreme Court opinion 
reversing or remanding a federal agency decision from the 1953 through 1990 terms.  
Spriggs identifies broad judicial policy influence but observes that policy change after 
Court opinions is influenced by the specificity of Supreme Court opinions, agency policy 
preferences, agency age, and amicus curiae support.  Relative to administrative policy 
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impact, the focus of O’Leary’s work, Spriggs (1996, p. 1143) observes that “it is unlikely 
that agencies can expect Congress or the president to protect their overturned policies 
from the Court.”  This suggests a nuanced picture of Hamilton’s purse and sword 
critique, where the judiciary often wields both of these powers over agencies relatively 
untroubled by the political branches.  
Extending empirical inquiry to a rich case of social policy, O’Leary and Wise 
(1991;  Wise & O'Leary, 2003) analyzed the Missouri v. Jenkins desegregation litigation 
to establish that courts are “senior” partners in the triumvirate of judges, legislators, and 
managers.  In the face of state constitutional provisions to the contrary, judicial impact in 
this litigation included court-ordered increases in property taxes.  The Supreme Court 
affirmed and Kansas City School District #33 continued its nearly three-decade 
relationship with a supervising federal district court.  In reviewing the actions and 
impacts of Judges Clark and Whipple, O’Leary and Wise’s analysis of judicial impact on 
policy thus runs counter to Rosenberg’s judicial impotence presumption, and directly 
opposes Rosenberg’s second “constraint.”  The rationalistic-like reach of the court altered 
the operation and administration of the school district.   
Parallel to O’Leary’s observations in the EPA, adherence to successive iterations 
of desegregation mandates became District #33’s “top priority, at times overshadowing 
its educational mandate” (O'Leary & Wise, 1991, pp. 322-23).  Other policy outcomes 
include a restructuring of the “priorities, implementation, interorganizational relations, 
and accountability mechanisms” of the institution, with court orders becoming “sole 
components of the district’s strategic plan” (O'Leary & Wise, 1991, pp. 322-23).  Again, 
in stark contrast to the incremental conception of judicial influence, where the judge is a 
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junior partner to the purse and sword, the Jenkins case empirically describes a situation 
where the “senior judicial partner is in the position to arrange decision-making power” 
and local and state executive, legislative and administrative officials are “very much in a 
junior partner position” (O'Leary & Wise, 1991, pp. 325). 
 The Jenkins case finds broad support among the empirical and theoretical 
investigations of public administration.  For example, scholars have explored judicial 
impact on public budget decisions and discretion (Frug, 1978; Hale, 1979; Harriman & 
Straussman, 1983; Horowitz, 1977; Straussman, 1986), agency decision and rulemaking 
processes (Bazelon, 1976; Cooper, 1988; O'Leary & Weiland, 1997; David H. 
Rosenbloom, 1987), liability (O'Leary, 1993b; David H. Rosenbloom, 1987; David H. 
Rosenbloom, Carroll, & Carroll, 2000), organization direction and control  (Koenig & 
O'Leary, 1996; Malmsheimer & Floyd, 2004; O'Leary, 1990, 1993a; O'Leary & 
Straussman, 1993; O'Leary & Wise, 1991), property takings and eminent domain 
(Emerson & Wise, 1997; C. R. Wise & Emerson, 1994), and oversight termination ( Wise 
& O'Leary, 2003).  Some of these points are expanded below. 
For example, speaking to the structure, operation, and immunity of the 
administrative state, Rosenbloom (1983; 1997) and Wise and O’Leary (1993a; 1991) 
have long contended that the judiciary has played a major role in retrofitting the civil 
service within constitutional schemes.  Rosenbloom concludes that the impact has been 
profound.  Where administrators once enjoyed immunity, the courts have played a major 
role in creating an administrative environment “governed by constitutional law” (D. H. 
Rosenbloom, 2000, p. 45).  Several examples illustrate this observation.  In an area of 
institutional reform litigation stemming from the common law case Brown v. Board of 
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Education  (1954), O’Leary and Wise (1991) emphasize that the judiciary is often the 
most powerful partner in the partnership of managers, judges, and legislators.  The theme 
of a judiciary shaping and directing civil service is emphasized again by Hamilton (1999) 
in the area of civil service patronage.  Hamilton calls to the attention of public 
administration scholars and practitioners the influence of the relatively recent evolution 
of common law in prohibiting consideration of political association in the decision to 
hire, promote, terminate, or grant contracts. 
Hamilton’s study illustrates the broader impact of the judiciary on personnel 
relative to civil rights; Hamilton’s own example largely focuses on civil servants’ First 
Amendment right of political association.  Beyond freedom of association, courts have 
been particularly influential in regulating a host of personnel decisions using the broad 
civil rights provisions of the Constitution and the civil rights statutes.  Today, common 
law interpretations of civil service issues are frequently founded on the rights of free 
speech; religion; privacy; procedural and substantive due process; and equal protection 
(DiNome, Yaklin, & Rosenbloom, 1999; C. Wise, Clemow, Murray, Boston, & Bingham, 
1999).  For example, Wise et al. (1999) illustrate that workplace searches of public 
employees will be governed by judicial interpretation of the Fourth Amendment privacy 
standards.   
 Another area of judicial influence illustrated by the Jenkins case is the area of 
fiscal powers and policy.  As indicated above, specific to public budgetary discretion, 
several scholars have generally challenged the observation that courts lack the power of 
the purse.  Scholars including Chayes (1976),  Glazer (1975), Frug (1978), and Feeley 
(1989) observe that in many circumstances courts widely exercise the power of spending 
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in the course of regulating policy provision and reforms.  The latter two suggest the 
broadest influence, and Feeley’s work stands in direct opposition to Taggat’s (1989) 
findings discussed above.  In his review of Southern prison reform cases, Feeley (1989, p. 
280-81) asserts that federal courts “have altered the vision and often the guiding 
principles of corrections officials and have helped re-shape the structure and organization 
of jails and prisons.”  In Hale’s (1979, p. 363) study, he observes that court intervention 
influences budget and program decisions to the extent a majority of corrections officials 
responded that judicial rulings forced an alteration or creation of programs.  Harriman 
and Straussman (1983) empirically confirm Hale’s conclusions, arguing that states have 
historically allocated more money for corrections in response to judicial intervention.  
Also relevant to fiscal powers and policy, Wise (2001) finds that the Court’s 
interpretations in Commerce Clause power and Spending Clause policy rulings, areas of 
policy particularly relevant in our current mode of government-by-contract, are highly 
influential in the direction and latitude of state government operations. 
Bertelli and Feldmann (forthcoming) imply that judicial influence, by the 
adversarial nature of institutional reform, remains high even if judges were to behave 
neutrally towards policy outcomes.  Using spatial bargaining modeling, they propose a 
theoretical argument that courts facilitating structural reform litigation shape bureaucratic 
direction, relatively insulated from legislative direction.  Prior evidence (O’Leary and 
Wise, 1991) confirms that in these public service configurations of the triumvirate of 
judges, administrators, and legislators, judges maintain primary influence.   
 Returning to the substantive issue of this dissertation, school desegregation, 
Rosenberg’s critics offer a more rationalistic view of Rosenberg’s conclusions about 
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Brown:  contrary to Rosenberg’s implicit hypothesis, desegregation legislation (e.g., 1964 
Civil Rights Act) did not rise up independently from Brown, but was highly influenced 
by the Brown decision.  This raises a point recommended by Marc Galanter (1983, p. 
126): court influence over policy can take the form of “strict imposition of controls,” a 
measure Rosenberg relies upon almost exclusively, but it can also take the form of 
brokering information, often providing catalyst for policy mobilization.   
David Schultz and Stephen Gottlieb (1998) provide a good deal of insight into 
this point.  In articulating the role of legal realism/functionalism in the judicial impact 
debate, they observe that “what is critical about Brown, Roe, Baker, and other similar 
decisions is how they reshaped choices, expectations, institutions, and structures.  In this 
respect, American politics was significantly different the day after these decisions 
because the Court granted legitimacy to certain claims, attached legal support or 
approbation to certain actions, or otherwise defined new roles for itself or for other 
institutions to follow” (Schultz & Gottlieb, 1998, p. 181).  In contrast to the relatively 
short temporal framework and direct imposition of controls inherent in Rosenberg’s 
analytical lens of desegregation policy, his critics suggest that “it is not necessary that we 
document the power of the court on large numbers; that Brown reflected the law of the 
land could have considerable significance through a small change in the numbers of 
unbelievers who nevertheless believed that public officials should obey the law” (Schultz 
& Gottlieb, 1998, p. 180).  Empirical support for the functional role of judicial influence 
is found in the work of John Bohte, Roy Flemming, and B. Dan Wood (1998).  These 
authors document the influence of Supreme Court decisions on media attention – how 
frequently and for what length of time judicial policies were covered.  They conclude that 
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judicial media attention is highest when judicial policies contest ground articulated by the 
political branches of government.  They note that this finding stands in direct contrast to 
the conditions that Rosenberg set as most conducive to policy change, i.e., when 
decisions are in harmony with political branches. 
Several recent empirical studies of court impact on desegregation policy enforce a 
more rationalistic view of judicial policy influence.  For example, Sarah Reber’s 
dissertation research (2005) explores the longitudinal effects stemming from variation in 
timing of court-ordered desegregation plans.  She concludes that court-ordered plans 
clearly resulted in lasting racial integration.  The court-ordered plans also resulted in 
varying degrees of ‘white-flight.’  While her theme is certainly not a novel one, with 
many scholars documenting white flight in much earlier studies (e.g., James Smoot 
Coleman, Kelly, & Moore, 1975) , Reber’s focus is unique in that she focuses on some 
aspect of court behavior—timing of desegregation plans—over the type of plan ordered 
(e.g., Rossell, 1990).   
Byron Lutz’s dissertation research (2005) explores the same dynamics in 
counterpoint.  Beginning in the 1990s, Lutz explores the impact of court dismissal of 
court-ordered desegregation plans.  Using a longitudinal, nationwide sample, Lutz finds 
that court dismissal of desegregation plans resulted in gradual growth of racially 
segregated school populations.  Lutz also found that the court behavior impacted black 
student behavior (e.g., dropout and private school attendance).  
Taken together, the literature in this section suggests that courts are gaining a 
rationalistic-like reach over policy direction– particularly through administrative 
mechanisms.  Feeley and Rubin (1998) would argue that there is nothing inherently ‘new’ 
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about the rise of judicial influence.  They argue that judicial policymaking has evolved 
for at least decades, if not centuries, as the orthodoxy of federalism, separations of 
powers, and rule of law grew increasingly suspect.  Looking at judicial impact on prison 
reform, Feeley and Rubin note that the evolution of a burgeoning administrative state 
challenged the Montesquieu-an separation of powers.  As a consequence, courts have 
increasingly filled the role of reconceptualizing guidelines for organizing government to 
be “readily adopted to a centralized, bureaucratic nation” – a form of government far 
different than that conceived by the Framers (1998, p. 20).  Others (Aman, 2004) argue 
that judicial decision-making influences this process even beyond national boundaries 
determining—even if indirectly—the organization of government relative to our global 
economy.   
 
Refining the Impact Debate 
 
This chapter has expounded the contours of the judicial impact literature within an 
incremental/rational framework that underpins one of the main themes of the study of 
public policy.  I have tried to clarify in this chapter that the main corpus of judicial 
impact literature generally adheres to either an incremental tradition, where judges have 
very little control over their policy environment, or a rationalistic tradition, where judges 
wield varying degrees of influence over policy outcomes.  My next task, and chapter, is 
to clarify a theoretical framework that allows navigation of the incremental/rationalistic 
dichotomy of the judicial impact literature.  The need to further develop the theoretical 
and empirical literature regarding implications of a managing judiciary has been well 
stated by Koenig and O’Leary (1996, pp. 19-20):  
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Given the significance of court orders for public administration, it is 
surprising that so little attention has been paid to the actual effects of such 
decisions. There is a need for survey research and comparative case 
studies that examine not just the spectacular cases but also the normal, 
everyday cases that affect public administration. Moreover, there is a need 
for long-range longitudinal studies of the impact of courts on public 
management. Most important, there is a need for the development of an 
adequate theoretical base from which researchers might predict effects, 
test them, and ascertain the impact of these and other court decisions on 
public administration (emphasis added). 
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Chapter 3 
 
Social Adjustment, Judicial Impact Theory, and 
Montesquieu’s Prescience 
 
In this chapter I review theories of judicial impact and develop hypotheses to 
explore under what circumstances courts might be constrained in their impact and under 
what circumstances courts might self-determine their impact.  I intend this endeavor to 
strike parallels with the incremental and rational approaches to social policy adjustment 
introduced in the previous chapter.  I argue that incremental views of social control 
confine the impact of courts, while a more rational paradigm of social control ascribes 
much more potency to judicial action.  
While the substantive policy focus of Chubb and Moe’s (1988) work is similar to 
my own (i.e., education outcomes), they do not occupy themselves with judicial impact.  
However, their approach also focuses on variation in methods of social control and has 
consequently informed much of my methodological thinking.  In their research, they 
encourage thoughtful consideration of the relationship between the environment of 
control behaviors and policy outcomes.  The two environments contrasted in Chubb and 
Moe’s empirical analysis are democratic, hierarchical governance and market-based 
decision making.  They suggest that private, market-based education environments allow 
more discretion to administrators and educators, resulting in student outcomes more 
consistently responsive to demands for learning.  Democratic, public education control 
environments, on the other hand, entertain not only demands for learning, but also reflect 
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responsiveness to equality, deliberation, transparency and accountability.  Based on these 
environmental distinctions, Chubb and Moe conclude that variations in education 
outcomes are partially accounted for by variations in control environments—whether 
market or democratic based.  
Similarly, I argue that variations in judicial behavior, whether adjudicative or 
political exchange-based, create contexts that account for variations in judicial impact on 
policy.  This “dialectic of meaningful actions and structural determinants” (Skocpol, 
1984, p. 4) constituting the link between institutional context, behaviors, and outcomes 
are hallmarks of the neoinstitutionalist approach described by Gillman and Clayton 
(1999), employed by Chubb and Moe (1988) and recommended by Rogers Smith (1988).   
In the first section of this chapter I identify a point of departure within judicial 
impact theories from which to develop hypothesis.  In the second section I argue that 
while Montesquieu is widely read as a hallmark of one side of the judicial impact debate 
(i.e., incrementalist) his work actually provides the groundwork from which I develop 
framework to transcend the largely dichotomous nature of judicial impact studies.  In the 
third section I define concepts—judicial behavior based on adjudication and political 
exchange—fundamental in my research hypotheses.  This section also draws implications 
for public administration researchers by drawing parallels between adjudication and 
governance by steering, and political exchange and governance by rowing (see Table 
3.1).  The fourth section specifies my research hypotheses.  In the conclusion I draw the 
themes of this chapter together and provide a bridge into the methodological and 
empirical chapters that follow.   
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Building on Judicial Impact Theory 
 
In 1970 Stephen Wasby declared the theoretical and empirical field of judicial 
impact to be open season, arguing that “one will be making a valuable contribution by 
starting just about anywhere” (1970, p. 266).  Almost thirty years later, Canon and 
Johnson (1999, p. 180)  argued that in 50 years of judicial impact research, “little real 
theory has been tested concerning the limits or consequences of lower courts’ ability to 
make major positive and substantive policy.  Arguments that such courts are exceeding 
their capabilities are largely drawn from case studies or particular experiences or based 
on speculation.”  While some work has been done to expound theories of judicial impact, 
little of it has satisfied those seeking empirical support (Koenig & O'Leary, 1996, p. 19-
20; Spriggs, 1996, p. 1124).  
Canon and Johnson (1999, ch. 6) dedicate an entire chapter of their book to 
reviewing theories that have been used to assess judicial impact.  These categories 
include psychological theories (e.g., legitimacy, cognitive dissonance); utility theory 
(e.g., cost-benefit theory); communications theory (e.g., decision context, means of 
communication); and organization and environmental theories (e.g., principal-agent, 
organization inertia).  Similar groups of theories are raised by Spriggs (1996), as mid-
level research frameworks, including utility theory, psychological theory, and 
organization theory.  Wasby (1970) also notes the use of communications theory and 
theory of cognitive dissonance. 
In noting that judicial impact research has offered neither “comprehensive 
explanations of judicial impact” or “attempts to reconcile alternative hypotheses,” 
Spriggs (1996, p. 1125) discounts psychological theories, particularly legitimacy theory.  
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He argues (1996, fn 2) that legitimacy theory “lacks refined hypotheses and has no 
precise empirical tests, offer[ing] little help for explaining government agency responses 
to the Court because it has no enforcement mechanism.”  Concerning implementing and 
consumer populations, Canon and Johnson (1999, p. 184,  Table 6-I) share Spriggs’s 
observation that legitimacy theory lacks structured hypothesis testing.  
While many of the findings relying on the various theoretical approaches above 
are reviewed in the previous chapter, my purpose is not to unpack each theory and engage 
in a comparison of which theory is most appropriate or has the greatest universal utility.  
To some extent this has already been done by scholars like Canon and Johnson.   
I seek here to develop judicial impact theory that I believe to have some power in 
navigating the polar (incremental/rational) nature of the judicial impact literature. In as 
braoder sense, I seek a more satisfying understanding of the role of courts in social 
adjustment.  In other words, I take up a strand of Koenig & O’Leary’s (1994) and 
Sprigg’s (1996) call to develop a theoretical argument that has comprehensive 
explanatory power and the ability to reconcile alternative hypotheses—in this case the 
incremental/rational hypotheses. 
 Ironically, I find that the very theory Spriggs discounts to be of greatest benefit 
for my own inquiry.  In fact, as will be laid out shortly, I find sufficient foundation in the 
literature to establish legitimacy hypotheses that guide my own empirical inquiry.  
Legitimacy theory, with a rich heritage in the political science and legal studies literature 
(e.g., Easton, 1965; Murphy & Tanenhaus, 1968), deals with “explaining individuals’ 
acceptance of and response to institutional policies as a function of their attitudes toward 
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the institution’s authority and role in the governance of society” (Canon & Johnson, 
1999, p. 157).   
While legitimacy theory may have received “scant empirical scrutiny” (Mondak, 
1992, p. 457), scholars’ use of it is not new to desegregation studies.  Both Spriggs 
(1996) and Canon & Johnson (1999) concede that several scholars have employed 
legitimacy as a theoretical approach to desegregation (Birkby, 1966; Johnson, 1967; 
Mondak, 1992; Muir, 1967; Rodgers & Bullock, 1972; Stephen L. Wasby, 1978).  
However, Spriggs offers his own opinion as a version of the ‘sword argument’ by 
suggesting that legitimacy theory’s use is limited because “agencies have strongly-held 
policy goals and are unlikely to drop their policies simply because they think they ought 
to” (1996, fn 2). 
Montesquieu’s Executive Sword, Legislative Purse, and Judicial 
Legitimacy 
 
In order to develop an “adequate theoretical base” with which to guide the largely 
polarized judicial impact debate, and to put a finer point on the utility of legitimacy 
theory, I return to one of the foundations of judicial impact debate: Montesquieu. 
Despite his statement that judicial power is, relative to the political branches, 
“next to nothing,” Montesquieu offers a much more nuanced description of judicial 
impact than Hamilton’s sword and purse argument would imply.  I read Montesquieu’s 
work, a foundation of the judicial impact debate, to actually hold the key to transcending 
that debate.   
In his historical description of separation of powers between and especially within 
branches, Montesquieu raises the importance of considering the various capacities and 
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functions of the judiciary.  Montesquieu’s well-known articulation of the concept of 
liberty—the right of doing whatever the laws permit (1748, p. 219, Bk. XI, Ch. 3) —
closely precedes Montesquieu’s description of how that liberty is lost.  Of primary 
concern for Montesquieu is liberty lost were judicial power to be blended with executive 
(sword) and legislative (purse) powers.  His reasoning is straightforward.  If judicial 
power is “joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed 
to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the 
executive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression.” (Montesquieu, 
1748, p. 221, Bk. XI, Ch. 6).  How then is judicial power established and distinguished?   
Montesquieu suggests that judicial power should be removed from the personality 
of the executive and endowed in the “body of the people.”  So doing, “the judicial power, 
so terrible to mankind, not being annexed to any particular state or profession, becomes, 
as it were, invisible. People have not then the judges continually present to their view; 
they fear the office, but not the magistrate” (1748, p. 222, Bk. XI, Ch. 6).   
Critical to ‘fearing’ (thus complying with) the office of magistrate, Montesquieu 
specified (1748, p. 223, Bk. XI, Ch. 6) that “though the tribunals ought not to be fixed, 
the judgments ought; and to such a degree as to be ever conformable to the letter of the 
law. Were they to be the private opinion of the judge, people would then live in society, 
without exactly knowing the nature of their obligations.” 
 Judgment upon the published law, then, is the essence of the legitimate judicial 
function. In Montesquieu’s view adherence to function within the judiciary was also the 
foundation of legitimacy.  In Rome, “[t]he judges decided only the questions relating to 
matter of fact; for example, whether a sum of money had been paid or not, whether an act 
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had been committed or not. But as to questions of law, as these required a certain 
capacity, they were always carried before the tribunal of the centumvirs” (Montesquieu, 
1748: Book 11, Ch. 18, emphasis added), a larger group of approximately one hundred 
judges.  
I do not believe that Montesquieu’s use of the word capacity is accidental.  
Montesquieu implies that judicial functional roles, particularly the capacity associated 
with those functional roles, determine ultimate impact.  In other words, just as the 
executive has the capacity of the sword and the legislative the capacity of the purse, the 
judiciary can wield its own capacity based on function.  These functions, in the view of 
Montesquieu, were based on the separateness of the judiciary from the executive and 
legislative roles, and upon adherence to judgment on law within a particular, functional 
domain (whether question of fact or law).   
A contemporary definition of capacity seems to warrant Montesquieu’s approach 
relative to policy impact.  For example, Hou, Moynihan, and Ingraham (2003, p. 297) 
measure capacity as those variables “that restrain discretion and direct behavior of . . . 
actors in a way expected to facilitate the achievement of the performance objective.”  
Hou et al.’s definition of capacity invokes Etzioni’s enunciation of the fundamental 
debate in public policy: “to what extent social actors decide what their course will be, and 
to what extent they are compelled to follow a course set by forces beyond their control” 
(1967, p. 385).  Applied to Montesquieu’s historical account of Rome, only the tribunal 
of the centumvirs possessed the capacity, thus the ability and influence, to determine 
questions of law; kings and consuls, on the other hand, retained the capacity to judge 
criminal affairs.   
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While the focus of this dissertation is largely empirical and descriptive, there is 
admittedly a normative argument here.  In many of the countries chronicled by 
Montesquieu ‘executive’ officials determined who should have the function of judgment.  
“Most kingdoms in Europe enjoy a moderate government because the prince who is 
invested with the two first powers  [executive and legislative] leaves the third [judicial] to 
his subjects. In Turkey, where these three powers are united in the Sultan’s person, the 
subjects groan under the most dreadful oppression” (Montesquieu, 1748, p. 221, Book 
11, Ch. 6).  In similar manner, The Founding Fathers, architects of the governmental 
form present in the United States of America reinforced, based partially on 
Montesquieu’s writings, that the Executive should wield the power of the sword, and that 
the Legislative should hold the power of the purse.   
Notwithstanding this normative, architectural fiat, there remains an important 
empirical inquiry that is the focus of this theoretical development on judicial impact.  In 
observing that certain policy functions require particular judicial capacities, Montesquieu 
suggests that those judicial behaviors accorded capacity by nature of their function are 
likely to have greater impact than those behaviors operating beyond their accepted 
function and capacity.   
The descriptive research question becomes more nuanced than whether courts 
have impact, but whether determinants of the functional capacity of the court to impact 
policy can be identified theoretically (this chapter) and tested empirically (chapter 4).  
This descriptive question is one that returns to the incremental/rational debate within 
which I have framed the judicial impact literature.  Are determinants of judicial influence 
dictated by the power given to Executive and Legislative branches, as Hamilton and 
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judicial incrementalists have suggested?  Or, does the judiciary hold a power of its own 
according to its function and behavior as Montesquieu suggested 250 years ago, an 
argument advocated by contemporary judicial rationalists?   
While Rosenberg’s work clearly advocates the former, Carter’s (1977) definition 
of judicial capacity raises the possibility of the latter scenario.  Carter’s capacity 
(institutional policy effectiveness, in his terms) framework includes indicators of 
“technical competence . . . effective information processing, and . . . political 
acceptability” (1977, p. 148).  The third group of indicators contemplates that “the public 
believes that [the judiciary’s] authority and competence match the problem” (Carter, 
1977, p. 148). 
 
I pause here to note that the concept of capacity is not unique to the judiciary, nor 
do I suggest that it be considered in isolation from the capacities of the political branches, 
i.e. the capacity of sword and purse.  To that end, Wise and I have argued elsewhere ( 
Wise & Christensen, 2001) that capacity to impact policy may well exist within the 
judiciary.  Like Wasby (1981) and Carter (1977), Wise and Christensen suggest that 
before judicial intervention is embraced or eschewed, one should conduct an assessment 
of the relative capacities of the courts, executive, and administrative officials to effect 
policy change.   
As my focus is to develop theory and empirical support for judicial capacity, the 
question becomes to what extent we can measure behaviors influencing judicial capacity?  
What actions can a judiciary take that might enforce or detract from its functional 
capacity to impact policy? As envisioned by Carter (1977), and supported by Wasby 
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(1981), this consideration of authority and competence is a manifestation of judicial 
capacity that focuses heavily on the notion of political acceptability, or political 
legitimacy.  In other words, while the executive wields the sword and the legislative 
holds the purse, the judiciary relies on legitimacy to actualize its preferences.  What 
determines this legitimacy and how can theory and empirical hypotheses of judicial 
impact be developed? 
Legitimacy and Governance: Hypothesizing Judicial Impact 
Through Adjudication and Political Bargaining 
 
Several scholars provide insight guiding this pursuit.  For example, Martin 
Shapiro observes that legitimacy is a function of judicial action.  Like Montesquieu’s 
argument that judicial impact results from capacity of function, Shapiro (1963, p. 603) 
argues that “if the Court is to be successful as a political actor, it must have the authority 
and public acceptance which the principled, reasoned opinion brings.”  Shapiro’s 
argument begs what constitutes a principled, reasoned opinion.  Montesquieu’s response 
would almost certainly suggest that a principled, reasoned opinion is based on published 
law and devoid of aspirations of executive or legislative power – for those are the 
conditions in which liberty ceases to flourish.  
The work of Colin Diver does much to contextualize principled, reasoned judicial 
behavior as he expounds a framework to theorize about judicial legitimacy.  In 1979, 
Colin Diver published a law review article exploring the implications of judiciaries acting 
in structural reform litigation.  I found in his writing what I believe to be a satisfying 
conceptual apparatus to develop Montesquieu’s suggestion that judicial capacity is a 
 Chapter 3  51    Christensen 
function of judicial action.  To test the theory of judicial legitimacy, I will draw 
extensively on Diver’s work to guide my inquiry.   
Diver observes that society’s methods for social adjustment fall between two 
alternatives: reliance on authority or reliance on exchange.  In expounding the role of 
courts in social adjustment, Diver explains that these polar alternatives imply two types 
of judicial behavior.  These behavioral techniques are adjudication and political 
bargaining, where the former is behavior that relies on authority and the latter is behavior 
that relies upon exchange (see Table 3.1).  Further illuminating the meaning of 
principled, reasoned opinions relative to adjudication and political bargaining, Cass 
Sunstein (1983, p. 126) summarizes a trend of contemporary adjudication literature to 
suggest that adjudication is a pursuit of reason and politics a pursuit of will. 
Diver is not the unique source of an adjudicative/political approach, but it is 
perhaps the most descriptive and amenable to hypotheses formation.  A few examples 
from various decades follow.  Chayes (1976) does not parse between adjudicative and 
political exchange as approaches to social ordering.  Rather he argues that our conception 
of adjudication should be updated to include many of the functions Diver includes under 
political exchange.  Regardless, Chayes’s “traditional” view of adjudication is closely 
related to Diver’s description of adjudication.  Chayes observes (1976, p. 1313)  that 
“among the most important functions served by traditional conception of adjudication 
was that of accommodating the reality of judicial power to the theory of representative 
government.” Paralleling Diver’s articulation of social adjustment by reliance on 
adjudicative authority, Cass Sunstein’s One Case at a Time (1999) offers a persuasive 
argument for judicial minimalism – a concept in my own mind akin to adjudication.  To 
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Sunstein, judicial minimalism includes the maxim that “courts should not decide issues 
unnecessary to the resolution of a case” (1999, p. 4) and leaves as much to the 
democratic, political processes as possible.  Earlier, Lon Fuller’s (Fuller, 1963; 1978) and 
J. Woodford Howard’s work (1969) also engaged a form of the adjudicative/political 
bargaining approach.  One of Howard’s (1969, p. 341) observations drives to the heart of 
trying to distinguish between adjudicative and non-adjudicative forms of social 
adjustment:  “Adjudication . . . is a functional concept that leaps across institutional 
structures and the frozen conceptual categories of separation of powers theory.  Yet, in 
our bones, most of us feel that there are –and ought to be—differences between courts 
and legislatures as alternative instruments of public policy-making.”  Like Montesquieu, 
these authors were seeking to understand the respective powers of judiciary, executive, 
and legislative. Like Montesquieu and Shapiro (1963), Fuller (1978) distinguishes 
adjudication as a form of social ordering reliant on principled reasoning.  Where reasoned 
arguments were either undesirable or unfeasible, Fuller argues that adjudication is less 
preferable to legislative or administrative action (see, e.g., C. R. Sunstein, 1983, p. 134).  
Similarly, Guarnieri et al. (2002, p. 186-87) warn that judicial entrance into the political 
fray can give more pronounced roles to those with resources to influence the judicial 
arena, diminishing the functionality of democratically elected policy-makers. 
Contrasting Adjudication and Political Bargaining: Steering or Rowing in 
Governance 
 
Adjudicator. Returning to Diver’s own attempt to distinguish adjudication and 
political exchange as forms of social ordering, he also observes (Diver, 1979, pp. 46-47) 
that adjudication achieves resolution/adjustment through “principled elaboration of 
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authoritative norms, typically embodied in rules and precedents”.  Pursuant to this 
definition, Diver (1979, pp. 46-47) characterizes the adjudicative judge as follows: 
• pure adjudicators do seek to vindicate individual legal rights, and policy 
outcomes are determined by those rights 
 
• pure adjudicators do find liability, which predicates further action 
• pure adjudicators do not provide a blueprint for the action itself 
• pure adjudicators do not promote any set of interests within society, but are 
limited by the plaintiff’s claim; limited set of actors and dispute 
 
• pure adjudicators do not seek strategic solutions to social problems 
• pure adjudicators do seek to vindicate, over a relatively discrete time span, 
individual legal rights 
 
 
Just predating Diver’s work in this area, Fuller (1978, p. 364)  also describes the 
uniqueness of adjudication observing that  
the distinguishing characteristic of adjudication lies in the fact that it 
confers on the affected party a peculiar form of participation in the 
decision, that of presenting proofs and reasoned arguments for a decision 
in his favor.  Whatever heightens the significance of this participation lifts 
adjudication toward its optimum expression.  Whatever destroys the 
meaning of that participation destroys the integrity of adjudication itself. 
 
Political Exchange.  In contrast to adjudicative behavior, political bargaining 
involves principles of exchange rather than authoritative norms.  Diver (1979: 47-48) 
characterizes judicial political bargaining as follows: 
• court decisions result from mutual accommodation of conflicting interests 
rather than formal structures or coercive authority  
 
• status of interests is not determined by legal principle, but by ability/power to 
influence others (e.g., intensity interests, skill of players) 
 
• process is more dynamic than adjudication, involving continuous, sequential, 
often cyclical bargaining among those in interdependent positions 
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• multiple related disputes and multiple actors who achieve their place at the 
table through bargaining and by nature of the positions they occupy in the 
hierarchy of organizations vying to influence the problem 
 
 
The implications of these techniques of social adjustment are that courts may behave 
along a continuum of low judicial obstruction (adjudication) or judicial intervention 
(political bargaining). 
In cases of structural reform litigation, Diver (1979: 64) has observed that courts 
have quietly “assumed a role, that although still cast in the authoritarian rhetoric of the 
adjudicatory model, actually relies upon a fundamentally different model of social 
adjustment, grounded essentially in exchange.  Institutional action, under this view, does 
not come about as a set of responses to authoritative commands but as the result of a 
bargaining process.”  While there is some debate as to the current tempo of federal 
judicial intervention in institutional reform (e.g., Guarnieri et al., 2002; Kagan, 2004; 
Mello, 2002), the fact remains that we still know very little (theoretically or empirically) 
about the role of judicial behavior in impacting policy. 
Implications for Governance.  In addition to articulating and testing a theory of 
judicial impact, one of my endeavors is to draw out the implications competing models of 
social adjustment for the field of public administration and one of its prominent (see 
Frederickson, 2005) pursuits: governance.  In this regard my research question is how 
judicial behavior enables/constrains attainment of public purposes.  The link between 
these endeavors is not overly tenuous.  Woodrow Wilson’s (1887, p. 212) definition of 
the public administrative function as “detailed and systematic execution of the public 
law” demonstrates this connection.   
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I begin with a definition of governance as those “regimes, laws, rules, judicial 
decisions, and administrative practices that constrain, prescribe, and enable the provision 
of publicly supported goals and services” (Lynn, Heinrich, & Hill, 2001, p. 7).  As Lynn 
et al. suggests, judicial decisions can significantly influence the environment of 
governance. 
Much of the governance literature has drawn our attention to the distinction 
between the administrative behaviors of “steering” (e.g., setting program goals and 
criteria) and “rowing” (e.g., performing the work to meet those goals).  Although 
envisioned as functions of the chief executive, Gulick’s (1937) POSDCoRB (planning, 
organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting, and budgeting) is applicable to the 
judiciary’s role in governance.   
Detailed in the hypotheses below, I argue that the administrative behaviors of 
steering or rowing are essentially variations of the directing function, and parallel the 
judicial functions of judicial adjudication (steering) and political exchange (rowing) (see 
Table 3.1). 
 Chapter 3  56    Christensen 
Directing, the choice between steering or rowing, in “new public management” 
has often been associated with incorporating private models of management and service 
provision into public service configurations (e.g., Osborne & Gaebler, 1992).  However, 
we were reminded ( Wise, 1990, p. 141) more than 15 years ago that the “privatization 
movement represents [but] one position in the debate over how public functions should 
be organized.”  As suggested by Diver, I argue that another important position in the 
debate of public service configuration involves groups and individuals who seek the 
intervention of non-private parties, the courts, in managing public organizations.  
Litigants have long sought the intervention of courts in the governance of public 
problems and services.  In the United States, which some argue (Kagan, 2004) as an 
increasingly prolific case, such a tradition reinforces de Tocqueville’s (1835: Bk I, Ch 
XVI) famous observation that “scarcely any political question arises in the United States 
 
Table 3.1  Summary: Contrasting Models of Social Adjustment 
 
 Reliance on Authority 
 
 Reliance on Exchange 
 Adjudication  Political Bargaining 
Directive 
Technique: 
posDcorb 
Governance (Steering)  Governance (Rowing) 
    
Hallmark Principal  Power 
Length, 
Process 
Limited, discrete declaration 
of rights 
 Continuous adjustment, cyclical, 
sequential 
Participation  Plaintiff primarily defines 
claim 
 Multiple, fluid players depending on 
their place in hierarchy of 
organizations seeking to influence 
the policy 
Positions Other actors given no 
preference in influence—all 
equal before law 
 Influence depends on actors place in 
hierarchy of organizations seeking 
to influence the policy 
 Low Judicial Intervention  High Judicial Intervention 
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that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question.”  The effect of such 
resolutions, de Tocqueville (1835: Bk I, Ch XVI) observes, is that “the American 
magistrate perpetually interferes in political affairs.” 
Applications of the present research focus on the types and effects of judicial 
involvement in public management.  In understanding types of judicial behavior, the 
distinctions of rowing and steering are as useful and applicable to inquiry focused on the 
impact of judicial institutions in governance, as they are concerning privatization of 
governance. Exploring judicial behaviors along these lines has the potential to answer 
both (1) do courts impact policy, and, if so, (2) what range of judicial behaviors are 
associated with the greatest/least impact. 
Hypotheses: Judicial Impact Based on Judicial Behavior 
 
The remainder of this research is an attempt not only to transcend the 
dichotomous debate of whether courts matter, but also to develop an applied aspect of 
whether ‘managing’ courts enlighten our understanding of governance.  Rosenberg’s 
(1991) qualitative studies reported in the Hollow Hope proclaim to constitute treatment of 
the former debate as he attempts to transcend the dichotomy in terms of the dynamic vs. 
constrained court models.  Unfortunately, Rosenberg’s resounding support of the 
constrained model yields a hotly debated conclusion that does little to settle the impact 
debate.  Nor, quite possibly because of its qualitative approach, does it provide a guiding 
framework for further empirical testing.   
Returning to the key theoretical and empirical question of this research, does 
judges’ capacity to impact social policy vary depending on whether the judge acts as an 
adjudicator or political bargainer?  Hypotheses exist but have not been coherently 
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assembled around legitimacy theory.  Building on Diver’s theory of social adjustment, I 
develop hypotheses of judicial impact based on judicial behavior—whether adjudicative 
or based on political exchange (see Table 3.2).  I broadly relate these competing 
approaches to social adjustment (adjudication vs. political bargaining) to the rational and 
incremental policy models introduced previously. 
As a matter of review, one of the most prolific existing hypothesis that I should 
recognize comes from one of the leading incrementalists of judicial impact debate.  
Rosenberg suggests that even as adjudicators, judges have very little impact. 
Hypothesis 1:  Judges as adjudicators have very little impact on policy. 
 
Rosenberg implies that if courts could overcome his specified constraints (see chapter 2), 
they would be able to have greater impact.  One such condition, which Rosenberg 
articulates, is when other actors induce compliance through positive incentives or 
imposed costs.  When courts step into structural reform implementation they arguably 
meet this condition by specifying the particulars of the plan and threatening contempt if 
 
Table 3.2  Social Adjustment Hypotheses: Implications for Judicial Intervention & 
Legitimacy 
 Reliance on Authority  Reliance on Exchange 
 Adjudication 
(Directing by Steering)  
Political Bargaining 
(Directing by  Rowing) 
Judicial 
intervention 
Low 
  
High 
 
Legitimacy Judicial Legitimacy Preserved  Judicial Legitimacy Compromised 
Hypothesis H2A  H2B 
Policy 
impact 
Judicial policy impact 
heightened because of 
uncompromised legitimacy 
 Judicial policy impact decreased because of compromised legitimacy
Policy 
Model Rational  Incremental 
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those plans are not met.  In other words, judges as powerbrokers (Diver’s term for judges 
as political bargainers) seem to impose costs, thereby encouraging social adjustment. 
Hypothesis 2A:  Judges taking more control of the implementation of their policy 
goals achieve greater impact; judicial powerbrokers have a greater impact on social 
policy.   
 
 
Countering this proposition, Diver’s work supplies the following hypothesis:  judges’ 
participation in the bargaining process can actually lead to decreased legitimacy of the 
courts (a legitimacy bestowed by their adjudicative function).  In his words, “as the 
political nature of judicial behavior in institutional reform litigation becomes more 
apparent, courts can draw less and less on the reserve of authority that the revered 
position of neutral lawgiver confers” (Diver, 1979: 106). 
Hypothesis 2B:  Judges taking more control of the implementation of their policy 
goals achieve less impact; judicial powerbrokers achieve less impact than 
adjudicators. 
 
Diver (1979: 103) argues that the capacity of the judiciary “to achieve results through 
extrajudicial political processes rests, ultimately, on its legitimacy as a social institution.”  
Diver observes that at its core, judicial legitimacy is a function of its impartial, 
adjudicative nature.  This argument echoes Montesquieu's concern that blending judicial 
and executive-legislative powers hazards liberty. 
 Nathan Glazer (1975, p. 122) further illuminates this approach as he laments 
judicial involvement in legislative function: “the great fund of respect and trust by the 
people for governmental institutions has been drawn down; the courts, trying to create a 
better society, have increasingly lost the respect and trust of the people – which in the end 
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is what sustained and must sustain the remarkable institution of a supreme judiciary in 
American life.”  Glazer’s argument underscores the important link between legitimacy 
and policy impact.  The more judges attempt to social engineer through non-adjudicative 
methods, the more they lose the capacity accorded them to impact policy.  That capacity 
rests in their legitimacy.  Horowitz adds some insight in his 1977 discussion of judicial 
capacities relative to social policy.  He concludes that expanding judicial capacities 
beyond the legitimacy accorded them as non-executive/legislative actors “may erode the 
distinctive contribution the courts make to the social order. The danger is that courts, in 
developing a capacity to improve on the work of other institutions, may become 
altogether too much like them” (Horowitz, 1977, p. 298).  I again invoke the close 
parallel between the type of proposition advanced by Horowitz and Montesquieu’s own 
work, which appeared more than 200 years prior: “Again, there is no liberty, if the 
judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive” (1748, p. 221, Bk. 
XI, Ch. 6). 
Conclusion 
 
Both Glazer and Horowitz reinforce Montesquieu’s and Shapiro’s warning that 
the judicial function, to be policy potent, should be based on a principled, reasoned 
interpretation of the law.  These observations reinforce the hypotheses I have drawn from 
Diver’s work on social adjustment.  The implications are summarized in Table 3.2, and 
suggest that adjudicative behavior preserves judicial policy potency while judicial 
political bargaining compromises the judicial role in social adjustment , while Yeazell 
(1998) illuminates the paradox contained in the adjudicative hypothesis:   
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judges are powerful, but their power comes at the cost of a constraint; 
without that constraint power ceases to be legitimate. Judicial 
independence should not mean independence of law. [A]ny discerning 
defense of judicial independence will mean disapproval of some judicial 
behavior. For us, just as much as for judges, wisdom must include a sense 
of proportion. 
 
Does the adage the government that governs best, governs least hold exceptional 
meaning for the institution of the judiciary?  Does constraint from legislative/executive 
function as manifest in political exchange actually result in greater policy potency for the 
judiciary?  Diver invites exploration of whether proportioning judicial behavior around 
the function of adjudication will actually yield greater judicial power (i.e., policy impact).   
Retuning to the language of governance, judicial behavior that functions by 
steering via an adjudicative approach preserves the legitimacy necessary for policy 
impact.  A “rowing” judiciary might expect the opposite: the more involvement in 
executive and legislative functions, the less likely they will distinguish their own 
institutional impact on policy.   
As will be detailed in the next chapter, my analysis focuses on historical, proxy 
measures of judicial behavior (spanning the range from adjudicative to political 
exchange) to test the hypotheses I have developed from Diver’s and others’ work. This 
effort constitutes an important contribution to testing, if partially, legitimacy theory’s 
utility.  More importantly, my analysis seeks to enrich judicial impact theory generally by 
demonstrating a longitudinal model that accounts for, without presupposing its existence, 
the impact of judicial behavior on policy.  This approach allows me to engage the judicial 
impact debate in its broader intellectual contest—the contest between rational and 
incremental approaches to policy making.  By focusing on the relationship between 
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judicial behavior and policy impact, I open the way to consider under what circumstances 
courts might be constrained in their impact (incremental) and under what circumstances 
courts might self-determine their impact (rational). 
This approach fits squarely within a neoinstitutional methodology—where 
scholars seeking to explore the broader cultural and political contexts of judicial 
decision making are . . . examining how judicial attitudes are themselves constituted 
and structure by the Court as an institution and by its relationship to other institutions 
in the political system at particular points in history. This more “interpretive” 
approach to studying the Supreme Court, relying on historical and ethnographic 
analyses, is not only useful in examining judicial decision making, but it can also be 
used to examine the impact that the Court has on other political and social structures.  
In this sense, social scientists may find themselves in a much better position to 
understand the full range of “judicial politics” if they move beyond the question of 
how individual justices promote their preferences and toward an exploration of the 
role that Court plays in maintaining or disrupting major political, social, and 
economic structures and processes (Gillman & Clayton, 1999, p. 2). 
 
More than 30 years ago, Howard’s (1969, p. 370) contrast of adjudication and 
legislation as means for conflict resolution, a concept akin to Diver’s use of social 
control, reminded us that ultimately there is no “open-and-shut calculus” to determine the 
normative question of whether adjudication of legislation is the ‘best’ institutional design.  
Beyond these questions, however, Howard encouraged us to engage the empirical 
implications of the adjudication vs. legislation debate (akin to Diver’s adjudication vs. 
political bargaining debate), arguing that “uncritical reliance on courts to fill policy 
vacuums raises” fundamental questions about their effectiveness.  Mirroring the 
hypotheses developed in this chapter, Howard  (1969, p. 370) asks “which procedure 
[adjudicative or legislative] is more likely to produce the desired behavior changes, less 
likely to dislocate legitimate expectations by their prospective or retroactive effects?” 
The following chapters engage this question empirically, based on theoretical 
approaches—yet to be fully tested—articulated as early as Montesquieu.   
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Chapter 4 
 
Data and Methodology 
 
 
This chapter presents a methodology to test the hypotheses developed in chapter 
three.  My approach is to test the hypotheses of judicial impact that I have developed 
from the literature, especially Montesquieu’s and Diver’s work.  To do this, I rely on 
longitudinal analyses of panel data that report (1) judicial behavior in primary/secondary 
school race integration efforts and (2) measures of integration/desegregation (i.e., policy 
impact).   
As evidenced in preceding chapters, the pillars of research bounding the judicial 
impact debate are largely qualitative case studies that have offered much insight, but little 
resolution.  In this section I introduce analyses approaching the courts/social policy 
impact debate quantitatively, supplementing our understanding with a more 
generalizable, quasi-experimental design.  The first part of my analysis focuses on 
quantitative, linear regression techniques.  These are supplemented, in the following 
section, by non-linear regression techniques.   
The hypotheses I propose to test, laid out in the previous chapter, constitute an 
important part of enriching the debate as to whether courts have the capacity to manage 
policy programs and problems.  In Colin Diver’s (1979: 46) words, the question I seek to 
assess is the impact of courts when judges use their “central position in the lawsuit to 
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wield influence . . . beyond the immediate boundaries of the cases before [them]” and 
step into the fray of policy design and implementation.  In such structural reform cases, 
can judges overcome the constraints posed by Rosenberg?  If so, under what 
circumstances do courts evidence policy impact? 
Diver (1979: 44) observes that recent decades have “witnessed a remarkable 
expansion of judicial participation in the implementation of public policy [where] courts 
have become the principal forum for the pursuit of structural reform.”  Court intervention 
in social policy continues to be prolific, although not without debate, across many 
substantive policy areas including prison reform, mental health institution reform, 
medical care reform, disability assistance reform, housing reform, and public school 
desegregation.  I have chosen to conceptualize the courts/social policy impact question in 
terms of the latter, which Diver has termed the “prototype for the judiciary’s new 
supervisory role” (1979: 44).  In broad terms, have federal courts evidenced policy 
impact in their participation in desegregation policy?   
I propose to analyze the impact of court intervention by regressing a continuum of 
federal court intervention behavior (i.e., managerial behavior) and control variables 
against policy outcomes (i.e., desegregation outcomes).  The model is detailed below in 
my methods discussion.  The range of court behaviors constitute measures of court 
intervention in (1) school districts where judiciaries closely and frequently managed 
desegregation to (2) districts where courts manifest very little or no intervention.  As will 
be discussed in greater detail below, I articulate court intervention behavior in terms of 
frequency and scope of desegregation plan components (subparts of plans) and plans that 
courts ordered over time.  Examples of interventions include judicial orders to school 
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districts to establish transfer programs, rezoning, and magnet schools.  By analyzing a 
nation-wide, longitudinal-panel data set that reports the frequency and complexity of 
judicial management from 1968 to 1985, I use regression techniques to model the effect 
of judicial management (independent variables of interest) on measures of segregation 
(dependent variables of interest).  I set forth greater detail on the variables of interest 
following a description of the data. 
Data Description 
 
The data I have assembled are a composite of several secondary data sources (see 
Table 4.1).  The data report student enrollee’s race, type of court behavior, and other 
descriptive/control variables either at the school or district level (see Table 4.1).   
These data sources include New Evidence on School Desegregation a report 
authored by Finis Welch and Audrey Light in 1987, and accompanied by an electronic 
data set supplied by Unicon Research Corporation.  I also used non-electronic 
information published in the Welch/Light report to construct court intervention variables.  
The data sources also include Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and 
Referencing (TIGER) system information about the geographic size of the school 
districts in my sample.  In all cases, where data were reported at the school-level, 
variables were aggregated to the district level – the unit of analysis for this dissertation.   
 Chapter 4 66 Christensen 
Independent Variables of Interest 
  
My data sample mirrors that published in a report by Welch and Light (1987) and 
prepared for the United States Commission on Civil Rights under a research contract 
ultimately held by Unicon Research Corporation.   
The primary purpose of the Welch and Light study was to lay the groundwork for 
a database that would “support analyses of school desegregation programs” (Welch et al., 
1987, p. 69).  With the database the authors sought answers to whether districts were 
desegregating and whether “white flight” was neutralizing the impact of desegregation 
plans.  Full details of sample selection and description are available in their report.  I have 
chosen to summarize essential sample information from their report here.  My general 
 
Table 4.1  Data Sources 
Source Years 
 
Level Description 
Welch /Light Report 
(Welch, Light, Dong, 
& Ross, 1987) 
1960-
1985 
School 
 
School-level enrollment data 
(including race) for over 130 school 
districts, provided by Unicon 
Research Corporation in 
electronically readable files.  These 
data based on (1) Taeuber-Wilson 
Data (2) Individual School Districts, 
and (3) Office of Civil Rights, U.S. 
Dept. of Education  (see, Welch et al., 
1987, p. 33). 
Welch /Light Report 1960-
1985 
District Table A3.  This printed appendix 
indicates court intervention behavior 
by year and district for 125 school 
districts. 
TIGER 
(Topologically 
Integrated Geographic 
Encoding and 
Referencing system), 
2000 Census Files 
2000 District Contains geographic size of districts 
(land and water). 
 
(matched to the districts in the Welch/Light 
sample) 
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understanding of these data was supplemented by my electronic and personal 
conversations with NCES statistician, Michael Ross, who assisted Welch and Light in the 
publication of their report. 
The authors selected 125 of the 21,782 school districts in the United States in 
1968 (Welch et al., 1987, p. 31) .  Their tiered sampling criteria selected (1) all districts 
with more than 50,000 students where between 20 and 90 percent of student enrolled 
were nonwhite; (2) districts with more than 15,000 students where between 10 and 90 
percent of student enrolled were nonwhite.  Of this latter group the authors subsequently 
randomly sampled according to size and geographic location.  Their final sample 
included 125 school districts, 7 where 68 districts enrolled over 50,000 students and 57 
districts enrolled between 15,000 and 49,999 students.  While a sample of 125 of 21,782 
school districts may seem insufficient to analyze the question of desegregation, the 
authors note that their sample contains “approximately 20 percent of national public 
school enrollment in 1968” and accounts for “45 percent of all minority students 
attending public schools in 1968” (Welch et al., 1987, p. 32). 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 describe the breadth of data and regional location,8 sorted by 
region (Table 4.2); and National Center for Education Statistics CCD identifiers and 
additional variables, such as federal judicial district,9 which I created based on available 
information (Table 4.3).   
                                                 
7 New Castle County, Delaware was ultimately discarded from my data set because of 
multiple districts consolidating halfway through the sample period. 
8 For purposes of consistency with other desegregation scholarship my geographic 
designations mirror Gary Orfield’s, e.g., South= AL AR FL GA LA MS NC SC TN TX 
VA (see, G. Orfield & Monfort, 1992). 
9 Although the 11th Circuit split from the 5th in 1981, for the purposes of this study I have 
treated both 5th and 11th Circuits jointly, under the designation of 5th Circuit.   
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Table 4.3  Districts in Sample by State & Jurisdiction  
 
Identifier  
(NCES) School District State 
Geo. 
Region 
Fed Ct.  
District 
100390 Birmingham Alabama south 5 
101920 Jefferson  County Alabama south 5 
102370 Mobile Alabama south 5 
404970 Mesa Arizona west 9 
408760 Tucson Arizona west 9 
509000 Littlerock Arkansas south 8 
609620 Compton California west 9 
614400 Fremont California west 9 
614550 Fresno California west 9 
616740 Hayward California west 9 
622500 Long beach California west 9 
622710 Los Angeles California west 9 
625150 Modesto California west 9 
627690 Norwalk-La Mirada California west 9 
628050 Oakland California west 9 
629940 Pasadena California west 9 
632550 Richmond California west 9 
633840 Sacramento California west 9 
634170 San Bernardino California west 9 
634320 San Diego California west 9 
634410 San Francisco California west 9 
634590 San Jose California west 9 
634710 San Lorenzo California west 9 
635430 Santa Clara California west 9 
640740 Vallejo California west 9 
803360 Denver Colorado west 10 
806120 Pueblo Colorado west 10 
901920 Hartford Connecticut east 2 
904320 Stamford Connecticut east 2 
1200150 Brevard  County Florida south 5 
1200180 Broward  County Florida south 5 
1200390 Dade  County Florida south 5 
1200480 Duval  County Florida south 5 
1200870 Hillsborough  County Florida south 5 
 
Table 4.2  Summary of Districts in Sample by Region 
 Count Proportion of Sample 
Border 11 9% 
East 13 10% 
Midwest 23 19% 
South 48 39% 
West 29 23% 
Total 124 100% 
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1201080 Lee  County Florida south 5 
1201440 Orange  County Florida south 5 
1201500 Palm Beach  County Florida south 5 
1201560 Pinellas County Florida south 5 
1201590 Polk County Florida south 5 
1201920 Volusia County Florida south 5 
1300120 Atlanta Georgia south 5 
1301830 Dougherty County Georgia south 5 
1303870 Muscogee County Georgia south 5 
1709930 Chicago Illinois midwest 7 
1713320 East St. Louis Illinois midwest 7 
1734510 Rockford Illinois midwest 7 
1803630 Fort Wayne Indiana midwest 7 
1803870 Gary Indiana midwest 7 
1804770 Indianapolis Indiana midwest 7 
1810290 South Bend Indiana midwest 7 
2007950 Kansas City Kansas midwest 10 
2012990 Wichita Kansas midwest 10 
2101860 Fayette County Kentucky border 6 
2102990 Jefferson County Kentucky border 6 
2200300 Caddo parish Louisiana south 5 
2200330 Calcasieu parish Louisiana south 5 
2200540 East Baton Rouge parish Louisiana south 5 
2200840 Jefferson parish Louisiana south 5 
2201170 New Orleans parish Louisiana south 5 
2201290 Rapides parish Louisiana south 5 
2201740 Terrebonne parish Louisiana south 5 
2400090 Baltimore Maryland border 4 
2400390 Harford County Maryland border 4 
2400510 Prince George County Maryland border 4 
2502790 Boston Massachusetts east 1 
2508430 New Bedford Massachusetts east 1 
2511130 Springfield Massachusetts east 1 
2612000 Detroit Michigan midwest 6 
2616440 Grand Rapids Michigan midwest 6 
2621150 Lansing Michigan midwest 6 
2630390 Saginaw Michigan midwest 6 
2721240 Minneapolis Minnesota midwest 8 
2916400 Kansas City Missouri border 8 
2929280 St. Louis Missouri border 8 
3174820 Omaha Nebraska midwest 8 
3200060 Clark City  Nevada west 9 
3407830 Jersey City New Jersey east 3 
3411340 Newark New Jersey east 3 
3500060 Albuquerque New Mexico west 10 
3501500 Las Cruces New Mexico west 10 
3605850 Buffalo New York east 2 
3620580 New York New York east 2 
3624750 Rochester New York east 2 
3631920 Yonkers New York east 2 
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3700011 Cumberland/Fayetteville North Carolina south 4 
3701620 Gaston County North Carolina south 4 
3702970 Mecklenburg County North Carolina south 4 
3703330 New Hanover County North Carolina south 4 
3904348 Akron Ohio midwest 6 
3904375 Cincinnati Ohio midwest 6 
3904378 Cleveland Ohio midwest 6 
3904380 Columbus Ohio midwest 6 
3904384 Dayton Ohio midwest 6 
3904426 Lorain Ohio midwest 6 
3904490 Toledo Ohio midwest 6 
4017250 Lawton Oklahoma border 10 
4022770 Oklahoma City Oklahoma border 10 
4030240 Tulsa Oklahoma border 10 
4110040 Portland Oregon west 9 
4218990 Philadelphia Pennsylvania east 3 
4219170 Pittsburgh Pennsylvania east 3 
4501440 Charleston South Carolina south 4 
4502310 Greenville County South Carolina south 4 
4503360 Richland County South Carolina south 4 
4702940 Memphis Tennessee south 6 
4703180 Nashville Tennessee south 6 
4808130 Amarillo Texas south 5 
4808940 Austin Texas south 5 
4816230 Dallas Texas south 5 
4818000 Odessa Texas south 5 
4818300 El Paso Texas south 5 
4819700 Fort Worth Texas south 5 
4823640 Houston Texas south 5 
4828500 Lubbock Texas south 5 
4838730 San Antonio Texas south 5 
4844280 Waco Texas south 5 
5100270 Arlington County Virginia south 4 
5102670 Norfolk Virginia south 4 
5102940 Pittsylvania County Virginia south 4 
5103300 Roanoke Virginia south 4 
5307710 Seattle Washington west 9 
5308700 Tacoma Washington west 9 
5401230 Raleigh County West Virginia border 4 
5509600 Milwaukee Wisconsin midwest 7 
 
A key contribution of the Welch/Light report is Table A3, found in the appendix.  
Based on the information in this table, I was able to construct variables reflecting court 
intervention behavior—frequency and intensity of intervention over time.  Examples 
include whether a federal court required a desegregation plan in a particular year.  If so, I 
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was able to code the number and types of components.  Welch and Light identify six plan 
components that judges included in their court orders (see Table 4.4).  Detailed 
descriptions are available in Welch and Light’s work (1987, pp. 23-28).  Welch and Light 
(1987, pp. 34-35) gathered the data in Table A3 from published and unpublished court 
documents, school district documents, their own surveys, newspapers, journal articles, 
books, and government documents (e.g., Department of Education and US Commission 
on Civil Rights documents), relevant to their sample.  In each of the districts in my 
sample, I triangulated court intervention reported in Table A3 and Appendix C with a 
web-based database, Desegregation Court Cases & School Demographic Data, initially 
assembled by John Logan and the Mumford Center, University of Albany, and currently 
sponsored by the American Communities Project, Brown University.  The database is 
available at http://www.s4.brown.edu/schoolsegregation/desegregationdata.htm. 
The districts in my sample manifest varying ranges of court intervention both 
along the dimension of frequency (plans and their components over time) and intensity 
(types and numbers of components).  My sample also includes approximately 18 districts 
with no record of court intervention.   
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As illustrated in Table 4.5 the data indicate a continuum of judicial management:  
(1) districts with court intervention and varying levels of court-imposed desegregation 
policy, (2) districts with no court intervention, but with varying levels of desegregation 
policy (i.e., non-court or self imposed), and (3) districts with no court intervention and no 
evidence of desegregation policy.  I verified the second category based on Appendix C 
(Welch et al., 1987, p. 115) and conversations with Michael Ross.  Appendix C contains 
a listing of court and other documents used to create Table A3.  Where court documents 
were not listed in Appendix C but integration measures were listed in Table A3, I coded 
the district as having a self imposed desegregation plan; this category also includes those 
plans directed by the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
(HEW), from whence the Department of Education was created in 1979.   
For example, in 1970 a federal court mandated that Birmingham, Alabama 
implement a plan (see table 4.5).  This plan comprised two components.  The first, 
 
Table 4.4  Court Intervention Types 
  
From Table A3 (Welch/Light) Plan Components 
Voluntary Plan Components 
(students retain choice of 
enrollment) 
Freedom of choice:  open enrollment 
within the district1 
 Magnets: enhanced curricula and 
schools to encourage racial integration 
 Voluntary Transfers: open enrollment 
if majority-to-minority schools 
Mandatory Plan Components Neighborhood  attendance zones: 
mandatory assignment to neighborhood 
school 
 Rezoning:  mandatory changes in 
attendance zones 
 Pairing/Clustering: mandatory 
reassignment between schools or grade 
restructuring 
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“transfers”, is considered a voluntary method of integrating students, i.e., students are 
allowed to transfer from a majority to a minority school.  The second, “rezoning” is a 
mandatory method of integrating students by altering attendance zones.  In Birmingham, 
federal courts intervened again in 1976 and in 1981 with a mix of voluntary and 
mandatory components.  Taken as a whole, Birmingham experienced three distinct 
interventions from 1968-1986 (e.g., frequency) and eight different mandatory and 
voluntary components (intensity). 
The court in Fort Wayne, Indiana also intervened three times, but relied on 
straight mandatory plans in two cases and a voluntary plan in one case.  The Gary District 
(Indiana) did not entirely escape federal court scrutiny but relevant cases did not yield a 
court ordered (or self-imposed) desegregation plan.10   
Table 4.5  Range of Court Intervention, Illustration 
State District Beg. 
Year 
Component 
1 
Component 
2 
Component 
3 
Alabama  Birmingham 1970 transfers rezoning  
    1976 magnets rezoning pairing 
    1981 magnets rezoning pairing 
Indiana Fort Wayne 1971 rezoning   
    1977 rezoning   
    1979 magnets   
  Gary 
No 
plan     
 
Aggregated over time, table 4.6 illustrates the dimensions of (1) type (2) frequency and 
(3) intensity of court intervention.  The southern states stand out as receiving the most 
attention from courts, both in terms of intensity and frequency. 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 E.g., Bell v. School City of Gary (1963), although no desegregation plan was ordered.   
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Table 4.6  Type, Intensity, and Frequency of Intervention 1968-1986 
 TYPE INTENSITY 
Region 
Court 
Imposed 
plan 
Self 
Imposed 
Plan 
No 
Plan Tot 
Mand 
Plan 
Compon
Volun Plan 
Compon 
Tot  
Plan 
 Compon 
Total 
New 
Plans 
Border 11 0 0 11 22 11 33 19 
East 9 1 3 13 17 21 38 22 
Midwest 18 1 4 23 50 39 89 50 
South 47 1 0 48 164 47 211 117 
West 12 6 11 29 35 27 62 34 
Total 97 9 18 124 288 145 433 242 
Other Control Variables  
 
Beyond variables that deal with judicial management (e.g., type, intensity, 
frequency of court intervention), the independent variables range widely, from decennial 
demographic- to socio-economic-based features of the district’s community in general 
(e.g., income and racial make up of the citizens in the district) to yearly, specific features 
about the school system in that district (e.g., number of schools, geographic location, 
white enrollment). 
Dependent Variables of Interest  
 
Another key facet of the data I use is student enrollment statistics at the school 
level.  These were first collected at a national level by the Office for Civil Rights, 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1968.  The Welch/Light publication 
contains some information collected directly from individual districts prior to 1968.  
However, because the electronic files provided by Unicon Research Corporation are 
based, in part, on the 1968 (and subsequent) national-level data collection, I have 
truncated my sample at 1968.  However, I do retain information about some independent 
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variables of interest prior to 1968, e.g., whether they were under court order prior to 1968 
(see Table 4.7), in order to estimate the structural “initial” state dependency of various 
models discussed below.  
Table 4.7  Structural State: Court Intervention Before 1968 
 No Yes Total 
Border 8 3 11 
East 9 4 13 
Midwest 22 1 23 
South 36 12 48 
West 22 7 29 
Total 97 27 124 
 
 
In general, the dependent variables are measures of racial integration by school 
district (although I have used individual school enrollment data to calculate each district’s 
integration/segregation measure).  There are multiple segregation indexes that could have 
been used for this study and many scholars catalog and contrast these measures.  Massey 
and Denton (1988) catalog approximately 20 residential segregation measures, each 
contributing to some aspect of evenness, exposure, concentration, centralization, or 
clustering.  James and Taeuber (1985) offer an analytical comparison of some of these 
measures along the dimensions of centralization and evenness.  For this work, I have 
chosen two measures of segregation common in contemporary desegregation studies 
(e.g., Lutz, 2005; S. J. Reber, 2005; Rossell, 1990):  exposure and dissimilarity.  I used 
the dissimilarity index as a measure of evenness within a district – a good measure for 
compliance with court orders—and the exposure index as a measure of racial interaction, 
or potential interracial contact.  While the two measures are inversely correlated, the 
importance of including both of these measures is detailed by Rossell (1990, p. 35), who 
illustrates that integration in terms dissimilarity  (racial balance in her words), “can be 
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achieved with very little interracial exposure, but interracial exposure cannot be achieved 
without significant racial balance.”   
The dissimilarity index is a measurement of evenness.  In the case of school 
districts, it is a measurement of how evenly different (i.e., mutually exclusive), racial 
groups of students are distributed across a particular school district.  Used as a measure of 
compliance with court ordered integration plans (e.g., S. J. Reber, 2005), the dissimilarity 
index communicates “the proportion of any one racial group of students that would have 
to switch schools to achieve racial balance across the district.” (Clotfelter, Ladd, & 
Vigdor, 2005, p. 8). 
As a measure of evenness, the dissimilarity index for a particular district is 
calculated from racial enrollments at the school level.  With the school-level data 
supplied by Unicon, I used STATA to calculate the dissimilarity index according to the 
following formula, which illustrates the evenness of white and nonwhite student 
populations within a district. 
 
Dissimilarity Index = 0.5 Σ | Nj / N - Wj / W | 
 
where N and W are total nonwhite and white enrollment in a district, and Nj and Wj are 
the nonwhite and white enrollments in school j.   
 According to this formula, the dissimilarity index variable is continuous between 
0 to 1, where 1 is complete segregation and 0 is complete integration.  For example, the 
nonwhite dissimilarity index for Birmingham, Alabama, in 1968 is .92, meaning that 92 
percent of nonwhite students would have to change schools to accomplish evenness in 
race enrollments within the Birmingham district.  Dynamically, an increase in the 
dissimilarity index indicates an increase in racial segregation within a district.   
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 The dissimilarity index calculated in this way is statistically independent of the 
relative size of the student groups, a criticism that Rossell (1990, p. 35) uses to advocate 
complementing the dissimilarity index (or any measure of racial balance) with a measure 
of interracial exposure.   
 The exposure index is a measure of potential contact between mutually exclusive 
racial groups. In the case of school districts, it is a measurement of the likelihood of 
exposure between, for example, white and nonwhite students in schools within a 
particular district.  As an indicator at the district level, it accounts for the racial balance of 
the district (i.e., evenness),11 while retaining sensitivity to the relative proportion of total 
enrollments of the various racial groups of students.   
As a measure of potential exposure, the exposure index for a particular district is 
calculated from racial enrollments at the school level.  With the school-level data 
supplied by Unicon, I used STATA to calculate the exposure index according to the 
following formula, which here illustrates the exposure of nonwhite students to white 
students within a district (or “nonwhite to white” exposure index): 
Exposure Index = Σ ((Wj/Tj)  · (Nj / N)) 
 
where Wj is number of white students in school j; Tj is the total number of all students in 
school j; Nj is the total number of nonwhite students in school j; and N is total nonwhite 
enrollment in the district. 
 According to this formula, the exposure index variable is continuous between 0 
and the percentage of white students in the district as a whole.  The nonwhite to white 
exposure index is a measure of the ‘average’ nonwhite student’s likelihood of exposure to 
                                                 
11 This feature is the reason that the exposure index is inversely related to the 
dissimilarity index.  
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a white student.  In Rossell’s (1990, p. 34) words, this exposure index measures ‘the 
proportion white in the average minority child’s school.” For example, in Birmingham, 
Alabama, in 1968, the nonwhite to white exposure index was .06, meaning that the 
average nonwhite student’s school was only 6 percent white.  The nonwhite to white 
exposure index is capped at the percentage of white students in a particular district in a 
particular year.  In 1968, Birmingham, Alabama the maximum exposure a typical 
nonwhite student could have had was .49 (the percentage of white students in the district 
that year).  A .49 exposure index that year would have indicated the best integration 
possible given the relative enrollments of white and nonwhite students.   
 The exposure index calculated in this way is not statistically independent of the 
relative size of student groups, but is sensitive to their relative size.  Dynamically, an 
increase in the exposure index indicates a decrease in racial segregation within a district.  
Like others (e.g., Frankenberg & Lee, 2002; Lutz, 2005; S. J. Reber, 2005; Rossell, 1990) 
I use this index as an important measure of policy impact12 to complement the 
‘compliance’ measure that is the dissimilarity index.   
    
Models and Methodology 
 
The general methodology I will be using to test my hypotheses (i.e., the impact of 
court intervention techniques on policy outcomes) begins with a linear regression model 
                                                 
12 The merits of interracial exposure are not taken up here, but the index is used because 
of its value in integration policy evaluation.  While racial integration (including 
exposure) is an intermediate policy outcome for which I have data, ultimately data 
describing the impact of integration on academic achievement would be ideal.  However, 
I was unable to find achievement data for the range of dates in question. For example, 
1997 (the last year of my sample) appears to be the first year dropout data are available 
for the sample I am using (see http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/drpagencysp ).   
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for panel data.  Panel data analysis allows testing of temporal and spatial dimensions.  In 
other words, regression models for panel data facilitate the testing of relationships 
between dependent variables and regressors of interest, while retaining sensitivity to time 
(e.g., year of observation) and space (e.g., cross-sectional units such as school district) 
aspects of the data.   
We can think about the data generating processes of panel data in two general 
ways: fixed effects and random effects.13  Fixed and random effects processes differ in 
their respective use of indicator or dummy variables.  If the indicator variables—such as 
those identifying spatial grouping (district identifier) and time (year)—play a role in 
determining the intercept, then Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation with dummies, 
or Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimation of a fixed effects model is most 
appropriate.  If, in the data generating process, the indicator variables do not play a role 
in determining the intercept, they consequently are more instrumental in the error term 
and Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimation of a random effects model is most 
appropriate.  In other words, a fixed effects data generation process most closely matches 
a scenario where intercepts systematically vary with the dummy regressors (Wooldridge, 
2002).   
Formal notations of these models (see, Park, 2005) are as follows: 
Fixed Effects:  yit = (α + µi) + X´it β + vit  
 
Random Effects: yit = α + X´it β + (µi + vit ) 
                                                 
13 Technically a third category exists, the constant coefficient (pooled) model.  In the 
constant coefficient model, if the time unit (here, the year) and cross-sectional unit (here, 
the school district) do not have discernable effect, pooling the data is justified and 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) can be used for estimation.  In other words, constant 
coefficient models do not have dummy variables as do fixed and random effects. 
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where the error term vit  is independently/identically distributed; where µ represents the 
dummy indicator for spatial unit i (e.g., school district) and t represents the temporal unit 
(e.g., year); and where X´ is some vector of characteristics of spatial unit i at time t.  In a 
fixed effects model, attributes of i that do not vary over time should be excluded to avoid 
collinearity with the fixed effects estimates.   
The choice of model specification, whether random or fixed, can be quantitatively 
analyzed with a Hausman specification test.  However, the Hausman test is primarily a 
test of efficiency.  The Hausman test, applied to my data, does not justify rejecting the 
null hypothesis that the efficient (random) and consistent (fixed) effects models display 
comparable efficiency (see Appendix 4.A).  In general, where H0 is not rejected, random 
effects are usually preferred because of their relative efficiency but we should remember 
that under either hypothesis (null and alternative) the OLS based estimates are consistent 
(see, Kennedy, 1992, p. 22-23)  
Beyond this statistical test, a deeper qualitative understanding of the data 
generating process is of primary importance.  The random effects model requires that the 
covariance between the error and regressors (e.g., attributes of unit i) is unrelated; 
specifically, that “the random error associated with each cross-section unit is uncorrelated 
with the other regressor, something that is not likely to be the case” (Kennedy, 1992, p. 
22).  In other words, to fully justify a random effects model, the regressors should have 
little to do with influencing a unit’s intercept. 
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Fixed Effects Models 
 
In the case of school desegregation, I found this assumption too challenging.  
Some southern districts’ resistance to the Brown decision (see, Kluger, 1976) illustrates 
that attributes within each unit district (e.g., attitudes about race, attitudes about social 
opportunity, respect for executive or judicial authority, etc.) certainly influence the ability 
of the court to direct racial integration.  In other words, the history of desegregation in the 
United States suggests that school districts responded neither uniformly nor randomly to 
court orders to integrate.  As with other social policy models, many such attributes are 
unobserved in that researchers have little ability to quantitatively operationalize them and 
incorporate them into a data set.  Normally, when such attributes are unobserved 
quantitatively they contribute to unobserved heterogeneity and are captured in the error 
term.  In panel data modeling, this describes the random effects model. 
However, when the unobserved heterogeneity is systematically related to subsets 
of observations—those distinguished by unit (e.g., school district) identifier—we would 
prefer a more consistent model that removes systematic heterogeneity from the error 
term.  This describes the fixed effects model, where dummy identifiers control for that 
unobserved heterogeneity systematically related to each school district.  A fixed effects 
model of school desegregation gives each school district its own intercept to account for 
its unobserved uniqueness.  Fixed effects models are built primarily on the variance 
within i rather than across i.   
 The base model I will test, then, focuses on variance within spatial units over time 
as follows: 
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y[policy impact: segregation indexes]it = (α + µ [dummy indicating each school 
district]i) + X´[measurable attributes of each school district that vary over time, 
including types of court intervention]it β + vit 
 
 
I have chosen fixed-effects based models because I esteem them to be the best 
match for the data generation process of court intervention in school districts across the 
country.  However, several estimation issues remain that are common among panel data.  
These include simultaneity, autocorrelation, and structural shifts.  
Methodological Considerations: Simultaneity 
 
One of the primary threats to the model suggested above is simultaneity.  In OLS 
modeling, endogeneity—a systematic relationship between error term and explanatory 
variable(s)—causes estimates to be biased.  For example, one might argue that school 
integration in period t influences court action in period t, as plausibly as court action in 
period t influences school integration in period t. 
 The most popular way to handle simultaneity has been to identify instrumental 
variables for each endogenous variable (e.g., Heckman, 1978) in order to break the chain 
of simultaneity.  The limited data collection over the entire time period of data collection 
makes this approach infeasible.   
My solution to the threat of simultaneity is based on thinking about the underlying 
data generating process.  In general, those data generating processes that are in 
equilibrium are especially prone to simultaneity, e.g., the coterminous determination of 
both court action and school district segregation.  If one were looking at three or more 
year increments, this would certainly be the case.  One might even make the case that two 
year periods exhibit some equilibrium. Imagine the following scenario where the 
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simultaneous relationships between dependent variables (DV) and independent variables 
(IV) are depicted by arrows (see Figure 4.1). 
 
However, by disaggregating the temporal nature of the data to one year intervals (see 
Figure 4.2), I contend that the system does not have enough ‘time’ to reach equilibrium.  
Within one year, courts with their limited resources and time-intensive adjudicative 
processes cannot respond to the current year’s segregation levels.  
 
This notion is supported by Glazer’s (1978, p. 75) observation that “determining the 
impact of any intervention – even the most massive— is an extremely difficult 
undertaking, and very likely impossible in the time needed to be a proper guide for a 
court.”  By disaggregating the analysis of the data generating process of school 
integration to one year periods, I argue that simultaneity threats are far less relevant and 
Figure 4.1 Simultaneous Model 
  
DVt.  School district segregation changes following court 
orders in the previous period;  
IVt.  Courts assess segregation levels and order districts to 
implement plans aimed at changing segregation.   
Periods of Analysis 
(equilibrium within  
period: simultaneous 
system ) 
DVt.  School district segregation levels change following 
court orders in the current period.   
Figure 4.2 Non-simultaneous Model 
  
DVt.  School district segregation changes following court 
orders in the previous period. 
IVt+1.  Courts assess segregation levels in period t and order 
districts to implement plans aimed at changing segregation.  
 
Periods of Analysis 
(equilibrium broken  
across periods: non-
simultaneous system) 
DVt+2.  School district segregation levels change following 
court orders in period t+1.   
 Chapter 4 84 Christensen 
that OLS estimates are far less biased.  This is accomplished by essentially introducing a 
lag between the dependent and independent variables.  
Methodological Considerations: Autocorrelation  
 
Another common issue in data generated over time is autocorrelation.  
Autocorrelation problems violate the assumption that estimation errors are uncorrelated.  
Considering the time-series aspect of the data generating processes (closely spaced 
interval data), one might presume the presence of serial-correlation, or non-independence 
of error terms. In other words, because of the temporal aspect of panel data, errors in time 
period t are commonly systematically related to the estimation of the model in time 
period t-1.  In such a case ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation will produce 
inefficient (biased) estimators.  Kennedy (1992, p. 119) reminds that several features 
about the data generating process may be responsible for these systematic relationships, 
including inertia, misspecification, and spatial autocorrelation. 
Inertia and Misspecification. Most use the Durbin-Watson (DW) test to assess 
the existence of first-order autocorrelation.  Whereas my data are in panel form, a simple 
Durbin Watson test is more appropriate for single time series.  Scholars Bhargava, 
Franzini, & Narendranathan (1982) have provided a generalized DW autocorrelation test 
appropriate for panel data.  I will review the results of this test after engaging one of the 
problems contributing to autocorrelation: inertia. 
 Typical models predicting segregation levels might include variables for 
segregation levels from previous time periods (lagged dependent variables) as 
explanatory variables.  However, as Greene demonstrates (1990, p. 435) “ if the 
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regression contains any lagged values of the dependent variable, least squares will no 
longer be unbiased or consistent.”  If these are the conditions:  
Lagged DV Regressor Model:  yt = α + Xt β + yt-1 β + vt   
 
then the Durbin Watson test is also inappropriate, with a “presumption against finding 
evidence of serial correlation, no matter what the true situation may be” (Nerlove & 
Wallis, 1966, p. 237).  
However proper conditions for the Durbin Watson test, and least squares 
estimation in general, might be achieved, if one thinks about the model as in terms of the 
differences between dependent variables 
 
First Difference Model: yit - yit-1 = α + Xit´ β +  vit 
 
rather than a lagged dependent variable with its own coefficient. 
 One might think about the advantages of this model in terms of addressing the 
‘inertia’ aspect of the data generation process contributing to autocorrelation.  In 
modeling school integration, the Lagged DV Regressor model may be a better description 
of the data generating process if segregation levels are dynamic and quite responsive to 
stimuli—whether court intervention, residential patterns.  In other words, The First 
Difference Model does not account very well for the social inertia that may be 
contributing to the autocorrelation aspects of the data generating process.  One could 
conceptualize the agility of the Lagged DV Regressor model as segregation quickly 
improving by time period t+1 after extensive court intervention in time period t.   
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Historical accounts of school integration suggest that a much less agile model is 
warranted – a model that accounts for the stickiness of change.  The First Difference 
Model accommodates this inertia-based stickiness and one can conceptualize the 
influence of the less-than-agile social and cultural values on levels of segregation.  
Without certain court interventions segregation levels from previous periods are 
relatively static – highly bound by the segregation values from the previous time period.   
The First Difference Model controls for the measured (and unmeasured) sticky 
social, cultural, and community attributes that might otherwise confound detection of the 
courts’ efforts.  Controlling for these measured and unmeasured sticky influences also 
serves to handle some of the misspecification that can contribute to autocorrelation.14 
One might think of segregation levels as an oil tanker coming into harbor.  Unlike 
a quick and agile jet ski, the trajectory of the moving tanker in time period t is highly 
dependent upon its trajectory in time period t-1.  If courts are conceptualized as tug boats 
pushing on the ship to guide it into port, the Lagged DV Regressor model will reveal very 
little of the courts’ effects.  However, under the First Difference Model, one can focus on 
the change in trajectory (rather than the trajectory itself) between time periods by 
controlling for those variables influencing overall trajectory.  I believe analyzing school 
desegregation in a similar way (where segregation is the oil tanker) to be less 
disingenuous than a Lagged DV regressor model.  Moreover, such a model seems better 
suited to handle the problem of inertia that can lead to poor estimates due to 
autocorrelation.   
                                                 
14 Tests for autocorrelation serve as general tests for model misspecification (Gujarati, 
1995, p. 462-63). 
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I ran a basic analysis of my data for autocorrelation assuming an exogenous 
model where the dependent variable is the change from one year to the next in the black 
student segregation index for the district (dindexblit – dindexbla it-1) and the dependent 
variable is the total counts of court-ordered voluntary/mandatory desegregation plan 
components. 
As mentioned above, the traditional Durbin Watson autocorrelation diagnostic, 
often used for single cross-section time series data, is not appropriate for panel data.  I 
incorporated Bhargava et al.’s (1982) modifications of the Durbin Watson test.  These 
modifications are particularly suited for fixed effects models (the generalized form of 
first difference models) and overcome the “significant computational burden” of the 
Imhof routine (see, Abrahamse & Koerts, 1969).  The formula for Bhargava -Durbin 
Watson is identical to the Durbin Watson calculation,  
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but is calculated from data that account for each cross-sectional unit over time.15   
The results of tests applied to my data suggest that serial correlation is not a 
significant threat in the first difference model of the data.  The null hypothesis is one of 
no autocorrelation.  The calculated DW(Bhargava) statistic is very near 2  
(=2.019756254) with rho near zero (=-0.009878127).  Bhargava et al. (1982)  publish the 
test parameters for their panel autocorrelation  test.  With an n (number of observations) 
of 15 for each H,  and H (number of cross-sectional units) of 124, the upper and lower 
bounds of indecision dpl = 1.82 and dpu = 1.93, at a .5 significance level (Bhargava et al., 
                                                 
15 See R:\Rob\BALANCED_DISS\excel_balanced_01_autocorr.xls 
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1982, p. 537). Since the d in my case = 2.02, there is little indecision:  we do not reject 
H0.  In fact, Bhargava et al. (1982, p. 536)  states that “for very large data sets (in H) it 
would not even be necessary to calculate dpl and dpu but simply test if the sample criterion 
calculated from (4) is less than two.” 
Methodological Considerations: Structural Shifts 
 
Kennedy describes spatial autocorrelation as a shock or event within a cross-
section that affects other cross-sectional units.  These supra-cross-section events “tend to 
cause the error terms between adjacent regions to be related” (Kennedy, 1992, p. 119).  In 
the case of school desegregation where federal district court behavior is the independent 
variable of interest, the Supreme Court—with jurisdiction over all federal courts—is 
conceivably the source of such events. 
The Chow test allows us to assess the “structural stability of a regression model” 
(Gujarati, 2003, p. 306).  Intuition suggests that each of the major school integration 
decisions16 handed down from the Supreme Court could possibly have an impact, or 
structural shift, on the data generating process of the data I use.  In practice, many 
researchers (e.g., D. Armor & Rossell, 2002; Orfield, Frankenberg, & Lee, 2003; Welch 
et al., 1987, p. 29)  have identified two major patterns in the Supreme Court’s decisions 
categorized by pre-Swann and post-Swann periods. 17  
                                                 
16 For a very brief summary of these decisions, see Welch & Light (1987, p. 29).  
17 I see in the research another pattern, relevant to the years right after my data coverage.  
During the early and mid-1990s, the Supreme Court signaled lower courts to withdraw 
from active desegregation oversight.  These cases Board of Education of Oklahoma v. 
Dowell (1991), Freeman v. Pitts (1992) and Missouri v. Jenkins (1995) “created 
standards for dismissing long running desegregation orders and allowing a return to 
neighborhood schools even if doing so meant returning to segregated schools [and 
otherwise] constricted the extent and duration of desegregation remedies” (Orfield et al., 
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 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (1971) was the first busing 
order from the Supreme Court and sent a new signal to the lower courts to move beyond 
geographic-based integration measures to achieve racial balancing.  Welch and Light 
(1987, p. 29) have identified Swann as dramatically altering “the nature of school 
segregation plans,” by ushering in an era of wide-scale involuntary busing.  I have 
allowed a two-year lag, and mark 1973 as the point of shift (to account for Swann lag 
since I am using actual changes in racial integration rates, not attitudinal reactions, which 
can be more immediate).  
“The Chow test is computed using three sums of square errors.  
 
where is the regression residual vector from the full set model, is the regression 
residual vector from the first set model, and is the regression residual vector from the 
second set model. Under the null hypothesis, the Chow test statistic has an F-distribution 
with k and (n1+n2-2k) degrees of freedom, where k is the number of elements [RKC: 
estimation parameters] in  ”  (SAS Help guide). 
As an alternative to running three models, using a dummy variable in Stata with 
the command “test” yields the same result but in one model.  The full calculation of the 
Chow statistic is available in the endnotes (see Appendix 4.B).  Using the balanced model 
from 1968-1985, the Chow test yields F= 88.45, with p value of 0.0000.  “The Chow test 
statistic is used to test the null hypothesis conditional on the same error 
variance V(u1) = V(u2)” (SAS Help guide). 
                                                                                                                                                 
2003,  p. 19).  The impact of the withdrawal of courts on school integration is the subject 
of research beyond the scope of this dissertation (Frankenberg, Lee, & Orfield, 2003; 
Lutz, 2005; Orfield et al., 2003). 
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Referencing an F distribution table, at the .05 confidence level the critical value 
F4, 1894 = 2.4.  Since the Chow statistic well exceeds this critical value, I can reject the null 
hypothesis that estimation parameters  pre- and post- 1973 are identical.  I also note 
that the p value of the observed F is near zero, which is additional evidence that rejection 
of the null hypothesis is a sound decision. 
Conclusion 
 
The implications of the Chow test, as well as other statistical tests reviewed here 
will be discussed in greater detail in the results chapters.  The purpose of this chapter has 
been to specify the general models I will use to test the hypotheses articulated in the 
preceding chapter.  In general, I will be employing a fixed effects-based, first-difference 
model to analyze the impact of court intervention on school integration.   
In this chapter I have also inspected my data for common data threats that would 
lead to poor estimates.  I have discussed simultaneity and autocorrelation (inertia, 
misspecification, and spatial autorcorrelation) related threats and tested for their presence.  
My selection of the first differenced model goes some distance in addressing  many of 
these threats as it captures the data generating process underlying my data.  Spatial 
autocorrelation is an issue, and Chow test results have been included to describe the 
influence of the Swann case on the data generating process underlying my data.   
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Chapter 5  
 
Analysis and Results 
 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to empirically test the hypotheses raised in Chapter 
3 with the models and methods introduced in Chapter 4.  Using data reporting court 
involvement and segregation levels from 1968-1986, the hypotheses I propose to test are 
reviewed as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Judges as adjudicators have very little impact on social policy. 
 
Hypothesis 2A:  Judges taking more control of the implementation of their policy 
achieve greater impact; judicial powerbrokers have a greater impact on social 
policy. 
 
Hypothesis 2B:  Judges taking more control of the implementation of their policy 
goals achieve less impact; judicial powerbrokers achieve less impact than 
adjudicators. 
 
 
As these issues have largely been explored qualitatively thus far (see Chapter 2), two 
groups of panel-data quantitative models will be used to add a voice of generalizability to 
the debate of judicial impact.   
 The first section of this chapter details linear models.  The second section deals 
with linear models – but explores the possibility of structural shifts in those models over 
time.  The final section of this chapter discusses curvilinear models.  In this latter section 
I raise the possibility that the relationships between adjudicative interventions and policy 
outcomes are nonlinear.   
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Output Notation and Key Variable Description 
 
 Before reviewing the results, I wish to briefly discuss my data in terms of the 
hypotheses.  The primary dependent variables of interest will be the yearly change in 
racial integration as measured by the change in desegregation indexes: nonwhite-to-white 
exposure (Exposure) and dissimilarity (Dissimilarity) discussed in Chapter 4.  However, 
because my chosen Markov-based methodology does not explicitly account for the 
history or prior extent of segregation in each of the districts in my sample, I have also 
considered two other dependent variables.  These variables, % Dissimilarity and %  
Exposure, reflect the percent change in dissimilarity and exposure indices from one 
period to the next, respectively.  For example, I calculated % Dissimilarity as Dissimt – 
Dissimt-1/Dissimt-1.  I use these variables to measure the “impact on social policy” or 
impact on policy goals.  I make the assumption here that the goals of judges handling 
desegregation litigation is to improve racial integration among the student bodies in 
question.  I interpret racial integration—measured by a decreasing dissimilarity index 
and/or increasing exposure index—as an indicator of positive policy impact.  For students 
of governance interested in organization performance – I use these segregation indexes as 
measures of organizational performance.  From this perspective, I envision performance 
as whether the school district, under the guidance of the “managing” judge, realized 
improved racial integration. 
 The primary independent variable of interest is a measure of judicial behavior 
along the continuum of judicial adjudicator (i.e., steering) to judicial powerbroker (i.e., 
rowing).  The proxy I use judicial “management” focuses on the intensity and breadth of 
that intervention (Components).  Intensity of observation is measured in two ways:  the 
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number of plan components (Components) ordered and the type of plan components 
ordered.  The type of plan components includes whether the component was 
mandatory/voluntary (i.e., whether the student had a choice to participate).18  I discuss 
this latter aspect of court intensity, including operationalization, in greater detail shortly.  
Conceptually, I deem those courts ordering no/few intervention components and those 
ordering voluntary components to be adjudicative in nature – closer to the steering end of 
the governance continuum.  I deem those courts exhibiting intense oversight to be 
“rowers”—policy powerbrokers proactively participating in the policy process.    
 The first models I use to test my research hypotheses assume that the relationships 
between judicial management (i.e., rowing vs. steering) and policy impacts are linear 
relationships. 
 In this chapter I explore the first difference version of the general fixed effects 
linear model outlined in Chapter 4, 
 
yt - yt-1  [policy impact: segregation indexes]i = (α + µ [dummy indicating each 
school district]i) + X´[ attributes of each school district including types of court 
intervention]it β + vit . 
 
                                                 
18 I base these categorizations on those made in the Welch and Light (1987) report and 
from recent, personal communication with Audrey Light: 
“We gathered boxes of documents (from courts, districts, newspapers, etc.) for each 
district in the sample.  By studying these documents, we determined (a) whether each 
district implemented at least one plan and, if so, how many [plan components] and the 
year(s) of implementation; (b) which plan(s) for each district should be deemed "major" 
and (c) which components were used in each plan and which components should be 
deemed "major."”  (Light, personal communication 2006). 
22 More specifically, the dependent variables are measured as follows: (1) Nonwhite 
Dissimilarityt - Nonwhite Dissimilarityt-1 (2) Nonwhite-to-White Exposuret - Nonwhite-
to-White Exposuret-1 
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Remembering that fixed effects models account for measured and unmeasured cultural, 
and community sticky (i.e., static) attributes, I begin with a relatively parsimonious 
model that facilitates a focus on the dynamic attributes of intervening courts.   
To ensure that the models comply with assumptions of homoskedastic error term 
variance and no serial correlation, the results below are reported (1) directly, with the (2) 
robust and (3) cluster options.  These latter two options constrict the models to standard 
errors that are asymptotically robust to (option 2) heteroskedasticity and (option 3) both 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.  The robust option alone would produce 
standard errors that are asymptotically robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity, but the 
cluster option is required in order that standard errors are not subject to arbitrary serial 
correlation.  In other words, the cluster option obtains a fully robust asymptotic variance 
matrix (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 275).  For this reason, cluster constricted models are 
reported in place of models constricted to robust estimates.   
In the tables displayed in this chapter, significance levels are represented by 
asterisks in the traditional manner:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Standard errors are 
reported for each coefficient in parenthesis.  Robust standard errors are reported in the 
cluster constricted models, indicated by the suffix “clstr” after certain iterations, e.g., 
“5.1.2.clstr.”   
Where applicable, I report inspections of multicolinearity among the independent 
variables by listing the VIF (variance inflation factor) and tolerance scores (1/VIF).  
Generally, the closer the tolerance is to 1, the less multicolinearity is a threat.  Similarly, 
a VIF of 10 represents severe multicolinearity. 
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Variable prefixes L, L2, L3, etc., indicate Stata’s designation that these are lagged 
variables.  For example L.Components is the equivalent of Componentst-1; 
L3.Components is the equivalent of Componentst-3.  Similarly, “g2” as the prefix of a 
variable is Stata’s syntax indicating the second time state in structural shift models.  For 
example, if the period 1961-1980 were divided in half, g2variablename would indicate 
the effect of various variables during the period 1971-1980.    
Linear Models 
 
Linear regression models in this section focus primarily on an independent 
variable dealing with the presence, but more specifically, the intensity of court 
intervention. Components is a measure of the extensiveness of that court intervention, 
e.g., how many desegregation plan components were ordered in a particular year.  My 
models employ first difference estimates, so the dependent variables of interest are 
changes in dissimilarity (Dissimilarity) or exposure (Exposure) indexes from one time 
period to the next.22  As indicated in chapter 4, there are several variables that I use to 
control for phenomena relevant to racial enrollment patterns in school.  One of these 
controls is “white flight” or the attrition of white students from a school/district, 
presumably in response to integration efforts. 
This variable is of potential importance because many scholars have debated a 
relationship between district/court directed desegregation and declining white enrollment 
(James Smoot Coleman et al., 1975; Orfield, 1976; Rossell, 1975, 1990; Rossell & 
Others, 1978; Welch et al., 1987).  More recently, scholars have documented 
“resegregation” in many of the areas where district/court directed desegregation has 
diminished (D. Armor & Rossell, 2002; Lutz, 2005; Orfield & Yun, 1999). 
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My findings with respect to white flight, however, are partially atheoretical and 
certainly raise the possibility for future exploration of these relationships.  Accordingly, I 
have placed much of this analysis in Appendix 5.A-5.C.  In brief, white flight bears a 
positive coefficient in predicting the change in the dissimilarity index.  This suggests, as 
we might expect, that increases in white flight (i.e., larger attritions of white students) 
correspond to increased (magnitude of 5 percent, see Appendix 5.A.5 and 5.A.7) changes 
racial segregation—all else equal.  Although intuitive, the relationship remains somewhat 
vague.  As Sarah Reber,  (2003, p. 11) expounds in her research, “The relationship 
between fraction white and the dissimilarity index is ambiguous; in general, it depends on 
whether whites who depart were in schools that were more or less integrated than the 
average school in the district.”   
Contrary to what one might expect, the variable’s coefficient is also positive in 
predicting the exposure index (see Appendix 5.A.6 & 5.A.8).  This suggests that as white 
students leave the district, the average nonwhite student’s exposure to whites actually 
increases.  Because this seems to be a mathematical anomaly, I ran several diagnostic 
models to explore other possible explanations.  These are reported in Appendix 5.B.  
First, there is a possibility that the atheoretical results are the product of a dominating 
independent variable.  I took out all other independent variables excepting measures of 
white flight.  The coefficients’ directions remain the same (see Appendix 5.B.1-5.B.6), 
and overall adjusted R-squared values are quite small.  This indicates that the 
independent variables I am using do not dominate direction of white flight variables.   
Second, I explored issues of directionality by modeling white flight as an 
independent variable, with my main independent variable of interest—court behavior—as 
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the control.  While statistically significant, these models also have very small adjusted R-
squared values indicating that the way I have operationalized court behavior does not 
account for a great deal of the variation in measures of white attrition (see Appendix 
5.C).  If anything, the coefficients suggest that court intervention and increasing intensity 
of court intervention corresponds with retention of white students. 
To some extent, the white flight findings are not inconsistent with historical 
observations of other researchers.  Using a similar data set and time frame as I do, Sarah 
Reber observed that:   
Between 1968 and 1970, segregation (by all measures) began to fall, as the 
first districts began to adopt major plans; white enrollment was steady. 
During the 1970s, the average dissimilarity index fell substantially, 
indicating increasing integration. However, as measured by the exposure 
of nonwhites to whites, integration rose only slightly – from 37 to 43 
percent – between 1970 and 1980 (2005, p. 565).  
 
Another important control variable to consider is the location of the district.  For 
example, historians have suggested that southern districts were fundamentally—if only 
initially—different than other regions of the United States in their approach to 
desegregation.  Some have observed (Rossell, 1990; Welch et al., 1987 ) that de jure, or 
intentional, segregation prevailed in the south, whereas segregation in other regions was 
often the result of de facto, or segregation that was not the result of administrative 
decisions.  Because this difference has bearing on the role of court intervention in 
desegregation, I have included “region” as a control variable. 
 Table 5.1 displays the results of these models, controlling for region.  The various 
specifications focus on the relationship between intensity of court intervention 
(Components) and the dissimilarity and exposure indexes while controlling for region.  
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Each model is a statistically significant improvement in predicting the changes in 
segregation, whether by the dissimilarity or exposure indexes, than chance alone.  The 
specifications using the percent changes in segregation (e.g., 5.1.3, 5.1.4, 5.1.7, 5.1.8) are 
similarly statistically significant, although with a lesser degree of explanatory power in 
terms of R-square values.  This suggests that even when one accounts for the “history” of 
segregation in each district, court intervention plays a positive role in affecting racial 
integration.  In most of these specifications the southern districts and those districts 
bordering southern districts (South) displayed a statistically significant tendency to 
integrate—although the coefficients suggest a fairly small order of magnitude.  In 
specification 5.1.2, for example, the coefficient is -0.006.  This suggests that 
southern/border districts witness changes in the dissimilarity index towards integration 
approximately one percent faster than non-southern districts.  The same relationship 
holds in predicting the change in the exposure index (see 5.1.6): southern districts trend 
towards positive exposure (i.e., integration) 1.2 percent faster than non-southern districts 
over the period of the sample. 
If we expect more resistance, and thus slower integration in southern states, these 
relationships may seem counterintuitive.  However if we remember that one of the 
characteristics distinguishing southern states is intentional segregation, the legacy of 
Brown v. Board of Education is far more likely to expose and remedy intentional than de 
facto segregation. Thus, while being a “southern” state occurs independent of court action 
(i.e., not a result of court action), the regional impact of being a southern state is slightly 
more apparent coupled with a control for court behavior because court involvement had 
direct bearing on the de jure segregation more prevalent in that region.  In contrast, I 
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intuit that court involvement in de facto segregation regions (i.e., non-southern) had a 
slightly less noticeable impact because causes of segregation were influences such as 
housing patterns rather than racially-prejudiced administrative decisions.  Welch et al. 
(1987) seem to support such an approach.  
 Another control variable to consider is school size reflected in total enrollment 
(Enrollment), logged.  In theory, larger schools districts would have a more difficult time 
accomplishing the logistics of integration -- particularly those elements that are 
mandatory (no student choice involved).  In these regressions, the log of total enrollment 
does not show up as a statistically significant predictor (see Appendix: Table 5.D).  
However, the positive signs of the coefficients are in the direction expected: more 
populated districts are more difficult to balance racially.  Perhaps this is because greater 
numbers of students involve more comprehensive logistical efforts.  
However, one reason that total enrollments may not be statistically significant on 
its own is that it accounts for but one element of “size.”  Another element of size—land 
size—is important to consider along with total enrollment in order represent the difficulty 
of integrating a particular district’s population.  The more concentrated student 
populations are likely to be the more urban populations and thus more difficult to 
integrate because of a relative lack of suburban, lower density areas with counter-
populations to bring about racial balance. 
 I added the variable Density to previous models to capture the ratio of a district’s 
total enrollment, logged, divided by the district’s total land square mileage, logged.  Size 
represented in this way is significant both in the court intervention (Intervention) and 
intensity of court (Components) models (see 5.2.1-5.2.8).  In predicting change in the 
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dissimilarity index (see 5.2.1-5.2.4) the coefficients of these variables are positive, 
suggesting that for every unit increase in density, districts trend towards segregation from 
one year to the next by about one half percent.  A similar finding is more pronounced in 
predicting changes in the exposure index (see 5.2.5.-5.2.8).  The coefficients of these 
variables are negative, suggesting that for a unit increase of density, districts trend 
towards segregation (remember that a zero exposure index indicates total segregation) 
from one year to the next by one to five percent.   
 The models reported in Table 5.2 are slight improvements over those, simpler 
models reported in Table 5.1, as indicated by slightly higher adjusted R-squared scores, 
with court behavior maintaining strong predictive value.   
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Table 5.1  Effects of Court Intervention and Region on Segregation 
 5.1.1 5.1.2.clstr 5.1.3 5.1.4.clstr 5.1.5 5.1.6.clstr 5.1.7 5.1.8.clstr 
VARIABLE Dissimilarity Dissimilarity %Dissim %Dissim Exposure Exposure %Expos %Expos 
Components -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.075*** -0.075*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.136*** 0.136*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.002) (0.004) (0.010) (0.019) 
South -0.006** -0.006*** 0.005 0.005 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.075*** 0.075*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) (0.012) 
Constant -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.028*** -0.028*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.005) 
Observations 1902 1902 1902 1902 1902 1902 1902 1902 
R-squared 0.200 0.200 0.165 0.165 0.172 0.172 0.111 0.111 
Adj R-squared 0.199 0.199 0.164 0.164 0.172 0.172 0.110 0.110 
F test 236.8*** 50.3*** 187.4*** 48.7*** 197.8*** 46.1*** 119.0*** 33.3*** 
VIF 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  
 
 Table 5.2 Effects of Court Intervention, Region, and Density on Segregation  
 5.2.1 5.2.2.clstr 5.2.3 5.2.4.clstr 5.2.5 5.2.6.clstr 5.2.7 5.2.8.clstr 
VARIABLE Dissimilarity Dissimilarity %Dissim %Dissim Exposure Exposure %Expos %Expos 
Components -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.075*** -0.075*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.136*** 0.136*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.002) (0.004) (0.010) (0.019) 
Density 0.005 0.005** 0.008 0.008** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.048*** -0.048*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.014) (0.011) 
South -0.003 -0.003 0.010* 0.010** 0.006** 0.006** 0.043*** 0.043*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.016) (0.011) 
Constant -0.018** -0.018*** -0.037** -0.037*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.096** 0.096*** 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.015) (0.012) (0.006) (0.005) (0.038) (0.027) 
Observations 1902 1902 1902 1902 1902 1902 1902 1902 
R-squared 0.201 0.201 0.166 0.166 0.180 0.180 0.117 0.117 
Adj R-
squared 0.199 0.199 0.165 0.165 0.178 0.178 0.115 0.115 
F test 158.8*** 38.6*** 125.8*** 35.6*** 138.5*** 43.3*** 83.7*** 25.5*** 
VIF 1.38  1.38  1.38  1.38  
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 Because one of my primary goals is to examine the impact of court intervention, a 
theoretically important group of predictors includes the effects of past court intervention.  
In many circumstances court intervention in school integration policy has evolved into an 
ongoing relationship between the court and district (O'Leary & Wise, 1991;  Wise & 
O'Leary, 2003).  Like many policy decisions, effects are not always fully manifested in 
the time period of the decision.  Distributed lag-models (Gujarati, 1995, p. 585) more 
accurately describe these data generating processes.  To account for the distributed impact 
of court behavior I created lagged variables of court intervention.  Again, Stata’s syntax 
marks lagged variables with an “L.variablename” for t-1, “L2.variablename” for t-2, etc. 
 Table 5.3 reports the results of distributed-lag models with court intervention 
distributed over an additional time period (L.Components).  The addition of this 
technique improves the overall predictive value of this model compared to previous 
models. For example, for my models using the intensity of court intervention as a 
predictor of segregation, the adjusted R-squared for specification 5.3.2 (Dissimilarity) is 
now 22 percent and 19 percent for specification 5.3.5 (Exposure).   
 The coefficients of the variables themselves are meaningful.  Density continues to 
be statistically significant in the directions expected – retarding the integration of a 
particular school district, but not eclipsing the effects of court intervention towards 
integration.  Being a southern district is not consistently statistically significant in these 
specifications.   
 Specifications 5.3.1-5.3.4 are models of the intensity of court intervention in 
predicting the change in dissimilarity index.  Negative coefficients indicate variables that 
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have a positive influence on racial integration (the more the dissimilarity index moves 
towards zero, the more integration in the district).   
 For each court-ordered desegregation plan component there is a 4 (i.e., -.044) 
percent improvement in the change of the dissimilarity index from one period to the next 
(see 5.3.2).  The effect are more pronounced when examining percentage change in the 
dissimilarity index (see 5.3.4).  The effects of court intervention are not entirely manifest 
within the period they are ordered.  For example, the effect of a single component of 
intervention is also felt through the next time period.  The coefficient for L.Components 
in specification 5.3.2 is -0.014, which indicates that the effect of a court component one 
year after it was ordered is that the change in the dissimilarity index trends towards 
integration by about one and a half percent. 
Specification 5.3.5 is a model of the intensity of court intervention in predicting 
the change in the exposure index.  Positive coefficients indicate variables that have a 
positive influence on racial integration (the more the exposure index moves towards the 
maximum percentage of white students in the district, the more integrated the district). 
For each court-ordered desegregation plan component there is a three percent 
improvement in the change of the dissimilarity index from one period to the next.  The 
effect of a single component of intervention is also felt through the next time period.  The 
coefficient for L.Components in specification 5.3.5 is 0.007, which indicates that the 
effect of a court component one year after it was ordered is that the change in the 
exposure index trends towards integration by just under one percent.   
 Including the effects of presence and intensity of court intervention for more than 
one year previous does not offer noticeable improvements to the overall predictive value 
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of models estimating changes in the exposure indices (see Table, 5.4, e.g., adjusted R-
square values).  However, two-year lags are of marginal statistical significance when 
modeling changes in the dissimilarity index (5.4.1-5.4.4)—although the same does not 
hold for modeling changes the exposure index.  I attribute this to the difference between 
the two indexes – dissimilarity being a proxy for compliance, and exposure being a 
measure of potential contact (see chapter 4). 
 Type of Intervention.  My data allow me to unpack the “intensity” of court 
intervention by modeling the effect of those court-ordered components that are 
mandatory (students cannot choose to elect out of the component, e.g., mandatory 
busing) versus voluntary (students can elect to plan component, e.g., magnet school 
attendance).  Table 5.5 reports these findings. 
Refining the variable, intensity of court intervention (Components), into two 
categories--voluntary components (Voluntary) and mandatory components (Mandatory) 
boosts the explanatory value of general model to nearly 30 percent when modeling 
changes in the dissimilarity index (see 5.5.2) and nearly 25 percent when modeling 
changes in the exposure index (see 5.5.6).  These are significant improvements over 
previous specifications. 
The results suggest that for each additional court-ordered, voluntary integration 
component, the change in dissimilarity index trends towards segregation by 1 percent.  
However, lagged one year, that component begins to have an effect in the opposite 
direction – at almost the same magnitude.  This is somewhat intuitive in that voluntary 
measures such as magnet schools take some time to get traction on segregation.  One 
possible scenario is that the year a magnet school is ordered mobile, affluent white 
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families exit the district.  However after mobile, white families have exited, the 
remaining white students opt for voluntary measures because of the increased educational 
resources found in magnet schools.  A year later, this integration is reflected, via a 
negative coefficient for lagged voluntary components, in the change in dissimilarity 
index.  Again, these relationships are more pronounced when predicting the percentage 
change in the dissimilarity index (Table 5.5.3, 5.5.4). 
Additional specifications suggest that, while statistically insignificant, these 
trends manifest themselves for components ordered two years after the year modeled (see 
L2.Voluntary  5.5.2)—voluntary components continue to influence integration in a 
positive way (negative coefficient) after the first year’s effects are overcome. 
The same patterns hold for the effect of voluntary components on changes in the 
exposure index.  The negative coefficient in the first year (see 5.5.4) suggests that for 
each additional court-ordered, voluntary integration component, the change in the 
exposure index trends towards segregation by about 1 percent.  However, lagged one 
year, that component begins to have an effect in the opposite direction – at an even 
smaller magnitude (.3 percent improvement in integration).  Again, this reflects the 
longer lead-time in implementing voluntary components.  As with modeling the 
dissimilarity index the effect of voluntary components continues to manifest influence on 
racial integration (although not to any statistically significant level) two years after 
implementation began (See 5.5.6). 
Mandatory components, on the other hand, have a more immediate, consistent 
impact on integrating schools.  One reason for this effect may be that mandatory plan 
 Chapter 5 106    Christensen 
components, unlike voluntary, do not allow for a “wait and see” choice in student 
adoption.  The first year, therefore, is likely to evidence immediate change.   
Each mandatory plan component corresponds with a 7 percent change in the 
dissimilarity index towards integration,  The influence of a mandatory component lagged 
one year (L.Mandatory) corresponds with a 1.3 percent change in the dissimilarity index 
towards integration (see 5.5.2).  Again, these effects are more pronounced when 
examining the percent change in the dissimilarity index (see 5.5.4).  While not 
statistically significant, mandatory components continue to manifest a positive influence 
(negative coefficient in predicting the dissimilarity index) on desegregation even two 
periods prior to the year modeled (see L2.Mandatory 5.5.2, 5.5.4).   
The effect of mandatory components on changes in the exposure index is similar 
to the effect on the dissimilarity index (see Mandatory 5.5.6).  The positive coefficient in 
the first year (see 5.5.6) suggests that for each additional court-ordered, mandatory 
integration component, the change in the exposure index trends towards integration by 
about 5 percent.  A component lagged one year (L.Mandatory) has a 1 percent impact on 
integration.  As with modeling the dissimilarity index the effect of mandatory 
components continues to manifest influence on racial integration (although not to any 
statistically significant level) even two years later (see L2.Mandatory 5.5.6 and 5.5.8). 
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Table 5.3 One-Year Lagged Effects of Court Intervention on Segregation 
 5.3.1 5.3.2.clstr 5.3.3 5.3.4.clstr 5.3.5 5.3.5.clstr 5.3.7 5.3.8.clstr 
VARIABLE Dissimilarity Dissimilarity %Dissim %Dissim Exposure Exposure %Expos %Expos 
Components -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.074*** -0.074*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.135*** 0.135*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.002) (0.004) (0.010) (0.019) 
L.Components -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.027*** -0.027*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.016 0.016** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.008) 
Density 0.004 0.004* 0.008 0.008* -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.047*** -0.047*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.014) (0.011) 
South -0.002 -0.002 0.012* 0.012** 0.005** 0.005** 0.043*** 0.043*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.016) (0.012) 
Constant -0.015* -0.015** -0.031** -0.031** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.093** 0.093*** 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.015) (0.012) (0.006) (0.005) (0.038) (0.028) 
Observations 1902 1902 1902 1902 1902 1902 1902 1902 
R-squared 0.221 0.221 0.188 0.188 0.189 0.189 0.118 0.118 
Adj R-squared 0.219 0.219 0.186 0.186 0.187 0.187 0.116 0.116 
F test 134.6*** 32.4*** 109.7*** 31.6*** 110.2*** 35.6*** 63.4*** 23.6*** 
VIF 1.29  1.29  1.29  1.29  
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Table 5.4 Two-Year Lagged Effects of Court Intervention on Segregation 
 5.4.1 5.4.2.clstr 5.4.3 5.4.4.clstr 5.4.5 5.4.5.clstr 5.4.7 5.4.8.clstr 
VARIABLE Dissimilarity Dissimilarity %Dissim %Dissim Exposure Exposure %Expos %Expos 
Components -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.072*** -0.072*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.014) 
L.Components -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.029*** -0.029*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.008) 
L2.Components -0.004** -0.004* -0.010*** -0.010** 0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) 
Density 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.005 -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.019** -0.019*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.007) 
South -0.001 -0.001 0.013** 0.013** 0.004* 0.004* 0.031*** 0.031*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.010) 
Constant -0.006 -0.006 -0.020 -0.020* 0.008 0.008 0.023 0.023 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.015) (0.012) (0.006) (0.005) (0.026) (0.018) 
Observations 1781 1781 1781 1781 1781 1781 1781 1781 
R-squared 0.220 0.220 0.188 0.188 0.175 0.175 0.151 0.151 
Adj R-squared 0.218 0.218 0.185 0.185 0.173 0.173 0.149 0.149 
F test 100.3*** 23.0*** 82.1*** 24.7*** 75.6*** 22.7*** 63.1*** 20.6*** 
Mean VIF 1.23  1.23  1.23  1.23  
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Table 5.5  Lagged Effects of Mandatory and Voluntary Court Intervention on Segregation 
 5.5.1 5.5.2.clstr 5.5.3 5.5.4.clstr 5.5.5 5.5.6.clstr 5.5.7 5.5.8.clstr 
VARIABLE Dissimilarity Dissimilarity %Dissim %Dissim Exposure Exposure %Expos %Expos 
Voluntary 0.011** 0.011 0.019** 0.019 -0.009** -0.009 -0.018 -0.018 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.004) (0.005) (0.016) (0.027) 
L.Voluntary -0.014*** -0.014** -0.024*** -0.024* 0.003 0.003 0.013 0.013 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.003) (0.004) (0.015) (0.016) 
L2.Voluntary -0.006 -0.006 -0.018** -0.018* 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010) (0.003) (0.004) (0.015) (0.010) 
Mandatory -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.121*** -0.121*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.175*** 0.175*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.012) (0.002) (0.006) (0.010) (0.028) 
L.Mandatory -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.025*** -0.025*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.029*** 0.029** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.002) (0.003) (0.010) (0.011) 
L2.Mandatory -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005 0.001 0.001 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.010) (0.008) 
Constant -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004 -0.004 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.007 -0.007* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) 
Observations 1781 1781 1781 1781 1781 1781 1781 1781 
R-squared 0.282 0.282 0.237 0.237 0.217 0.217 0.172 0.172 
Adj R-squared 0.279 0.279 0.234 0.234 0.214 0.214 0.169 0.169 
F test 116.0*** 22.3*** 91.7*** 24.1*** 81.8*** 16.8*** 61.3*** 13.1*** 
Mean VIF 1.21  1.21  1.21  1.21  
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Structural Shift Models 
 
In addition to controlling for variables such as type of court intervention, density 
and region, I consider the importance of temporal, structural shifts in the relationships.  
As discussed in Chapter 4, the question here becomes whether certain time-based events 
caused the impact of court behavior to matter differently.  I report here on Chow models 
raised in Chapter 4 to explore the possibility of these shifts—centered on 1973, two years 
after the Swann v. Mecklenburg case. 
Theoretical support for suspecting a structural shift around Swann is discussed in 
Chapter 4, and is generally reflected in the approaches of several segregation studies 
(e.g., D. Armor & Rossell, 2002; Welch et al., 1987).  Although the Swann case was 
handed down in 1971, 1973 is chosen, in part, to allow for implementation effect and 
because in 1973 the Supreme Court handed down Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, 
413 U.S. 189 (1973), which brought the effect of Swann to northern school districts as 
well (D. Armor & Rossell, 2002, p. 224). 
General statistical evidence reported in Chapter 4 suggested the existence of a 
structural shift pursuant to the Swann case.  Without considering the dummy variable 
approach to the Chow test, one might assume several states explaining the structural shift.  
These are described as concurrent, parallel, and dissimilar regressions (Gujarati, 1995, p. 
511).  The traditional Chow test allows us to reject the states of coincident regression.  
However, by referencing the Chow test (results in Table 5.6) we can determine that there 
has been a shift in the regression intercept between the two regressions (i.e., parallel), and 
a change in slopes (i.e., dissimilar).  In this case, the nature of Chow test reveals that the 
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nature of the structural shift is dissimilar regressions (i.e., difference slopes before and 
after the structural shock).   
For example, when modeling the effect of intensity of court intervention before 
Swann, for each additional court-ordered desegregation component, the change in the 
dissimilarity index improved by 6.8 percent (see Components, table 5.6.5).  Lagged 
components had a 1.6 percent correspondence with desegregation.  After Swann, 
however, each court-ordered component corresponded to a 4.2 percent change towards 
segregation as manifest by the change in dissimilarity index (see g2Components, table 
5.6.5).   
 These general relationships describe both the changes in dissimilarity and 
exposure indexes pre- and post-Swann whether one examines intensity or presence of 
court intervention as independent variables(see 5.6.5-5.6.8). 
 In general, the fit of the model is extremely good.  Specifications controlling for 
structural shift around Swann account for around 30 percent of the variance of changes in 
segregation from time period to the next (5.6.5 and 5.6.7) and around 25 percent of the 
variance of the percentage changes in segregation (5.6.6 and 5.6.8).  This level of fit is 
generally 10 percent better than previous specifications which do not account for possible 
structural shifts. 
Notwithstanding the improvement in overall fit, this structural shift model 
introduces results that may be counterintuitive.  The model suggests that court 
interventions have the opposite effect before (encouraged integration) and after 
(corresponded to segregation) the Swann decision.   
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Research by scholars such as Christine Rossell and David Armor suggests that 
part of the courts’ influence may be determined by whether the court ordered voluntary or 
involuntary measures.  As introduced in Chapter 4, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Board of Education was the Supreme Court’s first clear definition that an integrated 
school “was defined as one whose racial composition is roughly the same as the racial 
composition of the entire school system” (D. Armor & Rossell, 2002, p. 232).  According 
to Welch and Light (1987, p. 29)  Swann  allowed lower courts to use mandatory 
measures that went beyond narrower, geographic-based methods by using busing.  Swann 
introduced mandatory busing as a federal judicial integration tool.  Armor and Rossell 
(2002, p. 227) observe that “after Swann, most Southern districts that still had substantial 
racial imbalance were immediately back in court and typically ordered to adopt busing 
remedies along the lines of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg plan.” 
My sample does not evidence, however, that mandatory integration plan 
components eclipsed the growing use of voluntary plan components after Swann.  On the 
contrary, the average total counts of mandatory measures are higher before Swann and 
average total counts—across the sample—of voluntary measures appear higher after 
Swann (see Figure 5.1).  In fact, t-tests confirm that for mandatory components these 
means are statistically different before and after Swann.  The use of voluntary 
components does not statistically differ before and after Swann.23 
                                                 
23  ttest volcomp if yearnew<1986, by(g2) unpaired 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
PreSwann |     744     .063172    .0093214     .254253    .0448727    .0814714 
PostSwann|    1488    .0658602    .0076516     .295159    .0508511    .0808694 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    2232    .0649642    .0059717    .2821288    .0532534    .0766749 
 Chapter 5 113    Christensen 
Figure 5.1: Average Comparison of Mandatory and Voluntary Intervention 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -.0026882    .0126707               -.0275357    .0221594 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -0.2122 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     2230 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.4160         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.8320          Pr(T > t) = 0.5840 
 
. ttest mandcomp if yearnew<1986, by(g2) unpaired 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
PreSwann |     744    .1935484    .0189319    .5163922    .1563821    .2307147 
PostSwann|    1488    .0967742    .0099728    .3846976    .0772119    .1163365 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    2232    .1290323    .0092149     .435349    .1109616    .1471029 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .0967742    .0194444                .0586431    .1349053 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   4.9770 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     2230 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
25 Judicial activity in desegregation was certainly a fixture since at least 1954, but 1968 is 
the first year when nationwide data was consistently available on enrollments by race. 
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Research on this topic (e.g., Rossell, 1990; Rossell & Armor, 1996) ultimately 
concludes that voluntary measures have been more effective in bringing about racial 
balance than mandatory measures.  My analysis confirms these findings to some degree, 
but suggests that these relationships shifted structurally around events like Swann and 
should be analyzed within their respective structural states. 
During the pre-Swann structural state, the constant terms suggests that, all else 
equal, districts trended toward integration (whether measured by the dissimilarity or 
exposure index, see constant, 5.7.1-7.2 and 5.7.3-7.4).  During the post-Swann structural 
state, however, districts trended toward segregation (all else equal, see g2, 5.7.1-7.2 and 
5.7.3-7.4).   
The effect of voluntary components (Voluntary) is somewhat ambiguous.  The 
direction of the coefficients suggests that each additional voluntary component actually 
had a negative impact on racial integration pre-Swann but a positive impact on 
integration post-Swann (see pre-Swann [Voluntary] and post-Swann [g2Voluntary]).  
However, statistical certainty can only be ascribed to the effect of each additional 
voluntary component, post-Swann, on the percentage change in dissimilarity index (see 
5.7.2 and 5.7.6). For each additional voluntary component ordered, the dissimilarity 
index trends towards integration 3 percent more than had intervention not been ordered 
(see g2Voluntary, 5.9.1). 
The effect of mandatory components (Mandatory) is far less ambiguous.  The 
direction of the coefficients suggests that each additional mandatory component actually 
had a positive impact on racial integration pre-Swann but a negative impact on 
integration post-Swann (see all specifications pre-Swann [Mandatory] and post-Swann 
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[g2Mandatory]).  For example, as measured by the percentage change in dissimilarity 
index pre-Swann, for each additional mandatory component ordered, the dissimilarity 
index trends towards integration 15 percent more than had no intervention been ordered 
(see Mandatory,  5.7.2). 
 Modeling the type of court intervention per structural period improves the overall 
fit of the model, and offers a slight improvement over the fit of previous models (contrast 
adjusted R-square values in Table 5.7 with Table 5.6). However, specifications (see 5.7.5 
to 5.7.8). modeling lagged effects of type of court intervention—whether voluntary or 
involuntary—do not consistently add to the overall statistical significance of the model. .   
These findings raise the possibility that, at least in the post-Swann era, voluntary 
plan components seem to correspond with faster racial integration.  Why voluntary 
components do not manifest more statistically significant relationships with 
desegregation in either pre- or post-Swann is something that I take up at the beginning of 
the next section.  From the post-Swann structural state, there is some evidence to support 
the work of Rossell and Armor who ultimately recommend that “desegregation should be 
strictly voluntary, as with magnet schools or open enrollment options” (2002, p. 255).  At 
the same time, I observe some statistical evidence that mandatory plan components 
marked the zenith of their positive influence on racial integration at or before Swann, a 
court case that ironically allows federal courts to implement mandatory components (at 
least busing) more fully.   
While I have arranged the structural shift analysis around the Swann case I 
recognize here the possibility that Swann merely coincides other forces that influence the 
diminishing returns of certain tools, e.g., mandatory tools.  However, whether Swann 
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causes or was facilitated by these forces is not the focus of the present research.  Swann’s 
importance lies in its symbolic message to lower courts condoning a new direction in 
intervention to include mandatory, district-wide components.  Representing the 
culmination of social/judicial forces that would condone such court action, Swann serves 
as a guidepost viewed as a meaningful (e.g., Armor & Rossell, 2002; Welch et al., 1987) 
to desegregation and desegregation research
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Table 5.6 Chow Test: The Effects of Court Intervention on Segregation, before and after Swann (1972) 
 5.6.1 5.6.2.clstr 5.6.3 5.6.4.clstr 5.6.5.clstr 5.6.6.clstr 5.6.7.clstr 5.6.8.clstr 
VARIABLE Dissimilarity %Dissim Exposure %Expos Dissimilarity %Dissim Exposure %Expos 
South -0.018*** -0.012 0.017*** 0.108*** -0.015* 0.002 0.014** 0.099*** 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.005) (0.030) (0.008) (0.014) (0.006) (0.031) 
Density 0.011** 0.017* -0.018*** -0.107*** 0.003 0.009 -0.010** -0.040** 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.004) (0.028) (0.005) (0.010) (0.004) (0.019) 
Components -0.067*** -0.105*** 0.052*** 0.246*** -0.068*** -0.110*** 0.049*** 0.204*** 
 (0.009) (0.015) (0.007) (0.044) (0.010) (0.017) (0.008) (0.034) 
L.Components     -0.016** -0.036*** 0.009* 0.013 
     (0.007) (0.013) (0.005) (0.022) 
L2.Components     -0.001 -0.008 -0.000 -0.034** 
     (0.006) (0.013) (0.004) (0.015) 
Constant -0.037*** -0.066** 0.042*** 0.248*** -0.014 -0.038 0.021** 0.080* 
 (0.013) (0.026) (0.011) (0.072) (0.014) (0.027) (0.010) (0.048) 
g2 0.025 0.038 -0.034*** -0.228*** 0.006 0.018 -0.014 -0.064 
 (0.016) (0.034) (0.012) (0.074) (0.016) (0.034) (0.012) (0.053) 
g2rsthbord 0.027*** 0.039** -0.020*** -0.113*** 0.023*** 0.024 -0.018** -0.103*** 
 (0.008) (0.016) (0.006) (0.032) (0.009) (0.017) (0.007) (0.033) 
g2Density -0.010 -0.013 0.013*** 0.094*** -0.002 -0.005 0.005 0.027 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.005) (0.029) (0.006) (0.012) (0.004) (0.021) 
g2Components 0.040*** 0.054*** -0.038*** -0.196*** 0.042*** 0.060*** -0.036*** -0.155*** 
 (0.010) (0.017) (0.008) (0.045) (0.011) (0.019) (0.008) (0.036) 
g2LComponents     0.003 0.014 -0.003 0.007 
     (0.008) (0.014) (0.006) (0.023) 
g2L2Components     0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.030* 
     (0.007) (0.014) (0.004) (0.015) 
Observations 1902 1902 1902 1902 1781 1781 1781 1781 
R-squared 0.297 0.225 0.315 0.228 0.302 0.237 0.290 0.266 
Adj R-squared 0.294 0.222 0.312 0.225 0.298 0.233 0.286 0.261 
F test 26.2*** 24.2*** 30.3*** 15.3*** 14.6*** 15.0*** 16.0*** 13.3*** 
Post Swann F 
Test 17.86*** 12.28*** 27.97*** 13.86*** 8.01*** 5.72*** 12.01*** 8.69*** 
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Table 5.7 The Effects of Mandatory and Voluntary Court Intervention on 
Segregation, before and after Swann (1972) 
 5.7.1.clstr 5.7.2.clstr 5.7.3.clstr 5.7.4.clstr 5.7.5.clstr 5.7.6.clstr 5.7.7.clstr 5.7.8.clstr 
VARIABLE Dissim %Dissim Exposure %Expos Dissim %Dissim Exposure %Expos 
Density 0.011** 0.017* -0.017*** -0.106*** 0.003 0.009 -0.010*** -0.042** 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.004) (0.028) (0.005) (0.009) (0.004) (0.019) 
South -0.012* -0.000 0.012** 0.092*** -0.011 0.009 0.012** 0.097*** 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.005) (0.031) (0.007) (0.014) (0.006) (0.031) 
Voluntary 0.020 0.042* -0.010 0.043 0.021 0.046* -0.007 0.058 
 (0.014) (0.021) (0.012) (0.090) (0.017) (0.027) (0.014) (0.088) 
Mandatory -0.094*** -0.151*** 0.071*** 0.310*** -0.096*** -0.160*** 0.067*** 0.250*** 
 (0.011) (0.018) (0.009) (0.063) (0.013) (0.022) (0.010) (0.049) 
L.Voluntary     -0.012 -0.021 0.015 0.043 
     (0.019) (0.034) (0.014) (0.062) 
L2.Voluntary     -0.002 -0.006 0.000 -0.005 
     (0.017) (0.033) (0.013) (0.035) 
L.Mandatory     -0.011 -0.030* 0.003 -0.006 
     (0.009) (0.017) (0.007) (0.028) 
L2.Mandatory     -0.002 -0.010 0.000 -0.042* 
     (0.010) (0.017) (0.007) (0.022) 
Constant -0.039*** -0.069*** 0.043*** 0.253*** -0.017 -0.043* 0.023** 0.086* 
 (0.012) (0.025) (0.010) (0.073) (0.013) (0.025) (0.010) (0.047) 
g2 0.028* 0.043 -0.036*** -0.234*** 0.009 0.024 -0.016 -0.070 
 (0.015) (0.032) (0.012) (0.074) (0.015) (0.031) (0.011) (0.052) 
g2Density -0.010* -0.013 0.013*** 0.094*** -0.002 -0.005 0.005 0.029 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.004) (0.029) (0.005) (0.012) (0.004) (0.021) 
g2rsthbord 0.021*** 0.029* -0.016*** -0.098*** 0.019** 0.016 -0.015** -0.100*** 
 (0.007) (0.015) (0.006) (0.032) (0.008) (0.016) (0.007) (0.033) 
g2Voluntary -0.024 -0.047* 0.013 -0.031 -0.027 -0.053* 0.012 -0.045 
 (0.015) (0.024) (0.013) (0.092) (0.019) (0.029) (0.016) (0.090) 
g2Mandatory 0.053*** 0.069*** -0.050*** -0.234*** 0.056*** 0.080*** -0.047*** -0.177*** 
 (0.014) (0.023) (0.011) (0.066) (0.016) (0.026) (0.013) (0.057) 
g2LVoluntary     -0.009 -0.013 -0.007 -0.009 
     (0.020) (0.037) (0.014) (0.063) 
g2L2Voluntary     -0.005 -0.015 0.004 0.017 
     (0.018) (0.035) (0.013) (0.036) 
g2LMandatory     0.004 0.017 0.000 0.015 
     (0.011) (0.019) (0.007) (0.030) 
g2L2Mandatory     0.004 0.012 -0.005 0.028 
     (0.010) (0.018) (0.007) (0.022) 
Observations 1902 1902 1902 1902 1781 1781 1781 1781 
R-squared 0.344 0.268 0.351 0.239 0.349 0.281 0.322 0.280 
Adj R-squared 0.341 0.265 0.348 0.236 0.343 0.274 0.316 0.273 
F test 24.1*** 25.0*** 25.6*** 12.6*** 12.3*** 13.4*** 11.6*** 10.3*** 
Post Swann F 
Test 11.6*** 8.0*** 19.6*** 10.0*** 5.5*** 3.9*** 7.7*** 5.9*** 
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Curvilinear Models 
 
 
Previous models, even structural shift models, have been constricted to linear 
relationships.  The result is that statistical effects, to the extent to which nonlinear 
dynamics exist in the data generating process, will be underestimated in both the overall 
fit (e.g., R-squared) and individual coefficients.  For example, one question raised in the 
previous, structural shift linear models is why voluntary components do not manifest 
more statistically significant predictive properties both before and after Swann.  That the 
structural shift models do not reveal a larger role for court-ordered voluntary measures 
may be because there is a nonlinear relationship between their influence and segregation 
indexes.  
One way to more fully explore the influence of courts on racial integration is to 
use models that detect non- or curvilinear relationships (the idea that x amount more 
intervention does not necessarily produce x amount more integration).  As a compromise 
between the simplicity of linear models and the complexity of nonlinear models, 
curvilinear models are presented here to explore this notion.  Curvilinear models rely on 
ordinary least squares estimation, while employing both linear and nonlinear 
transformations (e.g., polynomical U-shaped curves) of the regressors.   
Some very elementary specifications suggest the appropriateness of these 
curvilinear models.  For example, when modeling the impact of intensity of court 
intervention, the specification (see 5.8.2) employing a nonlinear transformation (i.e., 
squaring the variable of interest) of intensity of court intervention (Componentssq) 
displays a higher goodness of fit (see adjusted R-square, 5.8.2) than the curvilinear model 
 Chapter 5 120    Christensen 
(see 5.8.1).  The improved fit of curvilinear modeling holds when racial integration is 
measured by the change in dissimilarity index (see 5.8.1, 5.8.2; and percent change in 
dissimilarity see 5.8.5, 5.8.6) or change in exposure index (see 5.8.3, 5.8.4; and percent 
change in exposure see 5.8.7, 5.8.8). 
These relationships are visually depicted in figures 5.1 and 5.2.  Graph 5.1 
indicates that the largest improvements in the dissimilarity index are associated with two 
components, and that judicial intervention exceeding this level (e.g., 3 and 4 components) 
offers diminishing returns.  Keeping in mind that the exposure index most generally 
displays an inverse relationship to the dissimilarity index, figure 5.2 depicts the same 
phenomenon:  court intervention is most effective when restrained to two components. 
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Table 5.8 Linear and Nonlinear Effects of Court Intervention on Segregation 
 
 5.8.1.clstr 5.8.2.clstr 5.8.3.clstr 5.8.4.clstr 5.8.5.clstr 5.8.6.clstr 5.8.7.clstr 5.8.8.clstr 
VARIABLE Dissimilarity Dissimilarity Exposure Exposure %Dissim %Dissim %Expos %Expos 
Components -0.045*** -0.095*** 0.031*** 0.073*** -0.075*** -0.170*** 0.140*** 0.369*** 
 (0.004) (0.017) (0.004) (0.014) (0.008) (0.031) (0.019) (0.071) 
Componentssq  0.021***  -0.017***  0.039***  -0.094*** 
  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.012)  (0.024) 
Constant -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.000 -0.002* -0.013*** -0.011*** 0.008 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
Observations 1902 1902 1902 1902 1902 1902 1902 1902 
R-squared 0.198 0.224 0.158 0.189 0.164 0.193 0.094 0.121 
Adj R-squared 0.197 0.223 0.157 0.188 0.164 0.192 0.094 0.120 
F test 99.8*** 60.0*** 75.8*** 45.0*** 95.2*** 64.1*** 51.8*** 29.7*** 
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Figure 5.1 Curvilinear Relationship between Intensity and Dissimilarity 
 
Figure 5.2 Curvilinear Relationship between Intensity and Exposure 
 
ComponentsDissimilarity
ComponentsDissimilarityExposure
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Not surprisingly, similar results are evident when examining the relationships between 
court intervention and percent change in dissimilarity and percent change in exposure 
indexes (see appendices 5.E and 5.F, respectively).   
Fuller models are presented below.  These models are primarily a mixture of 
modeling some control variables linearly but court behavior nonlinearly.  For example, I 
modeled region (South) nonlinearly because of its dichotomous nature.  For parsimony, I 
also did not perform nonlinear transformations on the lags of court intervention.  As in 
the models reported in Table 5.8, I did model the initial (non-lagged) intensity of 
frequency (Componentssq) nonlinearly. 
Table 5.9 reports specifications that include many of the control variables (e.g., 
region, density) discussed previously in this chapter as well as lags of court intervention.  
In each of these specifications the nonlinear transformation of intensity of court 
intervention (Componentssq) (see e.g., 5.9.2, 5.9.4, 5.9.6, 5.9.8) provided a better fit than 
the linear counterparts (see e.g., 5.9.1, 5.9.3, 5.9.5, 5.9.7), while the controls behave as in 
previous models (e.g., denser school district are slower to integrate, while southern 
districts are faster to respond to court intervention).  
Visual depictions of these full model specifications are very similar to figures 5.1 
and 5.2.  I include, below visualizations of (see Figures 5.3 and 5.4) two specifications in 
Table 5.9.2—integration measured by dissimilarity index—and 5.9.4—integration 
measured by exposure index.  The figures emphasize that even when controlling for 
region and density, intensity of court intervention has an optimal effect on race 
integration just above 2 intervention components.   
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Figure 5.3 Illustration  of Curvilinear Relationship between Intensity & 
Dissimilarity 
(see Table 5.9.2) 
Figure 5.4 Illustration of Curvilinear Relationship between Intensity & Exposure  
(see Table 5.9.4) 
ComponentsExposure
Dissimilarity Components
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One of the final questions to explore in this chapter was raised at the beginning of 
this section: whether focusing type of component—mandatory or voluntary—adds 
additional understanding to the role of courts in desegregation.  Table 5.10 presents the 
results of specifications exploring this question.  
When intensity of court intervention is unpacked into its component parts 
(voluntary and mandatory), the models exhibit much higher goodness of fit (compare, 
e.g., 5.9.2 to 5.10.2).  Within Table 5.10, when the impact of voluntary and mandatory 
components is nonlinearly transformed (Voluntarysq & Mandatorysq), those 
specifications have a slightly better goodness of fit than linear specifications (compare, 
e.g., adjusted R-squared values in 5.10.1 (.28) and 5.10.2 (.29).  This evidence of 
nonlinearity may help to explain why the relationships between voluntary court-ordered 
components and desegregation indexes were largely statistically insignificant, for 
example, in the Swann structural shift models (see Table 5.7, partial evidence that the 
impact of voluntary components was underestimated).  The linear relationships between 
mandatory court-ordered components and desegregation indexes, on the other hand, were 
statistically significant (see Table 5.7, partial evidence that mandatory intervention’s 
impact was not underestimated).   
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Table 5.9 Curvilinear Effects of Intensity of Court Intervention on Segregation 
 5.9.1.clstr 5.9.2.clstr 5.9.3.clstr 5.9.4.clstr 5.9.5.clstr 5.9.6.clstr 5.9.7.clstr 5.9.8.clstr 
VARIABLE Dissimilarity Dissimilarity Exposure Exposure %Dissim %Dissim %Expos %Expos 
Components -0.041*** -0.083*** 0.027*** 0.058*** -0.072*** -0.160*** 0.106*** 0.243*** 
 (0.004) (0.017) (0.003) (0.013) (0.008) (0.033) (0.014) (0.057) 
Componentssq  0.017**  -0.012***  0.036***  -0.055*** 
  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.013)  (0.020) 
L.Components -0.015*** -0.015*** 0.008*** 0.008*** -0.029*** -0.028*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
L2.Components -0.004* -0.003 0.001 0.001 -0.010** -0.009* -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Density 0.001 0.001 -0.006*** -0.006*** 0.005 0.004 -0.019*** -0.018*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) 
South -0.001 -0.002 0.004* 0.005** 0.013** 0.012** 0.031*** 0.033*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) 
Constant -0.006 -0.004 0.008 0.006 -0.020* -0.016 0.023 0.016 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012) (0.018) (0.019) 
Observations 1781 1781 1781 1781 1781 1781 1781 1781 
R-squared 0.220 0.239 0.175 0.195 0.188 0.211 0.151 0.171 
Adj R-squared 0.218 0.236 0.173 0.192 0.185 0.209 0.149 0.169 
F test 23.0*** 20.7*** 22.7*** 20.3*** 24.7*** 22.8*** 20.6*** 17.4*** 
VIF 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.23 
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Table 5.10 Curvilinear Effects of Mandatory and Voluntary Court Intervention on Segregation 
 5.10.1.clstr 5.10.2.clstr 5.10.3.clstr 5.10.4.clstr 5.10.5.clstr 5.10.6.clstr 5.10.7.clstr 5.10.8.clstr
VARIABLE Dissimilarity Dissimilarity Exposure Exposure %Dissim %Dissim %Expos %Expos 
Mandatory -0.070*** -0.083*** 0.045*** 0.065*** -0.123*** -0.181*** 0.171*** 0.234** 
 (0.007) (0.029) (0.006) (0.018) (0.012) (0.059) (0.028) (0.093) 
Voluntary 0.011 0.075*** -0.008 -0.045** 0.022* 0.155*** -0.012 -0.064 
 (0.007) (0.027) (0.005) (0.020) (0.013) (0.046) (0.027) (0.103) 
Voluntarysq  -0.041***  0.023**  -0.084***  0.030 
  (0.014)  (0.011)  (0.025)  (0.050) 
Mandatorysq  0.004  -0.009  0.026  -0.032 
  (0.015)  (0.009)  (0.032)  (0.046) 
LMandatory -0.014*** -0.013*** 0.009*** 0.008*** -0.027*** -0.025*** 0.023** 0.022* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) 
L2Mandatory -0.003 -0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.007 -0.008 -0.010 -0.010 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
LVoluntary -0.013** -0.014** 0.004 0.005 -0.021* -0.024* 0.020 0.022 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) 
L2Voluntary -0.005 -0.006 0.003 0.003 -0.015 -0.015 0.011 0.011 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Density 0.001 0.001 -0.006*** -0.006*** 0.004 0.004 -0.019*** -0.018** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) 
South 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.025** 0.026** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) 
Constant -0.006 -0.007 0.008* 0.008 -0.021* -0.021* 0.024 0.022 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011) (0.018) (0.019) 
Observations 1781 1781 1781 1781 1781 1781 1781 1781 
R-squared 0.282 0.291 0.224 0.231 0.241 0.254 0.183 0.185 
Adj R-squared 0.279 0.287 0.221 0.227 0.238 0.25 0.179 0.18 
F test 17.1*** 15.6*** 15.5*** 13.8*** 18.8*** 18.5*** 14.1*** 11.9*** 
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 In the linear specifications (5.10.1, 5.10.3, 5.10.5, 5.10.7), the independent 
variables of interest (voluntary and mandatory court-ordered components) yield 
somewhat conflicting results.  The coefficients for mandatory components (Mandatory) 
suggest that, whether measured by the dissimilarity or exposure indexes—or percent 
changes in those indices--mandatory components increase the rate of racial integration.  
Because of research (e.g., D. Armor & Rossell, 2002; Rossell, 1990) suggesting 
voluntary plans are generally more effective, one would expect voluntary components of 
desegregation plans—even if they included mandatory components—to be as strong or 
stronger in predicting racial integration.  The evidence presented in the linear 
specifications, however, suggests that voluntary components actually have weaker 
influence (smaller coefficients than mandatory counterparts) AND actually work against 
racial integration.   
 The curvilinear models (5.10.2, 5.10.4, 5.10.6, 5.10.8) provide some insight into 
this seeming contradiction.  I use layered, two-way graphs to provide graphical 
illustrations of several specifications in Table 5.10.  Voluntary interventions exhibit a 
parabolic correspondence with racial integration.  Figure 5.5 depicts this relationship as 
measured by changes in the dissimilarity index.  The gold/light line represents predicted 
values of voluntary intervention and the purple/dark line represents predicted values of 
mandatory court interventions.  Type of court intervention, not just general court 
intervention, seems most effective in measured doses.  For example, Figure 5.5 displays 
that more intervention is not always better:  two court-ordered voluntary components 
correspond with the same reductions in segregation that one voluntary component yields.  
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Increasing mandatory interventions, on the other hand, seems to produce more reductions 
in racial segregation (Figure 5.5, purple line).  
 
 
 
 Using the change in exposure index as a measurement of racial integration yields 
similar results.  In Figure 5.6 the predicted values of voluntary interventions are again 
represented by the gold line and mandatory interventions by a purple line.  Voluntary 
interventions are most effective alone (not paired with others) while mandatory 
interventions achieve higher exposure rates when more than one is ordered.  Similar 
patterns are evident when examining the dependant variables percent changes in the 
dissimilarity and exposure indexes (see Appendices 5.G, 5.H).  
 
Figure 5.5 Illustration of Curvilinear Relationship between Mandatory and 
Voluntary Court Intervention and Dissimilarity  
(see Table 5.10.2) 
Mandatory 
Voluntary 
Dissimilarity 
Dissimilarity 
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The significance of these models goes directly back to the role that intensity of court 
intervention plays in reducing school desegregation.  One of the research hypotheses 
guiding my inquiry is that judges who micromanage school desegregation by ordering a 
multitude of plan components do not achieve desegregation as effectively as their 
adjudicating counterparts who leave these decisions to local school administrators. The 
models I have just presented (see Tables 5.9 & 5.10) suggest that a deeper understanding 
of court influence comes in two ways.  First, we learn that court influence does not 
necessarily follow a linear relationship (i.e., some intervention is effective, so twice as 
much intervention is twice as effective).  In the case of school desegregation, court 
intervention was most effective when used moderately; too little or too much intervention 
yield diminishing policy influence.  Second, we learn that the impact of intervention 
Figure 5.6 Illustration of Curvilinear Relationship between Mandatory and 
Voluntary Court Intervention  and Exposure  
(see Table 5.10.4) 
Mandatory 
Voluntary 
Exposure 
Exposure 
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depends, in this case, on whether the intervention involved voluntary or mandatory 
components.  In other words intensity of court intervention—the sum of voluntary and 
mandatory plan components—offers additional insight when broken into its elemental 
parts.   
Returning to my research hypotheses, my analyses suggest that optimal judicial 
influence strikes the balance between mandatory and voluntary interventions.  For those 
advocates of judges as agents of political exchange, there is some evidence that too little 
intervention—particularly the ordering of mandatory components—does not encourage 
school integration.  For those advocates of judges as pure adjudicators, there is some 
evidence that too much intervention—particularly the ordering of voluntary 
components—does not induce school desegregation.  
Summary 
 
This chapter introduces statistical evidence with the ability to enlighten three 
empirical hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Judges as adjudicators have very little impact on social policy. 
 
Hypothesis 2A:  Judges taking more control of the implementation of their policy 
achieve greater impact; judicial powerbrokers have a greater impact on social 
policy. 
 
Hypothesis 2B:  Judges taking more control of the implementation of their policy 
goals achieve less impact; judicial powerbrokers achieve less impact than 
adjudicators. 
 
Implications of these results will be discussed more fully in the concluding chapter.  
However, the statistical evidence presented above answers these hypotheses, respectively, 
in the negative, positive, positive. 
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 Court interventions do manifest an impact on policy. The presence and intensity 
of court intervention account for a significant portion of the yearly improvement in racial 
integration, whether measured by the dissimilarity or exposure indexes. In other words, 
court actions manifest a positive impact on social policy over time. 
 The second and third hypotheses are antitheses of each other, yet both seem to be 
answered positively.  How is this possible?  More mandatory interventions (i.e., more 
judicial “management”) do correspond with larger annual improvements in the 
segregation indexes.  However, more voluntary intervention seems to work in the 
opposite direction.  Taken together this suggests that there is an “optimal” amount of 
judicial intervention.  While less intervention is not always warranted, more judicial 
intervention is certainly not always favorable to social outcomes.   
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Chapter 6 
 
Implications & Conclusion 
 
 
"We do not believe that the law is or should be so preoccupied with theory 
that practical consequences must be disregarded."  
 
-Judge Schwelb, Helm v. United States, 555 A.2d 465, 469 (D.C. 1989). 
 
 
In this chapter I conclude by discussing the implications of my findings—the 
“practical consequences” of the empirical theory analyses performed in earlier chapters.  
In the first two parts of this chapter I organize the discussion around each of my 
hypotheses.  I then focus on assimilating the three hypotheses in a discussion that focuses 
on the implications—both for public policy and public administration—of judicial 
intervention.  My concluding section focuses on future research to further explore these 
implications. 
The question of judicial impact shares a heritage with the doctrine of the 
separation of powers upon which this country was organized.  Scholars since the time of 
Montesquieu have grappled with the conceptual, and to a lesser extent, the empirical 
responses to this question.   
My first hypothesis focuses the question of judicial impact by examining a 
particular type of behavior: adjudication.  When judicial behavior is based on a social 
ordering underpinned by principled reasoning, what is the effect?   
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Hypothesis 1:  Judges as adjudicators have very little impact on social policy.   
 
Empirical work, particularly that which is quantitative in nature, that 
operationalizes “adjudication” in this context is scant.  Rosenberg’s (1991) widely-read 
qualitative analysis of the Supreme Court’s influence is largely responsible for the 
assertion in Hypothesis 1.  He recommends that without action from political institutions, 
we have but a hollow hope that adjudicatory behavior will influence real policy change.  
While Rosenberg’s conclusions seem to remove politically-based behavior from the 
judiciary’s autonomy, Fuller’s (1978) and Diver’s (1979) conceptions of judicial power 
allow that non-political, judicial institutions often reach beyond the adjudicative realm 
into the fray of political power brokering.  The paucity of quantitative work testing 
Diver’s continuum is understandable; most problems submitted to judges are 
“polycentric” in nature, simultaneously begging both legally-reasoned and political 
action.  The complexity of distinguishing judges’ adjudicatory and political behaviors 
challenges effective modeling.  In Chapters 2 and 3 I have developed an argument to 
distinguish these concepts and set forth the theory upon which I built my empirical 
analysis, described in Chapter 4.  
In the debate over whether judges can autonomously affect policy outcomes, I 
view whether Rosenberg’s or Diver’s approach is most warranted to be a partially 
empirical question.  I esteem the history of court involvement in school desegregation to 
be an ideal phenomenon for testing the empirical nature of this question—one that will 
ultimately guide those debating the impact of the judiciary. 
According to Diver, judicial power brokering is in direct contrast to judicial 
behavior that approximates to pure adjudication.  Pure adjudication is much more 
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concerned with base-level establishment of rights and far less concerned with the 
legislative and administrative behavior that “blue-prints” and maintains oversight of 
remedies of violated rights (see Chapter 3).   
As I discussed in Chapter 4, I seek to empirically differentiate adjudicatory and 
powerbroker behavior by controlling for the presence and intensity judicial oversight in a 
panel sample of the nation’s school districts during part of desegregation’s most 
judicially active period: 1968-1985.25 
On the question of whether adjudicators impact public policy, my quantitative 
findings contradict Rosenberg’s.  In all analyses (see Chapter 5) court involvement—
even minimal court involvement—displayed a positive relationship with patterns of 
desegregation.  Whether measured by the dissimilarity or exposure indexes, court 
intervention accounts for a statistically detectible portion of the yearly improvement in 
racial integration.  This same relationship generally held even when “lagged”; in other 
words, court involvement generally exhibited impact with more than temporary effect.  In 
addition, because I used fixed-effects-based estimation I was able to control for the more 
permanent social and political characteristics that Rosenberg suggests are wholly 
responsible for real social change (see discussion in Chapter 4).  
  Empirically engaging this hypothesis, however, only partially addresses the 
judicial impact debate.  Whether from a policy impact or policy governance perspective, 
a more fulsome understanding of judicial impact should reach beyond the dichotomous 
question of “was a court involved” and engage the question of degree, “to what extent 
was the court involved.”  In other words, if some adjudication displays a positive 
relationship with policy impact, does even more judicial activity –that reaching beyond 
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the adjudicatory into the political – yield even more desirable policy results?  From the 
governance perspective, if some managerial behavior is good, is a greater degree better?  
These questions are addressed in the next hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 2A:  Judicial powerbrokers have a greater impact on social policy than 
pure adjudicators.   
Hypothesis 2B: Alternatively, judicial powerbrokers achieve less impact than 
adjudicators.   
 
Reflecting the polarized nature of the judicial impact literature, I present these 
hypotheses as mutually exclusive statements.  As research questions, they engage the 
judicial impact debate and encompass a host of theoretical approaches.  Again, it is not 
my goal to develop or originate a particular theory of judicial impact.  Rather, my goal in 
testing the adjudicator/powerbroker continuum is to provide a larger, more 
accommodating theoretical context to the polar (incremental/rational) nature of the 
judicial impact theories (see discussion in Chapter 3) lamented by Koenig & O’Leary’s 
(1994) and Sprigg’s (1996) call to develop a theoretical argument that has some 
comprehensive explanative power and the ability to reconcile alternative hypotheses.   
Particularly with the area of institutional reform litigation that has been so central 
to the judicial impact literature, I contend that the way to provide this larger context is to 
examine the question of degree.  Consider the dichotomous nature of legitimacy theory.  
On the one hand, some judicial legitimacy theorists contend that court intervention in 
institutional reform litigation compromises their ability to influence policy because courts 
lack the political authority of purse or sword.  The opposing explanation is offered by  
Fletcher (1982, p. 637) who suggests that illegitimacy can “be overcome” when political 
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bodies “default,” leaving courts the ability to legitimately substitute their judicial 
discretion for political discretion.   
  Rather than engaging legitimacy theory by dichotomously constraining judicial 
behavior as ineffectual when resembling those powers of purse and sword, or effectual 
when political bodies are in default, my approach has been to empirically assess to 
whether a certain degree of judicial behavior (on the continuum of adjudicatory to 
powerbroker) might correspond with policy effects.  Legitimacy theory might then be 
expanded to accommodate this approach. For example, while Fletcher argues certain 
circumstances when judicial discretion might substitute for political discretion, a non-
dichotomous version of legitimacy theory might suggest that judicial discretion—as a 
substitute for political discretion—is only a legitimate substitute up to a certain threshold 
of intervention.   
To the question of degree, my analysis affirms this approach and Hypothesis 2A.  
Judicial powerbrokers – those reaching beyond adjudication by a certain degree – do 
have a positive impact on public policy.  One way to conceptualize degree is to examine 
how involved courts became in specifying the desegregation plan blueprint.  My linear 
analysis reveals that each additional court-ordered desegregation plan component 
corresponded with 3 percent improvement in the change of the dissimilarity index from 
one period to the next (see Table 5.5).  The effect of that added component of 
intervention, or additional degree of judicial intervention beyond the adjudicatory, 
continues to be felt through the next time period. 
Linear modeling does not, however, completely satisfy an attempt to provide a 
larger conceptual framework based on degrees of intervention rather than dichotomous, 
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yes/no, judicial intervention.  An extreme application of my linear results might suggest 
that courts should not only reach beyond adjudication but that they should order as many 
desegregation components as possible. If two or three judicially-mandated desegregation 
plan components are good, are five or eight or fourteen better?  My linear models do not 
illuminate whether there is an outside boundary of intervention.  
Curvilinear modeling provides support for what one might intuit – effective 
judicial behavior is bounded by degree; extreme degrees (on the adjudicative/political 
powerbroker continuum) may not correspond with positive policy impact.  The evidence 
from school desegregation suggests that when one examines the question of degree, there 
are circumstances when judicial behavior closer by degrees to adjudication may be more 
effective than judicial behavior that is closer to political power brokering.  
Linear models begin to illustrate these boundaries. These general relationships 
were visually depicted in figures 5.6 and 5.7.  These graphs indicate the largest 
improvements in desegregation indexes (exposure and dissimilarity) are achieved when 
courts specify no more than two components.  Judicial intervention that exceeds two 
components, on the other hand, offers diminishing returns.  I found similar patterns when 
modeling specific types of judicial intervention (voluntary vs. involuntary plans 
components), see tables 5.11, 5.12. 
In keeping with the larger theoretical framework I introduce in this work, these 
results introduce a relatively unique concept to the judicial impact literature.  The 
implications of judicial behavior might be better understood if modeled by degree.  In 
other words, in addition to the dichotomous approach (e.g., whether judicial behavior is 
or isn’t warranted according to cognitive dissonance or legitimacy theories), scholars 
 Chapter 6 139    Christensen 
might also explore what amount of judicial intervention is optimal given a certain context 
(e.g., school desegregation and funding, social service delivery, prison and hospital 
reform, etc.). 
 
Implications for Public Administration and Public Policy 
 
 The implications of this study are not limited to the legal studies and political 
science disciplinary literature on judicial impact.  Because the judiciary plays an 
important role in the administration of public services and regulations, this research also 
advances our thinking in public administration in several ways. 
 First, it answers Koenig and O’Leary’s (1996, pp. 19-20) call to supplement 
public administration’s knowledge of the prolific court intervention cases (e.g., Missouri 
v. Jenkins, see  O'Leary & Wise, 1991;  Wise & O'Leary, 2003) with an empirical, 
longitudinal knowledge of “normal, everyday cases that affect public administration.”  
The national, longitudinal sample of courts’ dealing with school desegregation, analyzed 
here, serves as such a supplement. 
 Second, also in answer to Koenig and O’Leary’s call, this research offers public 
administration scholars a theoretical base from which to develop propositions about 
judicial impact.  I have proposed and found some evidence that judicial intervention in 
institutional reform litigation might best be understood in terms of degree, rather than 
dichotomously.  In other words, I offer a theoretically-grounded, quantitative analysis 
supporting what we intuitively and qualitatively know: a clearer understanding of the 
“new partnership” between public administrators and judges (Bazelon, 1976) can be 
achieved by moving beyond dichotomous conventions and examining the degree of 
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judicial intervention.  This insight drives to the heart of Rosenbloom and O’Leary’s 
observation that “The courts still play the role of saying "no" or "yes" to agencies, as they 
did during the periods of opposition to and acquiescence in the administrative state, but 
now they have a supervening role as well” (1997, pp. 44-45).  In this supervening role 
Scholz (1984) asks “How can agencies be supervised in the use of appropriate techniques 
without reducing the flexibility required for handling different situations?” (p. 152).  By 
focusing on “optimal” judicial behavior, my research expounds a theoretical and 
empirical continuum in understanding judges supervening administrative affairs, for, as 
Rosemary O’Leary observes, judicial behavior falls along a continuum of intervention  
“neither entirely passive nor totally aggressive”  (1990, p. 559).   
 Third, in addition to articulating and testing a theory of judicial impact, one of my 
endeavors is to draw out implications for the field of public administration particularly in 
one of its most current, prominent (see Frederickson, 2005) intellectual pursuits: 
advancing our understanding of governance.  Lynn et al. (2001, p. 7) define governance 
as the administrative practices, legal constraints, regimes, and judicial decisions that 
enable and constrain public policies and services.  I contend that one aspect of this 
governance, judicial decision making, is an untapped area of study rich in lessons for 
those studying governance and public administration.  My research addresses the types 
and effects of judicial involvement in public management.  In understanding types of 
judicial management, the distinctions of rowing and steering are as useful and applicable 
to inquiry focused on the impact of judicial institutions in particular policy/administrative 
areas, as they are in broader governance arrangements, such as public-private contracting. 
However, in addition to importing concepts from the governance literature, my research 
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offers as an export a longitudinal study of judicial decision making behavior that parallels 
the steering (i.e., adjudication) and rowing (i.e., power brokering) concepts common in 
the governance literature.  The theoretical framework and empirical conclusions from my 
research stand to be replicated in other areas of administrative practice.  Questions that 
might be answered in this approach include:  
• Should other (non-judicial) administrative rowing and steering behaviors be 
broached, like adjudication and power brokering, on a continuum rather than 
dichotomously? 
 
• Could we understand governance better if we replaced an “either/or” 
assumption that steering or rowing is better, with empirical constructs that 
allow for an “optimal” mix of steering and rowing? 
 
 
A final implication of this research—perhaps the most relevant—concerns public 
policy. A vast debate (Boozer, Krueger, & Wolkon, 1992; Tushnet & Lezin, 1991; S. 
Wasby, 1977) has gathered in the wake of one of the United State’s most significant 
policy decisions, and one of the U.S. Supreme Court’s most famous (Balkin & 
Ackerman, 2001) judicial opinions:  Brown v. Board of Education (1954).  The debate of 
Brown’s impact cuts across boundaries of many academic disciplines to include: law 
(e.g., Ryan, 2004), education (e.g., Orfield, Eaton, & Jones, 1997), political science (e.g., 
Foreman, 2004; Rossell, Armor, & Walberg, 2002), public management (e.g., O'Leary & 
Wise, 1991), sociology (e.g., James S. Coleman, 1966), history (e.g., Kluger, 1976; 
Kluger, 2004), and economics (e.g., Clotfelter, 2004).  With each anniversary of the 
Brown decision, scholars and policy makers appear to become more and more inquisitive 
and reflective of this policy legacy.  As the year 2004 recently passed, marking the 50th 
anniversary of the departure from Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), the tenor of the 
conversation seemed especially intense. 
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Meaningful answers in this debate are particularly urgent because research (e.g., 
Clotfelter, 2004; Frankenberg & Lee, 2002; Orfield & Bachmeier, 1997; Orfield & Yun, 
1999) indicates that America is in fact resegregating.  While there is some debate on the 
extent and measurement of school resegregation (D. Armor & Rossell, 2002; Clotfelter et 
al., 2005; Logan, 2004), these trends run counter to findings that residential segregation 
has declined over the same period (Glaeser & Vigdor, 2001).  Erwin Chemerinsky 
reminds us that “public schools in the United States are more segregated today than any 
other time since 1954 and . . .  today much less is spent, on average, on a black child’s 
elementary and secondary education than on a white child’s education” (Chemerinsky, 
1999: 49).  This trend is especially troubling to those who view the No Child Left Behind 
(NCLB) policy as “structured in ways that will hurt poor students and students of color 
[because] NCLB’s sanctions for low-performing schools serve to further impoverish 
already poor schools by forcing them to divert district dollars out of the classroom and 
put them into transportation and tutoring” (Au, 2004). 
If America is indeed resegregating one might doubt the impact of the Brown 
decision.  Researchers have queried into many aspects of Brown’s legacy, delving into 
inquiries that include the following: 
• The effectiveness of magnets/voluntary programs vs. mandatory plans 
(Rossell, 1990; West, 1994). 
• The effectiveness of busing (D. J. Armor, 1972, 1989; Orfield, 1978). 
• The legitimacy of judicial taxation in desegregation policy (Wolohojian, 
1989). 
• The constitutional legitimacy of the Brown decision (Hockett, 2003) . 
• The impact of court-ordered desegregation plans on student enrollment 
(Cunningham, Husk, & Johnson, 1978). 
• The impact of court-ordered desegregation plans on residential patterns 
(Cunningham et al., 1978). 
• The impact of court-ordered desegregation plans on housing values (Vandell 
& Zerbst, 1984). 
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• The impact of court-ordered desegregation plans on achievement (Klein, 
2002). 
• The meaning of unitary status (Moore, 2002). 
• When and how  to terminate federal court intervention ( Wise & O'Leary, 
2003). 
 
While some (Parker, 2002; Wicker, 1997) argue the need to give courts more 
power and responsibility in realizing the Brown v. Board of Education mandate, to date 
there is scant research on “how” courts managed Brown desegregation for the last half-
century.  Does the adjudicative approach achieve results as satisfactory as a supervening, 
power brokering approach?   
 In this research I have revisited the policy dynamics of the Missouri v. Jenkins 
case, a case renowned for its legacy of intense judicial involvement in desegregation.  
Using a longitudinal, national sample of school districts with varying degrees of judicial 
oversight from, I have sought to contextualize the Missouri v. Jenkins case to more fully 
understand factors that led to successful/ unsuccessful desegregation.   
The relevance of such an investigation is highlighted by the recent pair of 
Bollinger (2003) Supreme Court cases.  These cases, like NCLB, renew the importance 
of racial equity in education.  If the nation decides once again to revisit the present 
incarnation of school segregation, should federal courts rise once again to pick up the 
oars?  Before such a governance arrangement can be supported, it should rest on 
empirical evidence of how courts have rowed in the past.  The Jenkins experience and its 
contextualization serve as a rich text from which to draw lessons about governance 
arrangements that rely heavily on court involvement.  My findings offer a unique 
perspective that courts should row AND steer—that the most effective judicial behavior 
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in the past was that which sought the optimal balance between adjudicative and political 
disposal of the conflict. 
Future Research 
 
This dissertation was largely inspired as an effort to quantitatively and 
longitudinally substantiate many of the qualitative lessons of the Missouri v. Jenkins case 
(e.g., O'Leary & Wise, 1991;  Wise & O'Leary, 2003).  In their work O’Leary and Wise 
qualitatively substantiate the ways a judiciary impacts public administration and public 
policy.  Their work describes the complexity of public services administered by 
managerial configurations that include judges, legislators, and public managers.  They 
conclude that “courts have been instrumental in . . . remedying discrimination [but that it] 
is time for the public management and education experts in the KCMSD [Kansas City 
Missouri School District] to take back responsibility for quality education of the 
children.” ( Wise & O'Leary, 2003, p. 189). From Wise and O’Leary’s perspective, the 
problem with transferring more responsibility from courts to public managers 
institutional reform arrangements is that there are not clear answers to questions such as 
whether continued levels of court supervision will “make the likelihood of achieving 
policy objectives better or worse” (p. 189).   
While I have quantitatively substantiated that court behavior has had significant 
impact in remedying school desegregation, I have also sought to illuminate this question 
of transferring power from the judiciary to public managers.  My analysis establishes a 
first cut at detecting the contours of when continued judicial intervention might actually 
decrease the likelihood of achieving a particular policy objective.  To convey this I offer 
empirical evidence that court behavior impacts policy in a non-linear fashion; additional 
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intervention does not necessarily lead to “more” positive policy outcomes.  By suggesting 
that there are “optimal” levels of court intervention, I offer an empirical approach that 
contemplates a balance between the adjudicatory and political methods of conflict 
resolution in institutional reform litigation. 
As we might expect, however, additional information is required.  For example, in 
the interdependent administrative configurations (i.e., triumvirates of judges, legislators, 
and administrators) how might judicial intervention influence the ability of executive and 
legislative actors to assume additional supervisory power?  Might some of that power 
naturally gravitate back towards these actors?  Ironically, I see the best exploration of 
these questions facilitated by a return to the qualitative richness that initially inspired my 
quantitative work.   
One such proposition to be tested qualitatively is articulated by Guarnieri et al. 
(2002, p. 186-87). They warn that judicial entrance into the political fray can give more 
pronounced roles to those with resources to influence the judicial arena, diminishing the 
functionality of democratically elected policy-makers.  Addressing this and related 
questions are best done in the richness of several qualitative cases.  Diver’s (1979) own 
work facilitates an extension of study of cases of intense judicial oversight.   
As a next step to the quantitative work presented here, Diver offers at least three 
propositions that spring from the adjudication/power brokering continuum. According to 
Diver (1979, p. 88) powerbroker-like judicial supervision can lead to a “pattern” of 
power shifts:  
1) “Power within the executive branch of the affected jurisdiction tends to shift 
toward the operating manager 
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2) The litigation tends to redistribute power within the institution from the custodial 
staff to professional workers 
 
3) The executive branch tends to gain significant bargaining advantages over the 
legislature as a consequence of its active involvement in the litigation.” 
 
I propose that these are hypotheses that can be examined empirically—reviewing 
the histories of several cases from my study sample that display a ranges of judicially-
driven power brokering.  Such cases might include Kansas City, MO., and Indianapolis, 
Indiana, where rich histories are available for examination (O'Leary & Wise, 1991; 
Thornbrough, 1989;  Wise & O'Leary, 2003).  Diver also encourages further exploration 
of legitimacy theory in these administrative arrangements.  The suggestion that over-
reliance on judicial politicization can lead to decreased legitimacy of the courts is also 
reinforced by Wise and O’Leary (2003). According to Diver (1979) legitimacy is 
primarily bestowed by their courts’ adjudicative functions.  Again, I view this as an 
empirical question to be examined qualitatively. 
Continuing the search for alternative dependent variables is also important to my 
qualitative agenda.  While measures of school integration are important, they are 
predecessors to more important measures of outcomes.  In Reber’s (2003, fn 1) terms, 
“ultimately, we are interested in how these plans affected educational and other outcomes 
for the minority students they were designed to help.”  To date, longitudinal, quantitative 
analysis of court impacts on school performance (minority dropout rates) can be 
accomplished only decennially (e.g., Guryan, 2004).  While gathering annual educational 
outcomes is a daunting task, a case-by-case approach is much more manageable.   
By proposing a research agenda around these qualitative questions I am not 
suggesting that quantitative approaches have been exhausted.  Among additional 
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quantitative efforts to be explored is the expansion of the time series.  I have only 
recently obtained from the Office of Civil Rights (Department of Education) the 1986 
data on race enrollments.  These data were unavailable when I began this project.  Race 
enrollments from 1986 would allow me to connect the UNICON data to corresponding 
districts that the National Center for Education Statistics began tracking in 1987.  
Extending my study from 1968 to present would allow me to track the influence of 
judicial behavior through the late 1980s and early 1990s and beyond, when courts began 
withdrawing their supervision and declaring many districts unitary.   
Conclusion 
 
 Returning to the ideal types—rational and incremental—discussed at the outset of 
this research, I reiterate the puzzle that frames my inquiry:  “to what extent social actors 
decide what their course will be, and to what extent they are compelled to follow a course 
set by forces beyond their control” (Etzioni, 1967, p. 385).  I have taken up the “search 
for a theory of how public policy should be made” (Diver, 1981, p. 393).  I have focused 
on the influence of the judiciary as a social actor.  While my aim has been descriptive, the 
implications are undeniably normative.  Proponents of the rational-type maintain that 
courts wield vast power as social actors; some (e.g., Parker, 2002; Wicker, 1997) 
maintain that courts should proactively wield that power to remedy social ills.  
Proponents of the incremental-type maintain that courts as social actors have “much less 
command over the environment” (Etzioni, 1967, p. 385); some (Rosenberg, 1991, 1998) 
even suggest that hopes of social change stemming from judicial action are hollow.   
 Perhaps it is not surprising that Etzioni, the framer of my inquiry, also provides 
the construct that accommodates my findings.  While my findings to not suggest that a 
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purely incremental-type perspective of judicial influence is warranted, neither do they 
wholly support a rational-type perspective of policy influence.  I have found that court 
behavior, even that reaching beyond the adjudicative, does result in policy change.  
However, there are limits to that reach.  My models suggest that reaching too far into the 
political fray of conflict resolution leads to diminished policy impact.  There is much 
work to be done qualitatively to understand the nuances of “optimal” judicial impact.  
However, Etzioni’s (1967) discussion of morphological factors recommend that judicial 
intervention in social change is perhaps best understood by a mixed-model that 
accommodates both incremental- and rational-type perspectives.  Even as the Supreme 
Court is poised to hear two race and education cases this term, the mixed-approach has 
the potential to offer us clearer insight as we decide how the future Brown’s legacy will 
unfold in the America.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 4.A  Fixed vs. Random Effects Models: Hausman Specification Test 
 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      2331 
Group variable (i): distident                   Number of groups   =       124 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0479                         Obs per group: min =         8 
       between = 0.1536                                        avg =      18.8 
       overall = 0.0514                                        max =        23 
 
                                                F(3,2204)          =     36.96 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0131                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 dissimilarity |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    LComponents |  -.0182765   .0018528    -9.86   0.000      -.02191   -.0146431 
   L2Components |  -.0062934   .0018288    -3.44   0.001    -.0098797   -.0027071 
   L3Components |   .0010205   .0018244     0.56   0.576    -.0025573    .0045982 
       _cons |  -.0059535   .0011295    -5.27   0.000    -.0081685   -.0037386 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |   .0087154 
     sigma_e |  .04859234 
         rho |  .03116651   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(123, 2204) =     0.56           Prob > F = 1.0000 
 
 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =      2331 
Group variable (i): distident                   Number of groups   =       124 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0479                         Obs per group: min =         8 
       between = 0.1539                                        avg =      18.8 
       overall = 0.0514                                        max =        23 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(3)       =    126.15 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 dissimilarity |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    LComponents |  -.0185037    .001783   -10.38   0.000    -.0219983   -.0150091 
   L2Components |  -.0062473   .0017624    -3.54   0.000    -.0097016    -.002793 
   L3Components |   .0010717   .0017576     0.61   0.542    -.0023732    .0045166 
       _cons |  -.0059341   .0010995    -5.40   0.000     -.008089   -.0037792 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |          0 
     sigma_e |  .04859234 
         rho |          0   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
hausman fixed random 
 
---- Coefficients ---- 
|      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
|     fixed        random       Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    LComponents |   -.0182765    -.0185037        .0002271        .0005039 
   L2Components |   -.0062934    -.0062473       -.0000461        .0004881 
   L3Components |    .0010205     .0010717       -.0000512        .0004892 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
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            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                  chi2(3) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =        0.52 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.9140 
 
 
Appendix 4.B Structural Shift Analysis: Chow Test 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1902 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,  1894) =  120.16 
       Model |  2.37106042     7  .338722918           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  5.33916518  1894  .002818989           R-squared     =  0.3075 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.3050 
       Total |  7.71022561  1901  .004055879           Root MSE      =  .05309 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 dissimilarity |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     Components |  -.0246673   .0078729    -3.13   0.002    -.0401077   -.0092268 
     Intervention |  -.0829611   .0139079    -5.97   0.000    -.1102375   -.0556847 
    South |  -.0235446   .0044545    -5.29   0.000    -.0322808   -.0148083 
          g2 |  -.0017041   .0036906    -0.46   0.644    -.0089422    .0055339 
   g2Components |  -.0002821   .0098706    -0.03   0.977    -.0196404    .0190763 
   g2Intervention |   .0790106   .0188383     4.19   0.000     .0420645    .1159567 
  g2South |   .0315894    .005353     5.90   0.000     .0210911    .0420877 
       _cons |  -.0062424   .0030036    -2.08   0.038    -.0121331   -.0003518 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
test g2 g2Components g2Intervention g2South 
 
 ( 1)  g2 = 0 
 ( 2)  g2Components = 0 
 ( 3)  g2Intervention = 0 
 ( 4)  g2South = 0 
 
       F(  4,  1894) =   57.54 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 5.A – 5.C Discussion and Analysis of White Flight 
 
In my analyses, one way that I calculate white flight is the change in logged total 
of white students in the district from time period t-1 to time period t (White Flight).  
Because the variable calculated in this way is also more sensitive to larger demographic 
movements (baby boom growth, etc.), I also calculated it as the change in the proportion 
of white students (White district /Total district) and proportion of white to nonwhite students 
(White district / Nonwhite district ).  However, because each proxy for white flight yielded 
 Appendices 165 Christensen 
similar statistical results I primarily report White Flight.  The addition of white flight, 
however, adds but marginally to the overall explanatory value of the model (see adjusted 
R-squared values 5.A.5 – 5.A.8).  Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 5, the results are 
only partially harmonious with what we might expect from theory. 
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Appendix 5.A Effects of Court Intervention and White Flight on Segregation 
 
 5.A.1 5.A.2.clstr 5.A.3 5.A.4.clstr 5.A.5.clstr 5.A.6.clstr 5.A.7.clstr 5.A.8.clstr 
VARIABLE Dissimilarity Dissimilarity Exposure Exposure Dissimilarity Exposure Dissimilarity Exposure 
Intervention -0.074*** -0.074*** 0.063*** 0.063*** -0.091*** 0.068***   
 (0.010) (0.021) (0.008) (0.017) (0.008) (0.007)   
Components -0.011** -0.011 0.002 0.002   -0.044*** 0.032*** 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.004) (0.008)   (0.004) (0.004) 
White Flight     0.055** 0.113*** 0.052* 0.115*** 
     (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) 
Constant -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.002 -0.002** -0.005*** 0.003** -0.007*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations 1902 1902 1902 1902 1902 1902 1902 1902 
R-squared 0.222 0.222 0.187 0.187 0.225 0.222 0.202 0.194 
Adj R-squared 0.221 0.221 0.186 0.186 0.224 0.221 0.201 0.193 
F test 270.3*** 60.8*** 217.8*** 45.4*** 60.5*** 48.5*** 52.2*** 44.1*** 
Mean VIF 5.81 5.81 5.81 5.81 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 
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Appendix 5.B  First Difference Estimates of the Effect of White Flight on Racial Integration  
 
 5.B.1.clstr 5.B.2.clstr 5.B.3.clstr 5.B.4.clstr 5.B.5.clstr 5.B.6.clstr 
VARIABLE Dissimilarity Exposure Dissimilarity Exposure Dissimilarity Exposure 
White Flight 0.080*** 0.094***     
 (0.029) (0.029)     
District Ratio of 
White to Total   0.023** 0.051***   
   (0.010) (0.009)   
District Ratio of 
White to Total     0.276*** 0.544*** 
     (0.070) (0.079) 
Constant -0.015*** 0.010*** -0.017*** 0.010*** -0.015*** 0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations 1902 1902 1902 1902 1902 1902 
R-squared 0.011 0.025 0.007 0.056 0.012 0.079 
Adj R-squared 0.010 0.024 0.006 0.055 0.012 0.078 
F test 7.4*** 10.6*** 5.0*** 30.3*** 15.6*** 47.0*** 
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Appendix 5.C  First Difference Estimates of the Effect of Court Behavior on White 
Attrition 
 
 5.C.1.clstr 5.C.2.clstr 5.C.3.clstr 5.C.4.clstr 5.C.5.clstr 5.C.6.clstr
VARIABLE 
White 
Flight 
White 
Flight 
District 
Ratio of 
White to 
Nonwhite 
District 
Ratio of 
White to 
Total 
District 
Ratio of 
White to 
Total 
District 
Ratio of 
White to 
Total 
Components  -0.011***  -0.015***  -0.003*** 
  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.001) 
Intervention -0.018***  -0.026**  -0.004***  
 (0.005)  (0.011)  (0.001)  
Constant -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.084*** -0.084*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations 1902 1902 1902 1902 1902 1902 
R-squared 0.005 0.007 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004 
Adj R-
squared 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.004 
F test 11.1*** 14.8*** 5.1*** 8.3*** 13.9*** 22.4*** 
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Appendix 5.D  First Difference Estimates of the Effect of School Size on Racial Integration 
 
 5.D.1 5.D.2.clstr 5.D.3 5.D.4.clstr 5.D.5 5.D.6.clstr 5.D.7 5.D.8.clstr 
VARIABLE Dissimilarity Dissimilarity Dissimilarity Dissimilarity Exposure Exposure Exposure Exposure 
Intervention -0.092*** -0.092***   0.068*** 0.068***   
 (0.004) (0.008)   (0.003) (0.007)   
Components   -0.044*** -0.044***   0.032*** 0.032*** 
   (0.002) (0.004)   (0.002) (0.004) 
White Flight 0.056*** 0.056** 0.053*** 0.053* 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.115*** 0.115*** 
 (0.016) (0.028) (0.016) (0.028) (0.012) (0.027) (0.012) (0.027) 
Enrollment 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.019) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) 
Observations 1902 1902 1902 1902 1902 1902 1902 1902 
R-squared 0.225 0.225 0.202 0.202 0.222 0.222 0.194 0.194 
Adj R-squared 0.224 0.224 0.201 0.201 0.220 0.220 0.192 0.192 
F test 183.8*** 40.6*** 160.6*** 35.0*** 180.1*** 32.8*** 151.9*** 29.9*** 
Mean VIF 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 
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Appendix 5.E  Curvilinear Relationship between Intensity and Percent Change in 
Dissimilarity 
 
 
 
Appendix 5.F  Curvilinear Relationship between Intensity and Percent Change in 
Exposure 
 
 
Dissimilarity Components% Diss milarity
% Exposure Components
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Appendix 5.G Curvilinear Relationship between Mandatory and Voluntary Court 
Intervention and Percent Change an Dissimilarity 
(see Table 5.12.6) 
 
 
Appendix 5.H Curvilinear Relationship between Mandatory and Voluntary Court 
Intervention and Percent Change in Exposure  
(see Table 5.12.6) 
 
Dissimilarity Components% Diss milarity Mandatory
Dissimilarity Components% Diss milarity V luntary
Dissimilarity Components% Exposure Mandatory
Dissimilarity Components% Exposure Voluntary
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